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The aim of this dissertation is to argue for an approach to meaning-to-structure
mapping that has a certain degree of freedom, in contrast to what is observed in
current generative research. The dissertation supports the dynamic approach to
syntax, as opposed to the cartographic approach. The object of the dissertation is
possession in the clausal domain, where the topics include predicative possession,
external possession and modal possessive constructions, among others. The
analysis is couched within the Minimalist framework and also employs findings
from typological, cognitive and historical linguistics.
Predicative possession constructions with the meaning ‘X has Y’ are the core,
simplest case of possession in the clausal domain; a lot has been written and
claimed about these constructions. This thesis focuses on the much discussed










‘I have a car.’
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the
discussion. I first identify the object of the study, speaking about the notion of
possession in general, its modes, semantic types and encoding strategies. The
mode of possession that is relevant within this thesis is the predicative one; the
adnominal mode is presented for comparison in the explanation of semantic types
of possession, but is left out of the discussion in the rest of the thesis. In the
description of the encoding strategies of possession cross-linguistically I stress the
diversity of the observed construction types. The languages of the world in
general display four types of encoding strategies: the locational possessive, the
have-possessive, the Topic possessive and the with-possessive. This typological
picture is more complex than the one currently assumed in generative research
that restricts the typology of possession to the first two strategies. After the
discussion of the typological diversity of predicative possession I return to the
pre-theoretical notion of possession and emphasize that the role of the proximity
parameter should not lead to hasty conclusions about the conceptualization
possibilities of the possession relation. Further in the chapter I describe the
predicative possession landscape in Russian that at the present stage of
development includes three construction types: the be-possessive (an instance of
the locational strategy), the have-possessive and the anticausative possessive (a
have-locational hybrid). The chapter also introduces the constructions that have
been claimed to be related to be-possessives by virtue of using the same
prepositional phrase with a general possessive meaning. These are external
possession and involuntary causer constructions, modal possessive constructions,
and constructions with world-creating u-PPs.
The second part of the chapter introduces the formal conceptual ground for the
discussion, namely the opposition of cartography and dynamicity in syntactic
theory. In dynamic syntax relations are defined in terms of the operation Merge:
the derivation proceeds on the basis of relations established in a strictly local
sisterhood configuration. The cartographic approach assumes that there is a fixed
structural goal towards which the derivation has to work. After introducing some
of the issues to which the dynamic approach has been applied (such as the notions
of c-command and subject, the mechanism of binding and agreement) I proceed to
the issue of meaning-to-structure mapping at the level of argument structure. I
claim that an analysis assuming a rigid universal argument structure for
predicative possessives cross-linguistically is not only undermined by the
typological and cognitive data discussed in the first part of the chapter, but is also
not motivated by theory-internal constructs such as the Uniformity of
Theta-Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH). I conclude the chapter by hypothesizing
that a construct such as the UTAH is not necessarily a natural minimalist
assumption and may be substituted by cognitive primitives, e.g. Event schemas.
Chapter 3 describes the main construction for expressing predicative possession in
Russian – the be-possessive. I review the semantic and structural types of this
construction and conclude that what is generally referred to as ‘the be-possessive’
is actually a collection of constructions that involve the same elements, but in a
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Chapter 1. Introduction
completely different configuration. The constructions can be divided into two
groups with regard to what type of the verb byt’ ‘be’ they use: the existential
be-possessive and the copular possessives. The construction type that has enjoyed
the most linguistic attention is the existential be-possessive which is used to
express a permanent possession relation. One of the reasons for linguistic interest
in this construction is the challenge it presents for the notion of subjecthood: the
majority of works on be-possessives agree that in contrast to what is generally
observed in a Nominative-Accusative language like Russian, the subject status in
the construction belongs to the prepositional possessor, not to the Nominative
possessum. I dedicate a separate section to the issue of subjecthood. Chapter 3 is
intended to be analysis-neutral and is supposed to supply the reader with
sufficient overview to handle the following chapters.
In Chapter 4 I review the existing generative analyses dealing with Russian
be-possessives. These are the early transformational analysis of Chvany (1975)
and the newer minimalist approaches of Harves (2003), Dyakonova (2007) and
Jung (2011). Where possible, I also comment on the authors’ proposals for the
constructions that they consider to be related to be-possessives. In the discussion
of the analyses I show that they cannot derive the diverse properties displayed by
be-possessives; the fallibilities with regard to the related constructions are
discussed in Chapter 6 and 7.
Chapter 5 presents my proposal for the structure of be-possessives. Referring to
the insights of such cognitive linguistic works as Langacker (1993) and
Cienki (1995), I assume a projection that introduces possessor arguments in the
locational possessive strategy; I term this predicate Anchor. The different
properties of the be-possessives are derived by assuming different merging
possibilities for the Anchor phrase. The Russian existential be-possessive is
constructed by the merging of AnchorP to the existential base. The copular
be-possessives also involve the AnchorP projection, but it is merged at different
points in the structure.
I dedicate a separate chapter, Chapter 6, to the Russian have-possessive. The
structural unification of all possessives is a deep-rooted assumption in current
minimalist syntax and needs to be addressed in sufficient detail. Continuing the
line of thinking laid out in Chapter 2, I argue that the have-possessive in Russian
is an instance of a transitive encoding strategy and should not be attributed the
same syntax as the be-possessive. I point out that unificatory analyses are based
on outdated typological data with regard to types of encoding strategies and
grammaticalization patterns. I thus assume a vP-structure for the
3
have-possessive; the analysis has the advantage over other analyses in being able
to derive the structure of the anticausative possessive.
Chapter 7 considers a range of constructions that make use of the prepositional
possessor form involved in the be-possessive; these are constructions involving
external possession, involuntary causation, and also modal possessive
constructions and constructions with world-creating u-PPs. Attempts to provide a
unified account for these constructions have been made in different linguistic
schools: functional, cognitive and generative. Several of the generative analyses
presented in Chapter 4 include some of these constructions into their range. I
propose that the Anchor predicate that introduces the u-PP is also employed in
these constructions and takes complements of different size.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. The Introduction may be a good place to explain
the cover photo – a metaphor of the theoretical message of this thesis. Like a
predicative possession statement that finds different structural expressions in
different languages, in this picture one notion – martial arts gloves – is represented
by three different variants: these three pairs in particular are used in karate,
taekwondo and kickboxing. Furthermore, all of these gloves are used in sparring –
a process where decisions are made on the spot, based on the moves of your
opponent; this is a reference to the local decisions in dynamic syntax. Those who
find this explanation too strained may simply regard the picture as a




This chapter introduces the basic ideas and facts we need to be aware of
throughout the thesis.
The first part of the chapter deals with the object of the study – possession in the
clausal domain. I introduce the reader into the area of possession, discussing the
general notion of possession, its modes and semantic types. In the investigation of
possession in the clausal domain it is predicative possession that stands central –
accordingly, predicative possession receives considerable attention in this thesis. I
discuss the typological diversity of predicative possession and then proceed to the
implications of this diversity for the theory of possession. When it comes to
Russian, the predicative possession landscape is dominated by the be-possessive
construction, but features also such constructions as the have-possessive and the
anticausative possessive – all of which are discussed in the course of this thesis.
Extending the view further into the clause, we find constructions that have been
claimed to be related to be-possessives due to the employment of the identical
prepositional possessor phrase. These constructions are also presented in the first
part of this chapter.
The second part of the chapter introduces the bigger frame for the thesis: the
opposition of cartography and dynamicity in syntactic theory. After discussing the
general theses of the two approaches, I focus on the issue of argument structure.
2.1 Possession
Possession is generally described as a relation between two entities: possessor and
possessum. Taylor (1989) lists the following properties that are intuitively
2.1. Possession
associated with the relation of possession:
(1) a. The possessor is a human being.
b. The possessee is a concrete item.
c. The possessor has the right to make use of the possessee.
d. Possessor and possessee are in spatial proximity.
e. Possession has no conceivable temporal limit.
The more properties are associated with a particular possessive construction, the
more ‘prototypical’ this construction is. When talking about possession, one uses
several dimensions, such as mode (predicative/attributive) and semantic type
(alienable, inalienable, etc.). Typology of possession has played an important role
in linguistic theory; I discuss various types of encoding and theoretical
consequences in a separate section.
It is generally agreed that possession can be expressed in two modes: predicative
and attributive. In the predicative mode the relation of possession constitutes the
main assertion of the sentence, as in (2-a). In attributive possession the relation
between the possessor and the possessum is presupposed, as in (2-b).
(2) a. John has a motorcycle.
b. John’s motorcycle got stolen. Stassen (2009: 26)
The predicative construction in (2-a) is the more specific one, whereas the
attributive construction is more general, as it can involve more relations than
possession per se: a phrase of the form ‘X’s Y’ in English can refer to such
relations as possession, authorship, the object of some action and other
contextually determined relations.1 Attributive possession is generally ascribed to
the sub-clausal, nominal level, but we shall see that this possession mode is also
possible in the clausal domain, involving bigger structural units – such as in the
case of external possession construction.
With regard to semantic types, Heine (1997: 34-35) singles out a range of
possessive notions that cross-linguistically ‘tend to be distinguished in some way or
other’: physical, temporary, permanent, inalienable and abstract. The possessive
notions, according to Heine, can be used both predicatively and attributively. In
(3)-(8) I give English examples for both modes of a particular semantic type.
(3) instantiates physical possession where the possessor and the possessum are
physically associated with one another at reference time:
1The range of interpretations is not completely unconstrained and context-dependent. See
Seiler (1977: 224-225) for a discussion of some interpretations that can be excluded.
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(3) a. I want to fill in this form, do you have a pen?
b. Steward, my glass is empty, can you bring me another beer? Heine
(1997: 34-37)
In temporary possession possessor can dispose of the possessum for a limited
time but cannot claim ownership to it:
(4) a. I have a car that I use to go to the office but it belongs to Judy.
b. You can’t have my car because it belongs to my wife. Heine (1997:
34-37)
In the examples in (4) the second belong-clause spells out the actual (permanent)
possession relation. The first predicative possession clause in (4-a) thus describes
a temporary possession relation. The adnominal possessor in my car also
describes a temporary possession relation, as made clear by the second clause.
Permanent possession is possession par excellence, it is ‘prototypical’ with
regard to the properties given in (1). The possessum in permanent possession is
the property of the possessor for an extended period of time, and there is no
requirement of shared location:
(5) a. Judy has a car but I use it all the time.
b. My car had an accident, I have to buy a new one. Heine (1997: 34-37)
Linguists are usually concerned with permanent possession; this applies to
typological works (e.g. Stassen 2009) and generative syntactic analyses (e.g. Jung
2011) alike.
In inalienable possession the possessum is regarded inseparable from the
possessor – it typically involves body-part or relative possessums, as illustrated in
(6), with animate possessors:
(6) a. He has blue eyes. His eyes are blue.
b. I have a sister. My sister has majored in Chinese.
Inalienable possessors can also be inanimate, with both animate and inanimate
possessums. (7-a) shows a part-whole relation, whereas (7-b) involves a relational
term:
(7) a. That tree has few branches.The branches of that tree are
deformed.




Abstract possession involves a possessum that is a concept, not visible or
tangible:
(8) a. He has no time/mercy.
b. my flu, my thoughts Heine (1997: 34-37)
Heine also mentions inanimate alienable possession, where the possessor is
inanimate and the possessum is separable from the possessor, as represented by
the English examples for predicative and attributive modes in (9-a-b):
(9) a. That tree has crows in it.
b. the chairs from this room. Heine (1997: 34-37)
In the investigation of possession in the Russian clause we will deal with both the
predicative and the attributive mode and most of these semantic types. The mode
and semantic type of a possessive construction are analytical tools that are useful
for the understanding of the data, even though not all of the combinations have
distinct characteristics.
2.1.1 Understanding possession in view of the typological diversity
The meaning ‘X has Y’ can be expressed in a variety of ways across languages.
Typological data are important for linguistic theory as they exemplify a subset of
constructions that the theory must take into consideration. In generative
linguistics typological findings have had long-reaching theoretical consequences for
the field of possession. The well-known claim in the generative tradition is that
the typology of predicative possession is restricted to two construction types (the
have-possessive and the locational possessive) – the claim was for the first time
forthrightly stated by Freeze in his 1992 article where he proceeds to reduce the
two construction types to one underlying structure. Although Freeze’s
misrepresentation of the typological picture was criticized already in Heine (1997:
215-222), the reductionist view of possession caught on in generative research and
gave rise to several types of analyses. I discuss Freeze (1992) and several analyses
of Russian possessives in Chapter 4; here I present a more adequate typological
picture of possession.
The latest comprehensive typological overview of possessive constructions is
offered in Stassen (2009), who singles out the following major types of encoding
for predicative possession:
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The last three construction types are grouped by Stassen into the
locative/existential strategy, as all of them may involve a locative/existential
predicate with the rough meaning of ‘be’, instead of the transitive predicate
employed in the have-possessive. Note, however, that in some languages this
predicate may be lacking altogether; Heine (1997:228) stresses the presence of
be-verbs in these structures as epiphenomenal to possession per se and largely
attributable to the nature of cognitive source structures.
The have-possessive receives the following definition in Stassen (2009): the
construction contains a transitive predicate, the possessor NP is constructed as
the subject/agent and the possessum NP is constructed as the direct
object/patient (Stassen 2009: 62). (11) presents examples of the have-possessive
strategy from Norwegian (Indo-European, North Germanic) in (11-a) and Abun




















‘She had some egg plants.’ Stassen (2009: 65-66)
Stassen (2009:63) states that have-verbs tend to be derived from verbs that
indicate physical control or handling, such as ‘grab’, ‘seize’, ‘take’, ‘obtain’, ‘hold’,
‘carry’, ‘rule’. In many cases the etymology of the verb is still transparent.
The locational possessive receives the following description in Stassen’s typology:
the construction contains a locative/existential predicate, the possessum NP is
constructed as the grammatical subject of the predicate and the possessor NP is
constructed in some oblique, adverbial case form (Stassen 2009: 49-50). The
locational strategy is represented by examples from Irish (Indo-European, Celtic)
















‘I have a horse’. Stassen (2009: 51-52)
The with-possessive involves a be-like verb, the possessor argument constructed as
the ‘grammatical subject’, and the oblique possessum, as is illustrated by (13-a)
for Amele (Papuan, Madang) and (13-b) for Tshiluba (Niger-Kordofanian,

















‘The chief has slaves.’ Stassen (2009: 56-57)
The Topic possessive construction contains a locative/existential predicate, the
possessum NP is constructed as the grammatical subject of the predicate and the
possessor NP is constructed as the sentence topic of the sentence (Stassen 2009:
58). The possessor argument in the Topic possessive ‘indicates the frame within
which the sentence holds’ and the construction can be literally translated as ‘(As
for) possessor, possessum is/exists’ (the notion of sentence-topichood should not
be confused with the discourse-functional concept of topic). The examples from
Mandarin (Sino-Tibetan, Sinitic) in (14-a) and Navajo (Na-Dene, Athapaskan) in
















‘Baa’ has sheep.’ Stassen (2009: 59-61)
Topic possessives are also known in the literature as ‘Double Subject Possessives’,
due to the fact that none of the arguments here is oblique (Stassen 2009: 59).
Besides the major encoding types discussed above, Stassen (2009) mentions a
number of other possessive strategies, such as: the Conjunctional possessive, the
Clausal possessive and a Topic-Locational hybrid.
Works like Heine (1997) and Stassen (2009) have shown that languages of the
world display a variety of possessive strategies, beyond the popular have-locational
10
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dichotomy a` la Freeze (1992). The inclusion of the with-possessive and the Topic
possessive into the range of major encoding strategies certainly complicates the
overall typological picture and presents a challenge for Freeze-inspired analyses:
the enterprise of deriving all construction types from one underlying structure now
becomes more non-economical. Chapter 6 discusses in more detail the significance
of the new typological findings for the current analyses of possession.
Heine (1997) ascribes the diversity of predicative possessives to the multiplicity of
templates that may serve as a cognitive source for the linguistic expression of
possession. Event schemas are cognitive concepts that are ‘based on the
stereotypic description of recurrent experiences’ (Heine 1997: 45). Heine singles
out eight event schemas that serve as cognitive templates for most predicative
possession constructions cross-linguistically, (15) represents a formulaic description
of schemas used for the expression of predicative possession, (Heine 1997: 47):
(15) a. Action: X takes Y
b. Location: Y is located at X
c. Companion: X is with Y
d. Genitive: X’s Y exists
e. Goal: Y exists for/to X
f. Topic: As for X, Y exists
g. Equation: Y is X’s (property)
Possession is an abstract concept, according to Heine, and to describe this
abstract concept, expressions from more concrete domains are employed. ‘A car
that belongs to me may be described as one that is regularly found to be located
close to me (Location), that I drive (Action), that I am accompanied by
(Companion), or that is there for me (Goal)’ (Heine 1997: 76). Possessive
constructions are derived from the expressions in (15) through the process of
grammaticalization whose driving force is context extension.
Heine’s generous list of source templates contrasts sharply with the localist
analyses of possession. A popular direction in various linguistic schools has been
the reduction of possession to location – the tradition to interpret ‘possessor’ as a
metaphorical extension of location includes such scholars as Benveniste (1960),
Lyons (1967), Clark (1978), Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev (1983), Freeze (1992),
Borschev and Partee (1998). The generative tradition is heavily influenced by this
localist line of thinking: one can find analyses that construct possessors as
external arguments in the base syntactic representation and still assume that on
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the cognitive level a possessor is a type of location.2 However, in view of the
typological findings discussed above, this line of thinking is compromised.
Location is one of the properties that is included in the pre-theoretical notion of
possession given in (1), and it remains an important component in theories that
choose to represent possession as a composite notion, involving the additional
component – control. Stassen (2009) refers to Evans (1995) for a formulation of
the role of control in possessive constructions:
(16) ‘X [the possessor] can expect Y [the possessee] to be in the same place as
X when X wants, and X can do with Y what X wants.’ Evans (1995, 146)
The control component is responsible for the fact that the relation between the
possessor and the possessum is asymmetric, i.e. that the possessor is the more
prominent element than the possessum. According to Stassen (2009, 14), the
notion of control has been developed in functional/typological analyses touching
upon such phenomena as agency, transitivity, ergativity, voice systems and
causativity. The cognitive notion of control should not be confused with the
generative linguistic term describing interclausal dependencies; in order to avoid
confusion, I refer to the cognitive notion of control as c-control in this thesis.
The composite understanding of the notion of possession is supported by a range
of authors: Seiler (1973, 1983), Hage`ge (1993), Heine (1997), Baron and Herslund
(2001), Stassen (2009). Building on previous typological research and his own
findings, Stassen proposes the following definition of a possessive relation:
(17) A prototypical case of possession is characterized by the presence of two
entities (the possessor and the possessee) such that
a. the possessor and the possessee are in some relatively enduring
locational relation, and
b. the possessor exerts control over the possessee (and is therefore
typically human). Stassen (2009, 15)
Stassen (2009, 14-15) points out that if control is accepted as one of the semantic
parameters defining the notion of possession, it is no longer necessary ‘to view the
human or humanized status of the possessor as a defining factor in the possessive
relation’. Rather, the frequently human status of possessors follows from their
control-exerting role. The presence of the second parameter in the notion of
possession gives more flexibility to an analysis that aims to give an appropriate
2Cf. B laszczak (2007b).
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account of the data: different degree of prominence of the two parameters would
yield different strategies of encoding possession. Thus, for instance, in the
locational possessive the proximity parameter would have the most prominence,
whereas in the have-possessive the special status would be given to the control
parameter.
I propose to reconcile the localist tradition with Heine’s theory of event schemas.
Namely, the role of the location component for the concept of possession is not to
provide the only possible conceptualization frame, as assumed in the localist
tradition, but to determine the choice of the event schemas that may serve as
cognitive templates for possession. The common feature for all (or most) of the
event schemas in (15) is the achievement of proximity. The Location schema is the
direct reflection of the proximity requirement and does not need to be commented
on. In the Action schema where the possessor is construed as the agent, proximity
is required for a direct action to be possible; this is reflected by the tendency of
the transitive sources for have-predicates to have the general semantics of ‘grab,
seize, hold ’ – predicates that require direct contact, as opposed to predicates like
shoot or see.3 For with-possessives, the proximity effect is achieved by construing
the two arguments as companions.4
Thus, inclusion of the proximity parameter into the cognitive notion of possession
is not in conflict with the diverse typology of these constructions – this parameter
may be the criterion by which the various cognitive templates are chosen for the
expression of possession. In addition, in some conceptualizations the parameter of
c-control may have greater prominence than the parameter of proximity.
2.1.2 Predicative possession in Russian
Russian is the language of investigation in this thesis. The main means of
expressing predicative possession in Russian is the be-possessive that belongs to









3This understanding of possession does not rule out cases where non-contact verbs may be the
transitive source for a have-verb. Such cases are indeed found, e.g. in Ewe (Kwa, Niger-Congo)
where the verb meaning ‘see’ is employed to express ‘have’ and ‘find’ (Heine 1997: 43). My guess is
that languages are flexible with regard to the expanse of the area they conceptualize as proximal.
4It should be mentioned that such use of the proximity component is not part of Heine’s
(1992) analysis: the author states that the various event schemas exhibit contrasting conceptual
properties, in particular, ‘notions such as action and location do not seem to have any salient
properties in common’ (Heine 1997: 74).
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‘I have a car.’
The possessor argument in (18) is expressed by the prepositional phrase consisting
of the preposition u and a Genitive noun phrase. The possessum argument takes
the form of a Nominative noun phrase; the construction makes use of the verb byt’
‘be’. Be-sentences are overall a widely used structural frame in Russian: according
to Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev (1983: 6), they are nearly the most popular sentence
type in the language, with a big system of variants and a huge semantic potential.
The properties of the be-possessive are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 where I
show that there are, in fact, several construction types that are disguised under
this name.
According to Heine (1997) and Stassen (2009), employment of several possessive
strategies is a common phenomenon cross-linguistically, and Russian is no








‘I have a car.’
The have-possessive employs the verb imet’ ‘have’, a Nominative possessor and an
Accusative possessum. The have-possessive is a minor strategy in Russian,
dispreferred in a range of semantic contexts; it is, however, favored in non-finite
syntactic environments – mainly due to the Nominative form of the possessor.
Furthermore, there is a predicative possession construction in Russian that makes
use of the reflexive form of imet’ ‘have’ and the u-possessor. Following









‘I have a car.’
The anticausative possessive is more restricted syntactically in comparison to the
have-possessive – this is partially due to the formal characteristics of the
prominent argument, the possessor. In addition, the predicative possessive use of
the construction may be a recent development.
An analysis of the predicative possession field in Russian should be able to include
the three current possessive constructions. My discussion of these constructions is
spread over several chapters: in Chapter 3 I present be-possessives and other
constructions that have been classified as such, Chapter 4 discusses existing
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analyses of be-possessives and in Chapter 5 I offer my own analysis of these
constructions, the have-possessives are discussed separately in Chapter 6.
The be-possessive and the have-possessive are Modern Russian’s heritage from at
least as far back as Proto-Slavic, according to McAnallen (2011). Observe the






























‘if a man have a hundred sheep’ McAnallen (2011: 156)
McAnallen observes that the Old Church Slavic data disprove assumptions of such
scholars as Veenker (1967) that the be-possessive developed in Russian or East
Slavic: this predicative possession strategy was used in Old Czech, Old Serbian
and Croatian and Middle Bulgarian. Meanwhile, Russian is the only modern
Slavic language that retained the be-possessive. The have-possessive had a more
widespread use in early East Slavic texts, but gradually lost its ground to the
be-possessive; McAnallen (to app.) proposes that this has been conditioned by
language contact, and namely by the influence of the Balto-Finnic substratum.
In addition to the two possessive constructions in (21), Old Church Slavic also
displays examples of the Dative possessive (a subtype of the locational strategy,













‘if a man have a hundred sheep. . . ’ McAnallen (2011: 156)
No Slavic language has preserved the Dative possessive as the major predicative
possession strategy nowadays; Russian has retained some traces of the
construction. In particular, Chvany (1975: 110) classifies (23-a) as a subtype of
possessive sentences in Russian and includes it into the range of constructions to






























‘He doesn’t care about other people.’
If constructions in (23) have any possessive meaning whatsoever, it may only be
counted as idiomatic. In contrast to what is observed in the Old Church Slavic















‘He doesn’t have a car.’
I do not include the Dative construction into the field of predicative possessives in
Russian and do not present an account for it in my analysis.
2.1.3 Related constructions
When constructing an analysis for one phenomenon, one should be aware of its
possible implications for other parts of grammar. Apart from predicative
possessives I also discuss constructions that have been claimed to be related to
be-possessives due to the employment of a possessive-like u-PP. These





































‘The strong one always holds the weak one as guilty.’ Mra´zek and
Brym (1962, 101), cited from Cienki (1995)
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‘Masˇa has something to read.’ Livitz (to appear: 1)
Mra´zek and Brym (1962: 101) define the general meaning of the preposition u as
expressing a “relation of a very close participation of something in something”.
Rephrasing Mra´zek and Brym, Isacˇenko (1974: 46) refers to this general meaning
as “a relation of concern or implication”. A unified analysis for the first three
constructions in (25) is proposed in the cognitive analysis of Cienki (1995): the
u-PP serves as a reference point, in the sense of Langacker (1993). Also
Iordanskaja and Mel’cˇuk (1995: 168) state that in all of the constructions with the
possessive u-PP the possessum expresses an entity included into the personal
sphere of the possessor, and in all of these constructions the possessor has a
special salience.
Some of these constructions surface in the generative analyses of predicative
possession in Russian. For instance, Dyakonova (2007) suggests that locative
constructions in (25-a) provide a base structure for all three of the Modern
Russian predicative possessives. Jung (2011) extends her PP structure to modal
possessive constructions in (25-d). In this thesis I in some way or another include
all of the constructions in (25) into my analysis.
2.2 The dynamic approach to syntax
This section describes the dynamic approach to syntax as opposed to the
cartographic approach that currently prevails in the Minimalist framework.
Cartography is a research program aiming at drawing maps of syntactic
configurations. It originated in the Principles and Parameters framework:
Shlonsky (2010: 419) ascribes the laying of the foundation of cartographic research
to Pollock (1989) who argued for a splitting of the Infl head. According to
Shlonsky, this spawned endeavors ‘to discover new functional heads and study
their hierarchical organization’. Rizzi (1997) is the first explicitly cartographic
study of the left periphery of the clause – the complementizer space. On an
extreme cartographic approach, the full hierarchy of projections is present in every
clause, with some of the projections inactive; as observed in Rizzi (2011),
significant global complexity is the price the theory has to pay to achieve the
simplicity of structure-building. Current minimalist practice, though mostly
making use of abbreviated representations, subscribes to the cartographic
approach to syntax.
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The dynamic syntax approach envisions syntactic relations as a product of local
environments, the most local being the sisterhood configuration created by the
structure-building operation Merge. According to Zwart (2007), the dynamic
syntax approach is more in the spirit of the Minimalist Program than the widely
practiced cartographic vision of syntax: relations defined over local environments
with no global considerations lead to a more economical model of language.
One of the early dynamic syntax works is Epstein (1995) who defines syntactic
relations as a property of Merge (concatenation). The c-command relation is
assumed to be a primitive derivational construct and is established between two
phrases automatically as soon as Merge turns them into sisters; Epstein proposes
the following definition of c-command:
(26) X c-commands all and only the terms of the category Y with which X was
paired by Merge or by Move in the course of the derivation.
Epstein (1995: 17)
The definition in (26) captures the asymmetry in syntactic structures: a phrase
does not c-command its ‘aunt’ (the sister of its ‘mother’ phrase) because these two
phrases have never been merged together. As a derivational construct, c-command
does not need a representational definition – this circumstance, according to
Epstein, eliminates massive redundancy from the theory of grammar.
The dynamic syntax approach becomes more relevant in the light of Hauser et al.
(2002) who claim that the human language is uniquely defined by the capacity of
recursion. Ideally, syntactic operations must be defined by the local properties of
Merge, and not driven by global considerations. Zwart (2006, 2007, 2009)
emphasizes the role of the sisterhood configuration in the analysis of such
linguistic phenomena as syntactic position, word order, agreement, case, binding –
all of these phenomena are attributed to the dependency relation that is
automatically created between two sister phrases at the point of Merge.
Zwart (2007) discusses the notion of syntactic position, a very cartographic notion
as suggested by its name. In cartography, an element moving to the left periphery,
moves to a fixed position: topic movement targets SpecTopP, focus movement –
SpecFocP, and so on. Zwart (2007) bases his critique of the cartographic approach
on word order transitivity failures, among other things. For instance, with regard
to the left periperhy of the clause, Van Craenenbroeck (2006) observes that the
distribution of Topic elements in Venetian violates Rizzi’s (1997) ordering of
functional projections; Van Craenenbroeck proposes that Topic elements cannot
remain inside a focus-marked domain and thus must be externalized – a
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consequence of this analysis is that elements in the Venetian left periphery do not
have a fixed site, which means that the cartographic approach cannot be
maintained in view of the Venetian data. In dynamic syntax a syntactic position
is created due to a need of the local structural environment: movement (re-merge)
of a topic element results from the need of the comment domain to externalise an
offending topic-marked element, a wh-element is externalized from a
‘ground’-domain.
The subject requirement also receives a novel interpretation in dynamic syntax:
the need of a verbal event for a centering element motivates the merging of a
subject, which yields a proposition – a centered event. A verbal event, according
to Zwart (2007: 68), is a lexical domain with tense/aspect features that anchor the
event in time – hence the cross-linguistic association of subjects with the Tense
projection (SpecTP). In this context the Extended Projection Principle (EPP)
can be understood as a requirement for an event to be centered. Note that in the
cartographic approach the EPP remains an unexplained feature stipulated on T
(Chomsky 2001). (26) thus presents a derivational interpretation of the notion
‘subject’ and gives meaning to the EPP.
Furthermore, Zwart (2006b) offers an interesting analysis of subject-predicate
agreement which is interpreted as a morphological realization of a more contentful
dependency relation between two sister phrases: the subject phrase and its sister
phrase containing the predicate. As represented in (27-b), the subject marks the
predicate YP as its dependent upon merge – the dependency is then
morphologically expressed on one of the predicate’s constituents:
(27) a. She work-s at the hospital.
b. XP
subject YP
. . . verb . . .
. . . φ . . .
(27) illustrates a case of subject-verb agreement, but subject agreement can be
realized also on other constituents of the predicate phrase, not only on verbs. For
example, Swahili displays multiple target agreement where several members of the
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Zwart (2006) analyzes this pattern as multiple spell-out of the dependency
between the subject and its sister phrase, as illustrated in (28-b). Multiple target
agreement of the Swahili type is problematic for the recent generative agreement
models, such as spec-head and Agree. In the Agree model the agreeing elements in
(28) would have to be somehow associated with T to be able to host agreement
markers, or there would have to be more functional heads associated with the
agreeing elements and carrying uninterpretable φ-features. It is not clear how the
spec-head analysis would deal with the data: either the agreeing elements would
have to adjoin to AgrS , or multiple copies of Agr would have to affix-hop onto the
agreeing elements.
Another interesting agreement pattern is presented by Coahuilteco where subject
agreement is spelled out on the object, which is expected to be possible in Zwart


































‘(that) you will carry my soul to heaven.’ Zwart (2006b)
In (29-a) and (29-b) the demonstrative tupo.- of the object dios ‘god’ agrees with
the subject which is expressed by a clitic on the verb. As shown in (29-c), the
agreement can be expressed more than once, on different nouns, which suggests
that the markers are not simply subject pronominals cliticizing to the preceding
phrase. Agreement on the object is expected in Zwart’s analysis because an object
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is part of the predicate phrase. In the dependency analysis of agreement spell-out
of the subject’s φ-features is a possibility freely presented by the structure, the
reason why the Coahuilteco pattern does not occur more often cross-linguistically
may be due to the different settings languages have on the choice of terms that
can spell out agreement. Zwart hypothesizes that an element most suitable to be
a host of alien φ-features would be one that does not own any φ-features of its
own: that is why verbs would be more frequent φ-hosts than objects.
The dynamic syntax approach has covered a wide range of linguistic phenomena
since the 1990’s. My objective in this work is to provide an analysis of the
possession data that is compatible with the dynamic syntax approach and at the
same time fares better than the existing cartographic analyses in accounting for
the data.
2.2.1 The relation between structure and meaning
Meaning-to-structure mapping is a prominent topic in this thesis: I am primarily
concerned with the argument structure of be-possessives and the (presumably)
related constructions.
The realization of semantic relations has been a topic where the cartographic
approach has been most influential, due to the general assumption that argument
structure is universal. This concerns, in particular, the Uniformity of
Theta-Assignment Hypothesis that maps a conceptual representation of an event
onto a syntactic representation:
(30) The Uniformity of Theta-Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH)
Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by
identical structural relationships between those items at the level of
D-structure. Baker (1988: 46)
According to (30), the tight concept-to-syntax mapping is universal and thus
considerably constrains the grammar; surface differences are attributed to
non-trivial syntactic derivations or different conceptualizations of an event. Baker
(1997) notes that the ‘identical’ part of the UTAH may be too strong and should
be understood as ‘equivalent’. An example is presented by the positions of the
agent role in the active and in the passive that are equivalent in the sense that
they are both external to the VP: the specifier of IP in active sentences and the
head of I containing the morpheme -en in passive sentences (Baker 1997: 74).
Note that with the VP-internal subject hypothesis this example is no longer
relevant and one can go back to the strict interpretation of ‘identical’ in (30).
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The UTAH prompted a hoard of analyses that aspire to provide one underlying
argument structure for a variety of constructions in the languages of the world.
The possessive research is an instantiation of this phenomenon, as the reader will
witness in Chapter 4: a tacit (and sometimes explicit) assumption is made that
inasmuch as there is such a thematic role as Possessor, it should be projected in
the same syntactic position cross-linguistically, irrespective of the encoding
strategy.
A dedicated follower of the UTAH should remember, however, that the hypothesis
was stated only for the ‘core’ thematic roles such as agent/causer, patient/theme,
path/location and was lax about oblique arguments: their thematic roles are
expressed directly by adpositions and case markers. Baker (1997) also allows the
possibility that various PPs differ in their syntactic positions. Furthermore, the
UTAH allows for different conceptualizations of an event, as evident from the
experiencer-debate presented in Baker (1997). The debate concerns English
psych-verbs such as fear and frighten:
(31) a. Peter fears dogs.
b. John likes long novels.
c. Mary worries about the ozone layer.
(32) a. Dogs frighten Peter.
b. Long novels please John.
c. The ozone layer worries Mary.
The examples in (31) and (32) seem to refute the UTAH, as the two thematic
roles – Experiencer and Theme – are projected differently: with fear -verbs the
Experiencer is the external argument, and with frighten-verbs it is the Theme. A
range of scholars, such as Belletti and Rizzi (1988), have attempted to posit one
order as the basic one and derive the second from it. Baker (1997) proposes that
the correct treatment is provided by Pesetsky (1987, 1995) and Dowty (1991):
namely, the roles observed in (31) and (32) are the same, but are distributed
differently. In (31) the experiencer argument is a sentient being and is therefore
more like a canonical agent – it is thus mapped into an external argument
position. In (32), although the experiencer role is also involved, the other
argument (e.g. dogs) is more agent-like in that it causes an emotion (and is not
necessarily the target of this emotion).5 Baker’s conclusion is thus that the
projection of the Agent and Theme roles happens in the same way in (31) and
5Examples in (32) are also different from (31) in that the former involve a meaning of inchoa-
tivity.
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(32)– the differences are due to different conceptualizations of the events.
So there seems to be room in the UTAH for different conceptualizations of an
event, when it comes to such non-macro-roles as experiencers. It is then
conspicuous that Possessors are not granted the same conceptualization freedom
in generative research, even though the idea has been proposed elsewhere. Earlier
in the chapter I introduced Heine’s (1997) concept of event schemas that present
different conceptualization possibilities for the relation of possession. The
transitive have-strategy, for instance, stems from an Action schema where the
possessor argument is conceptualized as an agent. In the Location schema the
possessor is conceptualized as the location, and in the with-possessive the
possessum is conceptualized as a companion. The UTAH will apply within a given
conceptual frame.6
In view of Heine’s cognitive and typological observations and Baker’s own solution
for the problem of experiencers, a cartographic analysis can posit different
underlying structures for different possessive constructions and keep the UTAH
intact.
In the dynamic syntax approach a construct such as the UTAH is not a natural
addition to the theory if it is interpreted as requiring a universal map of structural
positions in which arguments are introduced cross-linguistically.7 However, once
one allows for a certain freedom in conceptualization possibilities as described
above, the UTAH becomes a more dynamic concept; a further necessary condition
is strict locality. The locality of θ-assignment is already assumed in current
Minimalism, as each θ-role is introduced by its own predicate: an agent argument
is projected together with an agentive v, a goal argument is introduced by an
applicative head, various adpositions serve as predicates introducing the necessary
θ-roles. As long as an ‘identical’ position in (30) is understood to be the local
environment of an identical predicate, no additional adjustments are necessary to
include the predictions of the UTAH into dynamic syntax. The attested hierarchy
of thematic roles is yielded automatically by the few ways in which various
predicates can be merged: e.g. the restrictions on combinatory possibilities of an
6It is thinkable that not only possessors may be introduced by different predicates in differ-
ent conceptual frames – Agents may also do so: this may be the difference between Agents in
Nominative-Accusative and Ergative-Absolutive languages.
7One of the early dynamic approaches to thematic structure is represented by
Hale and Keyser (1993) who try to derive the basic thematic relations from the two structural
relations: specifier and complement. Hale and Keyser propose four structural types of lexical ar-
gument structure that have differing specifications about whether they can take a specifier and/or
a complement; the derivation of argument structure proceeds according to the principles of Bare
Phrase Structure (Chomsky 1995).
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agentive v and V would yield the order Agent > Theme. In Chapter 5 I propose
an analysis of be-possessives where the possessor role is assigned by a predicate
responsible for possessor semantics. I claim that there is no fixed point in the
derivation where this predicate is merged – the predicate can be merged at a
variety of points; I demonstrate the various merging possibilities in the range of
be-possessives in Russian, as well as other constructions that employ prepositional
possessors. The notion of ‘possessum’ is thus determined dynamically – it is the
sister phrase of the possessor predicate.
So far in this section we have considered two approaches to the
meaning-to-structure mapping both of which referred to the UTAH. First, I
discussed the traditional approach and pointed out that it makes room for
different conceptualization possibilities. Furthermore, there is a more dynamic,
strictly local interpretation of the UTAH that defines identity of positions over
role-assigning predicates. In this thesis I subscribe to the latter approach. There
is also a third possibility that I would like to discuss here.
A construct like the UTAH is namely not indispensable – the same work can
presumably be done by cognitive primitives, such as the already mentioned Event
schemas of Heine (1997): ‘a set of structural templates that are available to
human beings for the expression of more abstract concepts’ (Heine 1997: 224).
Event schemas refer to basic situations, such as what one does, where one is, who
one is accompanied by, what exists, etc. (Heine 1997: 45). It seems that event
schemas can provide an interpretation for a syntactic structure and as cognitive
primitives they are preferable with regard to the economy of the system than an
independently stated principle of grammar.
Event schemas may also be sufficient where Baker (1997) means the UTAH has no
theoretical contestants – the syntax of one-place predicates. The context for this
claim is the comparison of two versions of the UTAH: the absolute version of
Baker (1988) that refers to exact syntactic positions, and the relativized version of
Larson (1988) that only refers to the relative hierarchy of two arguments.8 Baker
states that while both versions of the UTAH make largely similar predictions, the
absolute version fares better with regard to unaccusatives and unergatives.
8The relativized version of the UTAH in (i-a) is not a formal syntactic principle, but rather
follows the Thematic Hierarchy of Carrier-Duncan (1985) in (i-b):
(i) a. Identical thematic relationships are represented by identical relative hierarchical re-
lations between items at D-Structure.
b. Agent > Theme > Goal > Obliques (manner, location, time)
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Because the Relativized version of the UTAH operates on oppositions of two
arguments, it presumably does not care about one-place predicates, and can
wrongly allow the generation of an agent argument as the direct complement to
the verb. The absolute UTAH, on the other hand, imposes an exact syntactic
position on the sole argument and can thus derive the syntactic behavior of
one-place predicates – this means that the theory needs a principle that operates
with exact syntactic positions.
I suggest that a cognitive primitive such as an Event schema can do the job of the
UTAH with regard to the projection of arguments of one-place predicates. An
Event schema determines whether an entity carries out or undergoes an event, and
this can determine the dependency relation between a predicate and an argument.
When an entity undergoes an event, the predicate takes the entity as its
dependent, as in (33):
(33) a. The river froze.
b.
Predicate DP
When an entity carries out an action, it has a more prominent status and takes
the predicate as the dependent, as in (34):
(34) a. John laughed.
b.
DP Predicate
If it can be shown that the job of the UTAH can be done by a cognitive primitive,
we will be one step closer to a system without unnecessary assumptions. A
derivation can proceed in a relatively unconstrained manner, restricted only by
the properties of Merge and the requirements of the local configuration – the
grammaticality status of the result can be determined by independent cognitive
primitives. It is not necessary to assume that cognitive primitives directly
participate in derivations – instead, they can be given the status of conditions
that the language faculty is designed to satisfy in some optimal way, as e.g.
proposed in Frampton and Gutmann (2002).9
2.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter I prepare the ground for the upcoming discussion. The chapter
demarcates the empirical area that I deal with in this thesis: predicative




possessives and related constructions in Russian. Before an appropriate syntactic
analysis can be proposed, a profound understanding of the notion of possession is
necessary. I discuss various dimensions in which the notion of possession can be
dissected, such as modes, semantic types and encoding strategies. The discussion
of the typology of predicative possession is an important contribution of this
chapter; generative linguistics must internalize the typological findings on the true
diversity of predicative possessives. Furthermore, I emphasize that although
proximity is perhaps a universal component of the cognitive notion of possession
this does not mean that location should be directly involved in the construal of
possessive expressions – proximity can be achieved by other event types.
The formal conceptual part of this chapter consists in the presentation of the
dynamic approach to syntax, as opposed to the predominant cartographic view. I
point out that although the universality of argument structure is taken for granted
in the cartographic research program, there is no theory-internal motivation for
this state of affairs. The UTAH, in particular, allows a certain degree of variation
in syntactic structures attributed to different conceptualizations – a circumstance
that often seems to be overlooked in generative research. The dynamic approach
to meaning-to-structure mapping allows for a UTAH-like principle only if
conceptualization flexibility is combined with the strict locality of θ-role
assignment; in the following chapters I construct an analysis of possession in the




This chapter is dedicated to the main means of expressing predicative possession
in Russian – the be-possessive. The chapter is to a large degree descriptive and is
written for the reader’s orientation in the field of be-possessives: main
construction types, basic properties and related theoretical issues. My
presentation of the data is undoubtedly influenced to some extent by the analysis
I develop, but I do attempt to remain as analysis-neutral as possible. In the first
part of the chapter I discuss the term ‘be-possessive’ and the range of
constructions it encompasses. The be-possessives are presented with regard to two
dimensions: structural frame and semantic type. The second part of the chapter is
concerned with two topics that have been prominent in the discussion of the
existential be-possessive: Genitive of Negation and subjecthood. It should become
clear from this chapter that the range of be-possessive constructions in Russian is
diverse and a proper analysis should have room for this diversity.
3.1 The basic properties
The descriptive term ‘be-possessive’ refers to a construction that involves three
basic ingredients: the verb byt’ ‘be’, a prepositional u-phrase (possessor), and a
Nominative DP (possessum). As will be illustrated shortly the term in fact refers
to a variety of constructions with different semantic and structural specifications.
In this thesis I assume that in order for a construction to qualify for the
descriptive title of ‘be-possessive’, a possession relation must take place between
the u-PP and the Nominative noun phrase. (1) presents some examples:





























‘Kolya had thick hair.’
In (1-a) the relation of possession is asserted, the sentence is an instance of
permanent possession. In (1-b) the referent of the u-PP is a temporary possessor
of the Nominative vasˇe pis’mo ‘your letter’. In (1-c) Kolya is the inalienable
possessor of volosy ‘hair’. The possession relation requirement should be used to























‘Margarita at this time was already by the door of flat nr 50.’ M.









‘Kolya was at his sister’s place.’ Jung (2008: 116)
The sentences in (2) involve a Nominative noun phrase, the verb byt’ ‘be’ and an
u-PP; there is, however, no possessive relation between the noun phrases and the
u-PPs. The sentences are locative: the referent of the Nominative DP is situated
at a location designated by the u-PP, directly or indirectly. The u-PP in (2-a) is
unambiguously locative and is translated as ‘near the door’ – the sentence can be
unproblematically set aside as a non-possessive construction. (2-b), on the other
hand, represents constructions that the reader should be wary of: e.g.
Kondrashova (1996) categorizes examples like (2-b) as locative-possessive (on a
par with temporary possessive sentences as in (1-b)). However, though the u-PP
here is possessive, the possessum is not Kolya, but rather the unexpressed
location, ‘sister’s place’; the u-PP u sestry ‘at sister’s’ as a whole refers to a
location and the relation between the Nominative DP Kolya and the u-PP is that
of location.1 An analysis of be-possessives may or may not include the examples in
1Cf. Chvany (1975) who analyzes the u-PP in (2-b) as a modifier of a silent adverbial.
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(2) into the core of constructions to be accounted for – it is still important to be
aware of the differences. Note that although the preposition u has a locative
meaning as clearly demonstrated in (2-a), with human-denoting complements the







‘Kolya has the ball (at the moment).’, *‘The ball is near Kolya.’
The configuration in (3) favors a locative interpretation, however, the sentence
does not mean that the ball is situated in the proximity of Kolya, but rather that
the ball is in Kolya’s temporary possession during a game or at Kolya’s place.
The closest an u-PP containing a human DP comes to a locative interpretation is
the meaning in (2-b).
When it comes to the formal characteristics, the be-possessives can be roughly
divided into two groups: existential and copular. In the existential be-possessive
the relation of possession constitutes the main assertion of the clause, such that
the possessum is unpresupposed. In copular be-possessives the possession relation
is presupposed. The two main differences between the existential and the copular
frame are the form of the verb byt’ ‘be’ in the present tense and the case of the
possessum under negation.
In the existential be-possessive the verb byt’ ‘be’ is spelled out as jest’ in the
affirmative present-tense sentences, as shown in (4-a). Under negation the case of
the possessum in existential possessives is Genitive and the verb has a
non-agreeing 3Sg form (4-b). In negated present-tense sentences the form net is





























‘I don’t have a car.’
The properties of byt’ ‘be’ described for example set (4) are observed in other
existential be-sentences:
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‘There is no doctor in the village.’
The bare existential construction in (5-a) displays the form jest’, similarly to the
possessive in (4-a); the locational existential in (5-b) contains the conflated
net-form and the Genitive of Negation on the Theme doktora ‘doctor’.
The sentences in (6) represent copular be-possessives: (6-a) expresses inalienable




















‘It is not Anna who has the car (at the moment).’
Copular byt’ ‘be’ is null in the present tense, as (6-a) illustrates. (6-b) shows that
the case of the possessum under negation remains Nominative (and negation is
expressed as ne). These characteristics are displayed in copular be-sentences with














‘He is not a fool.’
Copular and existential be-sentences can thus be distinguished in the present tense
(both affirmative and negated) and in the past and future negated forms. When it
comes to the affirmative past and future tenses the form of the verb byt’ ‘be’ is
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‘The child had/will have blue eyes.’
The verb agrees with the possessum both in the existential permanent possessive
in (8-a) and in the copular inalienable possessive in (8-b). This is where the
existential and copular varieties of be-possessives may be formally
indistinguishable.
A useful tool in exploring the structural variants of existential and copular
be-possessives are Heine’s (1997) semantic types of possession: permanent,
physical, inalienable, abstract and temporary. (9) gives examples of these















































































‘I have a car at the moment, but it belongs to Petya.’
The sentences in (9) have the same basic word order: the u-possessor, the verb
and the possessum; it seems that all instances of existential be-possessives can be
grouped into one construction type. For copular be-possessives, Heine’s semantic


















‘Masˇa has (is wearing) a beautiful dress.’
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‘Arsˇavin has the ball.’
The sentences in (10) do not display the same word order: the temporary
possession type in (10-e) stands apart in that the possessum stands in the
sentence-initial position. The copular be-possessives seem to be divided into at
least two different structural types. On the whole, be-possessives can so far be
roughly grouped into three construction types represented in (11):
(11) a. u Possessor BEex Possessum.
b. u Possessor BEcop (Adj) Possessum.
c. Possessum BEcop u Possessor.
I will refer to these general construction types as the existential be-possessive, the
copular property be-possessive and the copular temporary be-possessive.2 In the
existing analyses it is the existential be-possessive that stands in the limelight.
The theoretical issues related to be-possessives that have been discussed at great
length in the literature are the Genitive of Negation and subjecthood.
3.2 The Genitive of Negation
The Genitive of Negation (GenNeg) is the case that a range of structural-cased
(Nominative and Accusative) noun phrases acquire under sentential negation. In























2The ‘property’-part in the term ‘copular property be-possessives’ reflects the analysis I assume
for these possessives further on in the thesis: the possessum noun is assumed to be of the {e, t}-
type.
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‘He won’t have any problems.’
(12-a) illustrates a negated permanent existential possessive in the present tense
where the Nominative ending is ungrammatical on the possessum. (12-b) shows
that the Nominative case on the possessum is ungrammatical even when the
predicate agrees with it; (12-c) is the grammatical variant. As stated at the
beginning of the chapter, copular possessives do not display GenNeg – in addition






























‘The secretary does not have your letter.’
Both the copular property be-possessive in (13-a) and the copular temporary
be-possessive in (13-b) require a Nominative case on the possessum when negated.
There is a huge body of literature containing various approaches to GenNeg; I
limit the present discussion to two approaches: the well-known Unaccusativity
hypothesis of Pesetsky (1982), and the recent property-type analysis of Partee and
Borschev (2004) – my position is the integration of the two analyses.
A popular approach to GenNeg in generative linguistics has been Pesetsky (1982)
who analyzes it as a case that occurs under negation on un-presupposed Themes:






















‘No newspapers have been received.’
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‘No answer came.’ Pesetsky (1982)
In all of the examples in (14) the Nominative/Accusative cases on the Theme
arguments represent presupposed Themes; the Genitive case marks no
presupposition of existence. For example, the Accusative form pis’mo ‘letter’ in
(14-a) refers to a specific presupposed letter that the speaker denies having
received; the Genitive pis’ma carries no such presupposition, the letter may or
may not exist. Pesetsky’s Theme-requirement reflects the fact that subjects of










To derive the necessary configurational requirement, Pesetsky (1982) proposes a
mechanism where negation licenses a null (quantificational) Q head that assigns
GenNeg to structural-cased NPs in its scope.
Partee and Borschev (2004) propose an alternative analysis of GenNeg. They
argue, following Babby (1980), that all of Nominative-to-GenNeg substitution
cases (the authors call it Subject GenNeg) happen in existential environments.
Besides the existential be-sentence in (5-b) and the existential be-possessives in
(12), this also applies to the passive and the unaccusative construction in (14).
Constructions with perception predicates allowing GenNeg are also analyzed as a
subtype of existential sentences, where the failure to perceive an entity in some







‘No frost was felt.’ Partee and Borschev (2004)
Partee and Borschev distinguish Subject GenNeg from the Genitive substituting
the Accusative case, which the authors refer to as Object GenNeg and consider to
be a phenomenon without semantic uniformity. In the criticism of the
Unaccusativity hypothesis Partee and Borschev start from the observation that
the Theme requirement makes incorrect predictions about the occurrence of
GenNeg in passive sentences and in transitive clauses. With regard to passives,
the Unaccusativity hypothesis predicts that if a verb allows GenNeg on its object,
the subject of the corresponding passive sentence should also be able to occur in
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the Genitive. This prediction is borne out for sentence-pairs like (17), where the
Theme argument of the verb polucˇit’ ‘receive’ is marked Genitive both in the








































‘This book wasn’t read.’ Partee and Borschev (2004)
Both sentences in (18) involve the verb cˇitat’ ‘read’ (presumably the difference in
aspects should not have a bearing on the data). The NP kniga ‘book’, despite its
Theme status and the possibility of GenNeg in (18-a), is ungrammatical in the
Genitive in (18-b). Partee and Borschev hypothesize that the crucial condition for
a passive subject to receive GenNeg is that the sentence be interpreted
existentially, not that the subject originate as the Theme. A lexical predicate can
undergo semantic bleaching to become an existential predicate depending on the
presupposition status of its argument: in (17-b) the predicate polucˇeno does not
presuppose the existence of its Theme argument and can thus be bleached to an
existential predicate; the predicate procˇitano in (18-b), however, does presuppose
the existence of its Theme, hence it cannot be bleached and GenNeg is not
allowed. Partee and Borschev emphasize the importance of the existential
interpretation by demonstrating that even the Theme requirement can be lifted












‘No sail shone white on the horizon.’ Partee and Borschev (2004)
Belet’ ‘shine white’ is an unergative predicate; however, once ‘shine white’ is
considered equivalent to the perceived presence of a sail (sails are generally white),
the sentence can be interpreted as existential, hence GenNeg in (19).
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The second incorrect prediction that Partee and Borschev attribute to the
Unaccusativity hypothesis concerns transitive verbs: it is assumed that all negated
transitive verbs in Russian allow their Themes to be Genitive. However, as
observed in Borschev et al. (2008, 58), Object GenNeg is ‘verb-sensitive and not
semantically uniform’. Object GenNeg can most frequently be observed with
















‘I don’t see Masˇa.’ Borschev et al. (2008, 58-59)
The Genitive form of the object in (20-a) emphasizes its non-specificity – no hotel
was built; if the Accusative form is used, we can be referring to a specific
(planned) hotel. Verbs of perception prioritize the observed presence of the object;
even proper names can take GenNeg in these environments. The Accusative case
in (20-b) gives the object a presupposed status, assuming that the person was
present but not visible, whereas the Genitive case does not carry the
presupposition of the person’s presence, simply referring to the person’s
invisibility. As soon as we leave the area of creation and perception verbs, GenNeg
becomes more rare and its meaning changes, too. GenNeg is rare with verbs that
take human objects (Accusative is preferred here) – when GenNeg does occur, a











‘He didn’t encourage the proud duchess.’ Borschev et al. (2008, 60)
The Accusative case makes the proud duchess the object of disencouragement; the
Genitive case, however, suggests that the disencouragement is directed at some
property of the duchess, according to Borschev et al. The property-type reading is
partly pragmatically conditioned. Verbs of incremental accomplishment bring yet
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‘I didn’t read (even) two pages.’ Borschev et al. (2008, 55)
Thus, Partee and Borschev (2004) and Borschev et al. (2008) show that Object
GenNeg is unevenly distributed among the transitive verbs and carries slightly
different meanings. The Unaccusativity approach, according to Partee and others,
cannot fully account for the distribution of Subject and Object GenNeg. The
alternative hypothesis that the authors propose is a diathesis-shift/property-type
analysis of GenNeg. The common denominator for the Subject and Object
GenNeg is the decreased referentiality of NPs. In terms of diathesis shift, an NP is
demoted from a ‘first-class’ subject/object position. In terms of semantic types,
the decreased referentiality of GenNeg NPs can be captured by assigning them an
{e, t}-type, as opposed to the {e}-type of ‘first-class’ arguments (that receive
Nominative and Accusative cases). Partee and Borschev hypothesize that the
type-shift of an NP argument can be correlated by a shift in the meaning of the
verb as well, the primary cause being the presence of higher operators (Negation
or modals). The property-type hypothesis allows Partee and others to unify
GenNeg with the Genitive NPs occurring in intensional and subjunctive contexts.
The authors do not develop a syntactic analysis for their semantic treatment of
GenNeg, but give some analysis-compatibility indications. For instance, Bailyn
(2004b) proposes that the high Neg head selects for a VP shell with the
quantification [q] feature of which GenNeg is the uninterpretable spell-out.
In this thesis my position is that GenNeg is a case that occurs on an {e, t}-type
Theme when the predicate of that Theme is negated (what is also called sentential
negation): this applies to both Subject GenNeg and Object GenNeg. Lexical
predicates differ in whether they can have {e, t}-type arguments. When it comes
to examples like (19) where seemingly non-Theme arguments may display GenNeg
in an existential context, I assume that the structure is re-analyzed when the
predicate is ‘bleached’ into an existential, such that the argument in question is, in
fact, a Theme. For existential be-sentences I assume the presence of the lexical
existential predicate ∃ that takes a Theme argument, see Chapter 5.
3.3 On jest’ and net
This section renders a closer look at the nature of jest’ and net – the
present-tense forms of the verb byt’ ‘be’ that have been used actively in Russian
linguistics as copular/existential diagnostics. I discuss conditions that license the
occurrence of jest’ in copular environments and also clarify my position on
affirmative-negative pairings among be-sentences.
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I begin with providing the reader with some historical perspective. The form jest’
is a non-inflecting 3rd person singular remainder of the suppletive present-tense





Table 3.1: Old East Slavic, byt’ ‘be’, present tense
In Old East Slavic the verb byt’ was more conspicuous in the system of the
language, used as an auxiliary in, for instance, the past tense (as opposed to the
sole ‘l -participle’ form in modern Russian) and spelled out in the present tense
also in the copular uses. The forms in Table 3.1 represent both copular and





































‘But I know that you have Oleska’s merchandise. So give the
merchandise to them.’ Birch bark No.548, (period 1180-1200)3
(23-a) illustrates a predicational be-sentence where the verb displays agreement in
person and number with the subject az ‘I’. (23-b) is an example of a temporary
possessive, presumably with a focused possessor; from the definiteness of the
possessum (Oleskas merchandise) I conclude that the construction is copular.4
The form net is a historical conflation of the negation particle ne and the verbal
form jest’. The conflation used to follow the paradigm presented in Table 3.1, (24)
illustrates the copular uses of the suppletive conflations:
3The glosses are mine, constructed with the help of Zaliznjak (2004).
4Although the form of the verb in this sentence is jeste that in Table 3.1 is glossed as 2nd
person Plural, Zaliznjak (2004:715) analyzes it as 3rd person singular; the form jeste is used with
the 3Sg interpretation in several birch-bark letters.
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‘You are not under law, but under grace.’ (Archbishop Platon, 1765)
The archaic form nest’ is preserved in modern Russian in some near-idiomatic
















‘And there is no end to the torment./And the torments have no end.’
The constructions in (25) are the remaining traces of the Russian Dative
possessive construction mentioned in Chapter 2. Note that the use of nest’ in (25)
is existential (as can be seen by the occurrence of GenNeg); copular uses of nest’
or other neg+be.prs conflations are not observed in modern Russian.
At the current stage of the language’s development the present-tense form jest’ is
commonly regarded as a diagnostic for existential byt’. However, one should be
aware of the fact that under certain circumstances jest’ can represent copular byt’
– these circumstances include at least the following:
(26) a. formal definitional sentences
b. rhetorical identity sentences
c. following the emphatic particle i
d. tense coordination.
The occurrence of jest’ in definitional sentences was noted already in Chvany
(1975); in the normal speech register the linking function is usually carried out by
the deictic element e`to (in the written language an em dash can be used instead).















‘Linguistics is a science about language.’
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‘Happiness is pleasure without regret.’ (Tolstoy L.N.)
Furthermore, there are rhetorical identity sentences where the same DP is used on






















‘Frost is frost, be it dry or humid.’
The construction with jest’ seems to be the only way to formulate rhetorical
identity sentences: e`to that alternates with jest’ in definitional sentences in (27),
is not available here.
Chvany (1975, 50) observes that jest’ in definitional sentences is not syntactically
























‘Is linguistics a science about language?’ Chvany (1975)
In contrast to the existential be-sentence in (29-a) where jest’ may move to the
beginning of the sentence, a definitional sentence with jest’ cannot be transformed
into a question as illustrated in (29-b). Chvany also observes that, when negated,
















5Chvany calls the negation in definitional sentences ‘external’: such sentences should rather
be translated as ‘it is not the case that . . . ’; negated definitional sentences presuppose, i.e. are
uttered in response to, a corresponding affirmative sentence.
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(30-b) is given here to show that net in a definitional sentence is not salvaged by
GenNeg. Rhetorical identity sentences differ from definitional sentences in that
they cannot be negated or questioned – they are frozen in their affirmative form.
Definitional and rhetorical identity sentences stand out in that jest’ can occur
here on its own, without licensing elements. In other copular be-sentences, jest’
can be ‘licensed’ by emphatic i ‘and’ and in tense coordination. The emphatic
particle i ‘and’ in combination with jest’ in copular sentences insists on the
relation (predication, specification, identity) between two previously mentioned

























































‘Considered to be an invalid, but his mug is criminal. – Well, he is a
criminal, he was convicted as such.’
The elements in the complex i jest’ are mutually dependent, and cannot be
dropped separately without causing ungrammaticality in a copular environment.
The other licensing condition for jest’ in copular be-sentences mentioned in (26) is
tense coordination – a coordination of different tense forms of the same verb of the























‘The Center party criticized, is criticizing and will criticize the
government for the areas where it doesn’t do enough. . . ’
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‘Russia has been, is and will be a great country.’
I assume that tense coordination involves either coordination of the T head (in
which case the verb would have to overtly raise to T) or coordination of TPs with
ellipsis of identical parts.6 For predicational sentences examples are to some degree
restricted – presumably due to possible conflicts in the case form of the predicate
noun: in the present tense the noun should be in the Nominative, whereas in the
past and future tenses the predicate noun is in the Instrumental. The most
frequent examples are thus when jest’ is enframed by the past and future forms of
byt’, as in (32), such that the present-tense requirement for Nominative is not that


























‘Who was and is their author?’ V. Agranovskij (1976-1999)
The sentences in (33) feel awkward because jest’ here occurs on the edge of the
tense coordination – the need for the Nominative case on the post-copular
NP-predicate is perceived as more prominent, which leads to a more distinct
conflict with the Instrumental-imposing byl/budet.7
In view of examples of jest’ in copular sentences one may claim that the
credibility of jest’ as an existential diagnostic is weakened – but we must
remember that we need special conditions to bring about jest’ in copular
environments. Moreover, the existential-like behavior of these constructions does
6I do not investigate this phenomenon further, but am inclined to the second alternative,
assuming that tense morphology on a verb is realization of a dependency between the tense head
and its sister phrase, without movement of the verb.
7By this description I refer only to grammaticality judgments, not to the actual grammatical
processes.
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not extend beyond the affirmative field: in negated sentences we do not observe
net in the same copular environments where jest’ is possible. (34) presents













– A ja i
*net/*ne jest’/ne bol’n-aja.






















‘He has never been and never will be a traitor.’
In (34-a), neither net (that is used in negated existentials) nor ne jest’ (that we
have seen in negated definitional sentences) can follow the emphatic i – the
sentence has to make do with the bare negation particle ne usual for copular
sentences. In tense coordination under negation the present-tense form is simply
excluded, with neither option being satisfactory, as shown in (34-b).
Copular be-possessives differ with regard to whether they allow jest’ under the
conditions described above: for example, copular temporary be-possessives only
allow jest’ after the emphatic i, while copular property be-possessives allow jest’
in tense coordination. For the data and analysis see Chapter 5. I have thus far
discussed cases of jest’ being used in present-tense copular environments under
certain conditions. When occurring alone, without any assisting elements like
emphatic i and tense coordination, jest’ can still be regarded as an existential
diagnostic in be-possessives. In general, however, we have seen that the
net-diagnostic turns out to be more reliable. One could thus state that whenever
net is used in a be-sentence, that sentence is existential. This statement, however,
has been disputed in Chvany (1975) and Harves (2003), among others. Here we
come to the question that Partee and Borschev (2008: 160) identify as ‘What is
the negation of what’.
Chvany (1975) and Harves (2003) namely assume that the negated counterparts of
locative and temporary possessive be-sentences involve net and the Genitive of
Negation, namely that the (b)-sentences in (35) and (36) are the negated
counterparts of the (a)-sentences:
43




































‘The secretary does not have your letter.’ Harves (2003: 167)
If one assumes that (35) and (36) contain affirmative-negative counterparts, then
the occurrence of net in the (b)-sentences suggests that net can also appear in
copular environments; this assumption has far-reaching theoretical consequences.
Harves (2003), for instance, concludes that all be-sentences with PP predicates
display net and GenNeg; see also the discussion of the significance of examples in
(35) for Chvany’s analysis in Chapter 4. Partee and Borschev (2008) question the
pairing of the type in (35) and (36). The authors propose that not every sentence
has a perfect sentential negation counterpart, and (35-a) and (36-a) are such
sentences. When the need for negation arises, a speaker has a choice between two
‘functional approximations’: a negated existential sentence (the (b)-examples




















‘The secretary does not have your letter.’
The role of constituent negation in Russian should not be downplayed. Partee and
Borschev (2008, 171) refer to Paducˇeva (1974) for an empirical observation that
Russian makes more use of constituent negation for the expression of ‘general
negation’ (‘it is not the case that. . . ’) than e.g. English: this is supposedly due to
the fact that ‘the Slavic languages generally prefer to position the negative
morpheme immediately before the Rheme’ (Paducˇeva 1974). Constituent negation
may thus often prove to be the best functional choice for a sentence. It is
therefore possible that the constructions with constituent negation in (37) are a
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better match for the (a)-sentences in (35-a) and (36-a). Giving the (b)-examples
in (35) and (36) the status of approximate negation counterparts means that we
are not making any claims about the presence of the existential predicate in the
(a)-sentences. Consequently, the occurrence of net can still be considered a
reliable existential diagnostic in Russian be-sentences. I follow Partee and
Borschev and assume that the pairs of sentences in (35) and (36) are not
affirmative-negated variants of the same derivations.
In this section I discuss the origins of jest’ and net, providing some examples from
the earlier stages of the language’s development. I also make the reader aware of
the non-existential environments that license the use of jest’ in modern Russian.
As for net, my position in this thesis is that this form is a reliable existential
diagnostic – with regard to its non-occurrence in non-existential environments
displaying jest’ and with regard to the proposal of Partee and Borschev (2008)
concerning the negations of locative and temporary possessive be-sentences.
3.4 The issue of subjecthood
The question of which argument is the subject in the be-possessive has been
discussed in various works: Chvany (1975), Freeze (1992), Bailyn (2004a),
Dyakonova (2007), Jung (2008), McAnallen (to app.). In the discussion of the
subjecthood issue most scholars do not distinguish between different types of
be-possessives. An observation made for one type (e.g. the existential
be-possessive) is presumed to be extendable to the other types. In this section I
discuss a range of subjecthood diagnostics and register the behavior of the
be-possessives according to type; the focus is on the existential be-possessive that
has received the most attention in the literature.
When it comes to the existential be-possessive, the general consensus is that the
prepositional possessor is the more subject-like element in the construction, even
though the possessum bears Nominative case and imposes agreement on the verb
– Nominative case and predicate agreement are generally taken to signal
subjecthood in languages with a Nominative-Accusative case system. The most
quoted subject properties of the PP possessor include sentence-initial position and
reflexive binding.
Sentence-initial position was listed in Keenan (1976) as a frequent subjecthood
characteristic cross-linguistically, in Russian it is considered to be one of the
properties of canonical subjects. The tendency of the possessor to occupy the
sentence-initial position can be observed in the existential be-possessive in (9) and
in copular property be-possessives; in the copular temporary be-possessive it is the
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possessum that ‘wins’ the subject test with regard to sentence-position.
Reflexive binding is considered to be a subjecthood property in many languages
(Keenan 1976). In the existential be-possessive the u-PP can bind reflexives in the
clause, including the possessum, whereas the possessum does not have binding
powers. In (38-a) the u-PP ‘u Ivana’ binds the reflexive s soboj ’with himself’; in

























‘Ivan has his own car.’ Chvany (1975: 99-100)
An interesting detail of the binding configuration in (38) is that the possessor DP
Ivana does not c-command the reflexive, but rather binds out of the PP. This
detail is commented on in Bailyn (2004a), who resorts to the distinction between
functional and lexical prepositions, in the spirit of Yadroff (1999). Bailyn states
that the preposition u is a functional preposition and does not create an opaque
domain: as a consequence, the u-phrase, though morphologically a PP, behaves as
a DP for the purposes of c-command. The possessum cannot bind reflexives inside
the u-possessor, and it is difficult to find or construct examples of existential
be-possessives where the u-possessor is expressed by the reflexive sebja, although































‘they bring her, well, what one can, what can you do when you yourself
don’t have anything.’ Remizov A.M. (1926)
(39) seems at first glance to be an exception to the general binding pattern in
existential possessives – however, the reflexive possessor is not bound by the
possessum nicˇego ‘nothing’ or any other element in that clause. The reflexive
sebja in (39) has the arbitrary ‘one’ reading (and bears contrastive focus, as I
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indicate in the translation).8 It thus seems that the u-PP in the existential
be-possessive cannot contain a genuine reflexive that is bound by some other
element in the clause.
Copular be-possessives may differ with regard to the binding possibilities. In the












‘Itsi lawful owner has the cari.’
The utterance in (40) may refer to a situation where the car has not been at the
disposal of its owner for the whole time (it is frequently borrowed or it had been
stolen), but at the moment it is; here the possessum binds the possessive reflexive
svojego within the possessor phrase. In copular property possessives there is no
























‘#Its owner has a huge house./#Its owner’s house is huge.’
In (41) I attempt to construct a configuration where either the possessum or the
possessor contains a reflexive. None of the utterances are grammatical.
So far, with regard to the two frequently mentioned properties (sentence-position
and reflexive binding), the different be-possessives behave differently. In what
follows I discuss two more subjecthood diagnostics: presupposition of reference
and substitution by PRO.
8The arbitrary use of the sebja-reflexive in (39) seems to belong to the same class of examples












‘One’s own shirt is closer to one’s body.’
(i) is a proverb stating that one’s own well-being is more important than that of others.
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3.4. The issue of subjecthood
3.4.1 Presupposed reference
Presupposition of reference is cited by Keenan (1976) as another typical subject
property. Keenan (1976) suggests that while the reference of “normally
referential” NPs can be suspended under certain operations (such as negation,
questioning, conditionalization), the reference of a subject is generally harder to
suspend:
(42) a. De Gaulle wasn’t the king of France.
b. The king of France wasn’t de Gaulle.
(43) a. Was de Gaulle the king of France?
b. Was the king of France de Gaulle?
(44) a. If the coup had succeeded de Gaulle would have been the king of
France.
b. If the coup had succeeded the king of France would have been de
Gaulle.
According to Keenan, the (a) examples in (42)-(44) do not imply existence of ‘the
king of France’, while the (b) examples do: the difference is presumably due to the
fact that ‘the king of France’ is in the subject position in the (b) sentences, but in
the predicate position in the (a) sentences.
We can apply Keenan’s presupposed reference test to be-possessives to see which
of the elements (possessor or possessum) resists reference suspension better. In
the existential possessive the possessor has a more stable reference than the
possessum. The negation test is presented in (45) and (46): under negation, the



















‘Fairies do not exist.’
In (45-a) feja ’fairy’ is in the position of the possessum and it is possible to
continue (45-a) with (45-b) denying existence of fairies. When feja ’fairy’
expresses the possessor argument as in (46-a), it is infelicitous to continue with
the general denial of the existence of fairies in (46-b): the unnaturalness of (46-b)
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‘Fairies do not exist.’
Under questioning, the reference of the possessor is again harder to suspend than
the reference of the possessum. The reference of the dragon is presupposed only in














































‘No, because dragons do not exist.’
(48-b) is not in itself a logically invalid reply to (48-a): if dragons do not exist,
they may by implication be considered to lack immunity to magic, but
pragmatically it is a weird reply, because it does not answer the posed question,
but instead denies the inquirer’s implicit presupposition of dragons’ existence.
The presupposition of reference continues to correlate with the possessor role in

















































‘If we lived in a fairy-tale, a flying carpet would have gears.’
(49-a) states that a flying carpet would have existed in someone’s possession given
the condition of living in a fairy-tale world, but since this is no fairy tale, there are
possibly no flying carpets at all. (49-b) makes a statement about a flying carpet
that could possess certain characteristics – the fact that the speaker does not live
in a fairy tale, does not cancel the presupposition of existence of a flying carpet:
the way (49-b) is built, flying carpets do exist in the speaker’s world, only without
gears.
To recapitulate, the data in (45)-(49) suggest that it is more difficult to suspend
the reference of the possessor – from this one can conclude that the u-possessor in
the existential be-possessive behaves more subject-like with regard to the
presupposed reference test.
When it comes to the copular possessives, both the possessor and the possessum
have a presupposed reference that resists suspension. (50-a) presents a negated
copular temporary possessive where both the possessor and the possessum
arguments are entities that do not exist in the real world – still, negation ne does
not suspend the reference of either argument: neither (50-b) nor (50-c) are























‘There are no flying carpets.’





























‘She doesn’t have a tail.’
As in (50), the negation in (51-a) is not enough to suspend the reference of either
argument. (51-b) denies the existence of fairies and is infelicitous in the context of
(51-a), which means that the possessor in (51-a) is presupposed; the infelicity of
(51-c) shows the same for the possessum xvost ‘tail’ in (51-a). Thus, both types of
copular be-possessives retain the presupposition of reference for both of the
arguments and differ in this regard from the existential be-possessive: according to
this test, the possessor argument in the existential be-possessive comes out as
more subject-like, whereas in the copular possessives no argument is favored in a
similar fashion.
3.4.2 PRO-diagnostics: inconclusive evidence
In this section I discuss two subjecthood diagnostics that have been mentioned in
connection with be-possessives and that I in this thesis hold as either irrelevant or
inconclusive – both of them happen to deal with PRO.
The first diagnostic is control of PRO in adverbial participles (gerunds) that is
sometimes mentioned in the literature. McAnallen (to app.) cites the following















‘I have good prospects living in Boston.’/‘My prospects are good, living in
Boston.’
In the abstract copular property possessive in (52) the u-PP seems to control the
reference of the adverbial PRO. According to Rappaport, the PRO of
‘non-detached’ adverbial participles can be controlled only by subjects – the fact
that the u-PP in (52) can provide a reference for the PRO, thus makes it more
subject-like. Personally, I find these sentences ungrammatical, but they do appear
in the corpus and both Slavic and western scholars thus keep referring to this
diagnostic (McAnallen 2011, Rappaport 1980, Testelec 2001, among others). Note,
however, that a gerundival PRO may find a controller in some disconcerting
configurations, such as in (53):
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‘We have a real experience in the matter of defence of Russia’s national
interests, without degrading to aggressive methods and confrontation.’
(Lavrov, 2004)
This is uttered by Sergej Lavrov, a high-ranking Russian politician (Minister of
Foreign Affairs) – his speech, if not directly literary, is supposed to have some
standard. It is not clear what is supposed to be the controller of the gerundival
PRO in (53): the u-PP u nas or the understood agent of the nominal zasˇcˇity
‘defence’ (both of these refer to one entity). Whatever is claimed to be the
controller – no syntactic relation of control, no matter whose analysis of the
phenomenon of control one follows, can be argued to take place in (53). Control of
gerundival PROs may thus be an unreliable test when it comes to subjecthood in
Russian.
Another PRO-related test that turns out to be inconclusive in our discussion is
mentioned in Arylova (2010). Substitution by PRO is a classic subjecthood test:
according to Keenan (1976), subjects should be able to undergo Equi-NP deletion
which in the current generative literature is referred to as control – a dependency
between the understood subject of an infinitival complement (PRO) and an
argument of the matrix predicate. Substitution by PRO has remained a sturdy
subjecthood test through the years: a noun that in a finite clause has claims for
the subjecthood status, should be substitutable by PRO in a control infinitive.
(54) illustrates two control predicates in Russian: the subject-control predicate
























‘I allowed Vanja to go to the party.’
Russian has a case condition on the control configuration: only Nominative DPs
can be substituted by PRO. The restriction can be formulated in the following
way: PRO can be projected in the subject position of a control infinitival if that
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position, were the clause finite, would be filled by a Nominative DP. The
case-requirement on PRO precludes us from using the test on the prepositional
possessor in be-possessives, but we can apply the control test to the Nominative
possessum. As the following examples illustrate, an existential be-possessive



























#‘Putin allowed a deputy to be had by each minister.’
In (55) a be-possessive is expressed as an infinitival complement; the possessum
argument is assumed to be PRO that is controlled by an argument in the matrix
clause – both subject and object control constructions in (55) are ungrammatical.
This ungrammaticality may be attributed to a variety of factors; in
Arylova (2010) I interpret the PRO-test as yet another indication that the
possessum is not the subject. It is more probable, however, that the
inapplicability of the PRO-substitution test to be-possessives is due to other
factors, such as the association of control predicates with certain volition, ability
to experience feelings.9 Predicational be-sentences can be embedded under control
predicates, as illustrated in (56), where be-sentences with AP/NP predicates are




















































9See, for instance, Landau’s (2000) semantic classification of control predicates.
53







‘He offered me to be the director and the anchorman of the whole
program.’
The controllers and the PROs in the infinitival be-sentences refer to animate
entities, which enables a control configuration. Possessums fail to display volition;
this conflict between what control predicates require and what possessums can do
may take different forms in the different be-possessive types. In (55), the infinitival
be-possessive asserts existence of an entity, the possessum, which trivially means
that the existence of the possessum is not presupposed; the control predicate in
the matrix clause, however, requires an argument whose existence is presupposed:
only an existing entity can be claimed to have some hopes and aspirations. Given
that the controller and the PRO refer to one entity, the conflict of existential
presuppositions cause ungrammaticality. In copular temporary possessives,
however, possessums are presupposed so we might expect to find a control
configuration there. However, here the volition requirement of control predicates
finds another obstacle: possessums in temporary possessives are inanimate and are
thus unable to display volition. It would make no sense to combine, for instance, a
desiderative control predicate with an inanimate entity, as in (57-b), which is a






















‘#Your letter plans to be had by the secretary.’
Copular property be-possessives resist a control configuration even more, to the
























‘#The big house hopes to be had by him.’
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‘#I allowed a big house to be had by him.’
There is a feeling that the impossibility of control in (58) should be attributed to
some special causes, different from the ones at play in the other be-possessives. In
my analysis of the structure of be-possessives in Chapter 5 I propose that the
possessum in copular property be-possessives is an {e,t}-NP which does not
comply with the {e}-DP requirements of a control configuration (both for the
controller argument and for PRO).
The PRO-diagnostics discussed in this section may be interpreted to indicate that
the prepositional possessor is the more subject-like element; however, there may
be other forces involved and PRO-evidence should be referred to with caution.
3.4.3 Summary of subject properties
With regard to subjecthood diagnostics the three types of be-possessives fare in
the following way. The possessum element in all be-possessives bears
morphological properties that are attributed to subjects in Russian: Nominative
case and predicate agreement. With regard to the other tests, the be-possessives
vary as to which argument comes out as more subject-like. Table 3.2 presents a
summary of the distribution of subject properties:
existential cop.temp cop.prop
Sentence-initial u-PP Possm u-PP
Reflexive binding u-PP Possm neither
Presupposed reference u-PP both both
Substitution by PRO neither neither neither
Table 3.2: Subjecthood diagnostics in be-possessives
As you can see, the subject status in the existential be-possessive can be assigned
to the possessor argument with regard to the first three tests given in Table 3.2.
The copular temporary possessive favors the possessum argument, whereas the
copular property possessive does not display an unambiguous favoring of an





In this chapter I present an overview of constructions that have been referred to
as be-possessives in Russian – this is the main means of expressing predicative
possession in the language. I demonstrate that what is assumed to be one
construction and is referred to by one term is in fact a motley group of
constructions with different properties. Dissecting this group with regard to
semantic types of possession and formal frames allows one to gain a better insight
into the properties of these constructions. I single out three types of
be-possessives: existential, copular property and copular temporary. I further
touch upon three issues that have been prominent in the discussion on
be-possessives: the Genitive of Negation, the form of the verb byt’ ‘be’ in the
present tense, and the issue of subjecthood. My position with regard to the
phenomenon of GenNeg in Russian is that it is a case that occurs on {e,t}-type
Themes under negation; this is a combination of the views presented by
Pesetsky (1982) and Partee and Borschev (2004). The section on the present-tense
form of byt’ identifies conditions under which jest’, which is commonly held to be
an existential diagnostic, can occur in copular be-sentences. I also observe that net
seems to be a more stable indication of the existential nature of a be-sentence; an
important point that is presented in this section is the clarification of the issue of
affirmative-negated counterparts that involves both net and GenNeg. In the
section on subjecthood I show that although it is generally assumed that the u-PP
in be-possessives in general behaves like a subject, the three types of
be-possessives in fact behave differently with regard to subjecthood diagnostics.
The general message of this chapter is that the field of be-possessives is diverse.
Before an analysis proposed for be-possessives can be extended to any other areas
of grammar, a proper understanding and awareness of the differences is necessary.
My stance is that a viable analysis of be-possessives must comply with two
minimal requirements:
(59) a. it must accommodate the diversity of be-possessive constructions.
b. it must be compatible with the dynamic syntax approach.
In Chapter 4 I review the existing analyses of be-possessives and claim that
neither of them satisfy both of the requirements in (59)– I propose an analysis





This chapter offers a representative selection of the analyses of be-possessives. I
begin the discussion from the monumental work of Chvany (1975), a
transformational grammar account that offers significant insight into the nature of
these constructions. I then go on to consider the cartographic analyses that have
all been inspired by the influential work of Freeze (1992). The analyses of Harves
(2003), Dyakonova (2007) and Jung (2011) are, like mine, couched within the
Minimalist framework, but are only compatible with the cartographic approach to
syntax due to the degree of and motivation for the structural unification.
In the review of the various treatments of be-possessives I also comment on the
authors’ proposals for other constructions that they deem to be related to
be-possessives (such as the have-possessive, the modal existential construction) –
this discussion becomes relevant in Chapters 6 and 7.
4.1 Chvany 1975
Chvany (1975), an extensive monograph on the syntax of Russian be-sentences, is
the earliest generative analysis of be-possessives known to me. Chvany develops
what may be called a dyadic unaccusative analysis of be-possessives: the possessor





















The possessum in (1) is the ‘Direct Object’ of the verb – Chvany motivates this
argument status by the occurrence of GenNeg, that is observed in negated
transitive constructions (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the
phenomenon). The u-PP originates as an ‘Indirect Object’, as it is semantically
close to the Dative Goal argument in a give-construction – minus ‘some feature
such as [+directional] or [+motional]’. Chvany (1975: 103) treats the u-possessor
as an NP and suggests that the u-phrase is a morphological form possibly
diachronically connected to the Dative marker: the form u is ‘the allomorph of the
dative case morpheme in the least marked declension type’. As an Indirect
Object, the possessor is higher than the possessum (Direct Object) on the Favored
Subject hierarchy and can thus move to the subject position. The subjecthood
properties of the prepositional possessor discussed by Chvany (1975) include
sentence-initial position and reflexive-binding.
As for the treatment of the verb byt’ ‘be’, Chvany distinguishes between two
types: the lexical verb (∃) and the copula. Copular byt’ carries syntactic features
and may also carry contrastive or emphatic stress; the copula is used e.g. in
be-sentences with NP/AP predicates and in passive constructions.1 The lexical
verb ∃ comes in two varieties: a one-argument version that yields an existential
construction and a two-argument version that is involved in the be-possessive. The
relevant diagnostics are first of all the different negated forms of byt’ in the
present tense (existential conflation net as opposed to the bare negation ne in
copular sentences) and GenNeg (according to Chvany’s observation, existential
byt’ behaves as a lexical verb in allowing GenNeg on its Direct Object).2
1The structure that Chvany provides for copular be-sentences with NP predicates may look
unaccusative to the contemporary linguist – this is, for instance, the interpretation in Harves
(2003: 201). However, Chvany’s discussion of copular sentences on p.69 and p.114 suggests a
small-clause interpretation.
2See the detailed discussion of the two properties in Chapter 3.
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Furthermore, Chvany observes that existential byt’ has lexical derivatives, such as
the ones in (2):
(2) bytije ‘existence’, sobytije ‘event’, sbyt’sja ‘come to pass’, byt ‘daily life’,
jestestvennyj ‘natural’.
As for the copula, it does not have lexical derivatives that can be semantically
related to what Chvany defines as copular senses of byt’ : class inclusion, class
membership and identity.
The have-possessive is also analyzed as an underlyingly dyadic unaccusative in
Chvany (1975), here the Nominative possessor and the Accusative possessum are

















The possessor Ivan in the have-possessive originates in the Indirect Object
position – as in the be-possessive. The Nominative case of the possessor in (3) is
due to the verb imet’ ‘have’ which, in contrast to the verb byt’ ‘be’, neutralizes
case on its subject. Another difference is that the structure of the have-possessive
does not have an optional locative element. Chvany postulates this distinction in




































‘Ivan has a car of his own at his parents’ (in the garage).’
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According to Chvany (1975: 100), the have-possessive cannot have a locative
modifier, in contrast to the be-possessive. Chvany’s analysis seems simple and has
a solid empirical ground. There are, however, some complications, one of which
regards the distribution of the negated existential form net (and the other tense
forms ne bylo, and ne budet). Chvany namely assumes that (5-b) is the negation
















‘The doctor is not in town.’ Chvany (1975: 47)
The form net is identified by Chvany as a solid diagnostic for lexical byt’ and the
author therefore assumes that the affirmative (5-a) contains a lexical byt’.3
Positing lexical byt’ in (5-a) becomes a liability for Chvany as she has to account
for why jest’ does not appear there – this forces her to resort to the rule of
∃-deletion that applies when the ‘existent’ (the Theme) is presupposed. As for the
negated form net, it appears in (5-b) because the rule of Contraction to NET
applies before the rule of ∃-deletion. Such susceptibility of lexical byt’ to
presupposition in Chvany’s analysis attracts criticism from Harves (2003: 219)
who points out that if existential byt’ were a lexical predicate, ‘then it would be
the only verb in the language that is morphologically sensitive to the definiteness
of the subject NP’. In Chapter 3 I discuss the pairings of sentences like (5)– I
follow Partee and Borschev (2008) in not treating the sentences in (5) as the
affirmative-negative pair.
Another complication for Chvany’s analysis is that u-possessors are claimed to be
underlying Indirect Objects in all contexts (Chvany 1975: 102), and the role of an
Indirect Object can only be received from a verb – this imposes lexical byt’ on
structures where its presence would otherwise be unmotivated. This includes cases
when an u-PP has the meaning ‘at someone’s place’ and also (what I in this thesis
describe as) copular be-possessives. Chvany analyzes phrases of the type ‘at X’s
(place)’ as containing a silent adverbial; however, because the u-PP in this
adverbial phrase has possessive semantics, she has to assume that the phrase also
contains a (silent) verb. Consider the structure in (6-b):
3I suppose that it is sentences like (5) that forced Chvany to add naxodit’sja ‘be situated’ to the
range of lexical synonyms of existential byt’ (the other synonyms are imet’sja and susˇcˇestvovat’
‘exist’, pp. 47-48).
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There are two lexical verbs in the structure in (6-b). The higher verb is the one
that is spelled out as jest’. The lower verb, embedded in the adverbial phrase, is
silent and its sole purpose is to provide the Indirect Object role to the u-PP – the
locative adverbial phrase is in essence a relative clause and is interpreted literally
as ‘at the place that Ivan has’ (Chvany 1975: 105).
In the same manner, the Indirect Object origin of u-possessors imposes lexical byt’


























The presupposed status of the possessum in (7) is supposed to motivate
∃-deletion, which accounts for the absence of jest’ (if the sentence is to be
interpreted as inalienable possession). Note, however, that a negation of (7-a)
does not involve the form net, as it does in (5-b) – remember that Chvany
assumes a rule of Contraction to NET before presuppositionally conditioned
∃-deletion, such that net is still expected to appear in (8). In endnote 4-24

































‘Ivan hasn’t very pretty eyes.’
The only interpretation for (8-a) is alienable possession where Ivan is a manager
of an eye bank, and there are currently no beautiful eyes in this bank (Chvany’s
proposal). A proper negation for (7-a) would be (8-b); in order to illustrate that
the particle ne is not merely a part of the word with the meaning ‘ugly’, Chvany
introduces the adverb ocˇen’ ‘very’ in (8-c) and shows that the adverb occurs
between the negation particle and the negated constituent. The sentences in (7)
and (8) contain neither jest’ nor net (or GenNeg, for that matter), but Chvany
still has to assume the presence of the verb ∃ in these constructions, because her
analysis ties the possessor semantics of the u-PP to this predicate. The constant
62
Chapter 4. Existing analyses of be-possessives
association of possessive u-PPs with existential byt’ is one of the points where I
depart from Chvany’s standpoint. I follow Chvany (1975) in the assumption of the
lexical existential predicate in Russian and also in the structural differentiation of
the be-possessive and the have-possessive.
4.2 The cartographic minimalist analyses
At present, the discussion of the structure of be-possessives is heavily influenced
by such works as Benveniste (1966), Freeze (1992), Kayne (1993) and Den Dikken
(1998), who all have been concerned with cross-linguistic and language-specific
patterns of have/be alternation and their formalization.
Freeze (1992) unifies locatives, existentials and ‘have’-predications (possessives) in
one locative paradigm, based on his observation that these three kinds of
predications display a restricted and highly predictable range of formal differences



























‘I had a sister’. Freeze (1992, 553-554)
This set of examples contains a locative in (9-a), an existential in (9-b) and a
possessive sentence in (9-c). Driven by the reductionist excitement of the
Government and Binding era, Freeze proposes that all predications in the locative
paradigm are derived from one underlying structure where the location/possessor
and the locatum/possessum are projected in a PP small clause:
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The P head in (10) selects its arguments, a Theme and a Location. Whether the
sentence comes out as existential/possessive or locative depends on which element
moves to the subject position in SpecIP due to definiteness: movement of the
Theme NP yields a locative, whereas movement of the P’-phrase yields either an
existential or a possessive. In addition, possessors are different from locations in
that they have a [+human] feature; in Russian the effect of the [+human] feature
is visible on the choice of the special preposition u.
A feature of Freeze’s analysis that has proven very popular in subsequent works is
the derivation of the verb ‘have’. Freeze namely suggests that in have-possessives
P incorporates into BE and this head complex is spelled out as ‘have’; the
possessor/location NP is stripped of its lexical-case assigner (P) and becomes
Nominative.
Note that Freeze (1992), like so many other scholars, overgeneralizes in presenting
predicative possessive constructions as taking the form of either
have-constructions or locative be-sentences. In Chapter 2 we have seen Stassen’s
(2009) typology of predicative possessives that includes other types such as topic
possessives, with-possessives and Genitive possessives, among others. Freeze’s
typological motivation of his theoretical model is thus weakened when faced with
the real typology of possessives.
Apart from the typological objection, several details of Freeze’s analysis have been
subject to criticism. Harves (2003:174) points out that the movement of the
P’-layer in (10) is problematic in view of the Structure Preservation Hypothesis of
Emonds (1976) and Chomsky (1986) that only allows movement of heads and
maximal projections.4 B laszczak (2008) provides a whole range of critical
comments. With regard to locative and existential constructions, B laszczak points
out that it is not clear what governs the distribution of the Genitive of Negation,
4See also a related discussion in section 4.2.3.
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if these constructions are assumed to have the same underlying structure: Freeze’s
analysis namely predicts that Theme NPs in locative constructions should also be
marked Genitive under negation. Furthermore, with regard to the fact that
existees can be definite (as in (11-b), where the Genitive of Negation signals an
existential sentence), Freeze’s proposal that the existential interpretation is























‘John was not at the party.’ B laszczak (2008: 35)
B laszczak also criticizes Freeze’s P-to-BE incorporation analysis of have – see
section 6.1 for a detailed discussion.
The recent analyses of the be-possessive that will be discussed shortly can all be
called descendants of Freeze (1992) via two routes: Kayne (1993) or Den Dikken
(1998). I abstain from the discussion of Kayne (1993) and Den Dikken (1998) as
these works are sufficiently well-known and are amply preserved in the
Russian-specific analyses that are discussed in detail in this chapter. Before
proceeding to the discussion of the Russian-specific analyses, I should mention
Kondrashova’s (1996) classification of Russian be-sentences that is often referred
to by generative Slavicists: in the present selection of analyses in particular,
Harves (2003) and Jung (2011) make use of this classification.
Kondrashova’s (1996) classification roughly corresponds to Graham’s (1959)
classification of copula functions and contains seven be-sentences whose labels are

























‘Kolya is that person with a bouquet.’
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‘Kolya has a ticket to go to the movies.’
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‘Masˇa is in a good mood.’
The ‘possessive’ constructions in these examples are represented by (16) and (18).
In Chapter 3 I identify several types of possessive be-sentences, in Kondrashova’s
classification these construction-types have been collapsed into two groups. The
‘Possessive’ group in (18) contains sentences with the sentence-initial u-PP, both
copular and existential varieties. Scholars that adhere to Kondrashova’s
classification should be aware of the fact that the constructions grouped together
under one heading in (18) behave differently with regard to a range of factors: the
verb byt’ ‘be’, (Genitive of) negation, the possession relation, as described in
Chapter 3. The two examples in the ‘Locative-possessive’ group in (16) are also of
different types. While (16-a) can be argued to be possessive in some sense
(temporary possession), (16-b) is a purely locative sentence – see my discussion of
example (2-b) on p.28.
The analyses reviewed in this section all have the same characteristic that I
consider to be a theoretical drawback: namely, they all strive for a complete
unification at the level of argument structure. I show in this thesis that structural
unification is not supported by the data – within Russian and cross-linguistically;
it is also fundamentally incompatible with the dynamic syntax approach. In the
review of the analyses I also discuss points that are problematic for them – though
of minor theoretical significance (most analyses have inconsistencies), the
problematic points also deplete from the credibility of the analyses.
4.2.1 Harves 2003
Harves (2003) investigates the syntax of unaccusativity in Russian and sets out to
prove that the various unaccusative phenomena, such as the Genitive of Negation
and First Conjunct Agreement, can be attributed to the featural make-up of the
constructions. Harves argues that GenNeg on DP arguments is due to the
defective nature of the lexical and functional heads selecting those DPs as
arguments. In transitive and unaccusative constructions the negated verb is
defective in that it lacks an object agreement feature and thus cannot value
Accusative case on the object. This view of GenNeg has consequences for the
analysis of the be-sentences that display this phenomenon. Harves claims that all
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and only those be-sentences that involve PP predicates display GenNeg; examples
in (19)-(25) are what Harves assumes to be the negated counterparts of






































































‘Kolya doesn’t have a car.’
Harves states that GenNeg appears only in (22)-(25), and the common trait for
these sentences is the PP predicate. I already commented on examples like (22)
and (23) in section 3.3, where I follow Partee and Borschev (2008) in assuming
that sentences like (22) and (23) are not the negated counterparts of (15-a) and
(16-a). Harves’s analysis seems to be fundamentally incompatible with Partee and
Borschev’s (2008) proposal: the PP-GenNeg correspondence is the cornerstone of
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Harves’s theory and deviations from the correspondence would mean that not all
PPs are unaccusative predicates.
In order to account for the occurrence of GenNeg in (22)-(25), Harves proposes










In (26) the PP takes the ‘subject’ DP as its internal argument. Harves assumes
that PPs are like VPs in that they need a functional head to compositionally
assign their θ-role (p.220) – Pred is such a functional head in (26) and it must be
defective and φ-incomplete (to comply with Harves’s analysis of GenNeg).
Predicates of equative, predicative and generic be-sentences (DP-, NP- and
AP-predicates) are classified by Harves as unergative, i.e. they are ‘φ-complete’.
One consequence of the φ-completeness of these predicates is that GenNeg is not












‘Kolya is not a fool.’
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Coming back to PP-predicates, the derivation in (26) proceeds differently
depending on whether the sentence is existential/possessive, or
locative(-possessive). In locative(-possessive)s the subject DP raises overtly to


















The verb byt’ ‘be’ in Harves (2002: 214) is devoid of any semantic content and is
merely ‘the morphological spell-out of a functional predicational head, Pred’ that
raises overtly to T. When Tense or Aspect features are specified – in past and
future tenses – Pred raises to T, which results in the spell-out of the past and
future forms of the copula. In the present tense, Harves argues, T bears no tense
specification; if T is unspecified for tense, there is no motivation for Pred to raise
– that is why the copula is not spelled out in the present tense, as in (28-a). Note
that in Harves’s system a T that is unspecified for tense still has a Case feature to
dispatch (i.e. it is not defective with regard to agreement), thus Nominative case
is available in present tense as well.
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In existential and possessive sentences different processes take place. According to
Harves, the conspicuous spell-out of jest’ in present-tense existential sentences is
due to exceptional Pred-raising which is motivated by the derivation of the
existential interpretation. Harves follows Heycock (1994) in assuming that in
order for the subject of a small clause to receive an existential interpretation, the
nuclear scope must be ‘closed off’ by a feature of Asp – in Russian this is achieved
by feature-matching of the PP-predicate in SpecAspP. In existential sentences,
Asp probes the features of Pred and the PP predicate simultaneously; this results
in the movement of Pred to Asp, and of PP to SpecAspP.5 From SpecAspP the
PP constitutes a closer goal for the probing T such that movement to SpecTP can















As illustrated in (29), Pred does not stop in Asp – the head complex raises further
to T even in present tense, where such movement is featurally unmotivated.
Harves needs this movement to take place in order to account for the derivation of
negated sentences (see example (32)). The complex of heads Pred+Asp+T is
spelled out as jest’ in present tense (and as agreeing forms of byt’ in past and
future tenses).
The derivation becomes more complicated in negated be-sentences. Harves’s
position is that negated be-sentences with PP predicates all involve non-agreeing
byt’ -forms: net ‘is not’, ne bylo ‘was not’, ne budet ‘will not be’. Following
Babyonyshev’s (1996) idea of a defective T and Hale and Keyser’s (1993) notion of
5The movement of Pred extends the domain for the movement of PP, in the manner of Chomsky
(1993) and Den Dikken (1995).
71
4.2. The cartographic minimalist analyses
head-incorporation in the lexicon, Harves claims that the non-agreeing negated
byt’ -forms are a spell-out of a pre-syntactic incorporation of Neg into T. The
defective nature of Pred makes it possible for T to be defective (lack agreement


























The definite DP raises to Spec(Neg)TP due to the matching with the [+Topic]
feature (on which the EPP feature is parasitic) on the T head – simultaneously,
the DP receives Genitive case from the Neg head. Harves assumes that there is no
mismatch between the [+NQP] feature on Neg (a feature that requires a
non-referential DP) and the [+REF] feature on the DP, because it is enough for at
least one feature to be checked in the Neg+T complex. This derivation allows
Harves to claim to have accounted for what she calls the Existential Paradox: why
GenNeg is not subject to the Definiteness Effect in be-sentences, in contrast to
other unaccusatives and transitive constructions.
Harves’s ‘at least one’ feature-checking in the Neg+T complex means that one
feature is left hanging in the derivation unchecked – however, it looks suspicious
that it is always the [+NQP] feature of Neg that is left unchecked. Harves tries to
show that both the [+Topic] feature of T and the [+NQP] feature of Neg can be









‘Nobody was home.’ Harves (2003: 249)
The NPI element in the subject position in (31) shows, according to Harves, that
Neg can match its scope feature with the DP in Spec(Neg)TP. However, the
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interpretation of (31) is such that the NPI element nikogo ‘nobody’ can be argued
to be [+Topic] as well. Namely, nikogo refers to people whose identity is given
from the previous discourse. Thus, it seems that the [+Topic] feature of T must
be checked. This leaves the [+NQP] feature on Neg as anomalous in that it does
not need checking.
The derivation of a negated possessive sentence in Harves’s analysis is more





























Up to the level of AspP we observe the derivation of an existential/possessive
sentence already discussed above. The derivation related to the Neg+T complex is
the same as in (30-b). Because Asp is syntactically active in these sentences (it is
featurally responsible for the existential interpretation), it has to raise to T,
dragging Pred along. Note that Harves has to assume that Pred+Asp raises to T –
otherwise her analysis predicts a sequence of the type net jest’ (see Harves, p.250).
This results in a rather heavy incorporation complex – Pred+Asp+Neg+T, which
is spelled out by non-agreeing negated forms of byt’ : net, ne bylo, ne budet.7
A feature of Harves’s analysis worth mentioning is the inconsistency in the
treatment of the verb byt’ ‘be’. Harves argues insistently against the lexical status
of the verb (its existential variant), in particular as proposed in Chvany (1975). It
6Harves does not provide the structure, I constructed (32-b) from Harves’s discussion and hope
that I understood it correctly.
7In (32) GenNeg is valued on the possessum by Neg, presumably via agree; the [+NQP] is
dispatched simultaneously with the Case feature, as far as I understand Harves’s mechanism.
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is then interesting to see how Harves deals with examples like (33) which involve a











‘Father was not at sea.’ Partee and Borschev (2002)
Here the negation cannot be written off as a constituent variety, since it precedes
the verb. Harves sides with Chvany in treating the verb byt’ as an unergative
predicate similar to ‘to go’; the unergativity (φ-completeness) of the predicate
prevents it from being able to select for a defective T and GenNeg is thus ruled
out, according to Harves’s mechanism. I regard this explanation as somewhat
inconsistent: having argued against the lexical nature of existential byt’, Harves
allows for a lexical byt’ with the meaning ‘to go’.
Harves’s analysis of unaccusativity presents an intricate featural story for
be-possessives. The analysis is built on an empirical overgeneralization with
regard to PP-GenNeg pattern. In addition, it is questionable what an analysis
gains from refuting an existential predicate in favor of an Asp head that may be
unspecified for any features but still be syntactically active in order to derive an
existential interpretation.
4.2.2 Dyakonova 2007
Dyakonova (2007) is a work on the double object construction in Russian that
also contains a proposal on the treatment of possessive constructions. The
discussion of possessives constitutes just several pages in Dyakonova’s paper – the
fact that I direct so much attention (and critique) at Dyakonova’s proposal should
be considered as a tribute to its powerfulness.
In her analysis of the double object construction, Dyakonova, building on such
works as McIntyre (2006) and Pylkka¨nen (2002), develops the notion of the









‘I bought my husband a present.’
b. [vP Agent [ v [V applP Goal [ Vappl [V P Theme [ V Complement]]]]]]
The properties of Vappl are the following:
(35) a. it is a semantically contentful light verb;
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b. it has the following meaning: have (x spec, y compl) asserts of x
that it stands in a possession relationship to y ;
c. it can select either for an entity or an event. Dyakonova (2007: 18-19)
Possession in (35-b) is understood as an abstract notion, such that experiences
and states can be viewed as possessums, along with concrete objects. Besides
Goals, Vappl introduces such arguments as Experiencers, Bene-/Malefactors, and
also Possessors. Thus Vappl appears in possessives as well. The Russian
































‘I have reasons to think that. . . ’ Dyakonova (2007)
These are the three constructions that are used for the expression of predicative
possession in modern Russian, as discussed in Chapter 2. For her treatment of
possessives, Dyakonova utilizes Den Dikken’s (1998) analysis that derives double
object constructions and possessives from one underlying structure, presented in
(37):











In Den Dikken’s analysis the possessor (and also the Goal argument in the double
object construction) originates as the predicate of a small clause and subsequently
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raises to a position c-commanding the possessum/Theme. Den Dikken makes use
of domain-extending head-incorporations as a way to escape a violation of the
Minimal Link Condition.
Dyakonova applies Den Dikken’s model in (37) to the Russian data: in all of the
possessives in (36) the two arguments are organized in a small clause
configuration, where the would-be possessor is the predicate. The ‘would-be’ part
is what distinguishes Dyakonova’s analysis from Den Dikken’s: at the level of the
small clause the only relation that takes place between the two nominals is that of














‘I have a lot of his books.’
‘There are a lot of his books at my place.’
Dyakonova proposes that possessive semantics is acquired by the locative PP in
the specifier of VapplP. (39) presents Dyakonova’s derivation of the be-possessive

















In (39) the DP osnovanija ‘reasons’ is the subject of the small clause, and the
u-PP is its locative predicate. The head of the small clause, Pred, incorporates
into Vappl and thus extends the domain for the movement of the u-PP to
SpecVapplP, in the manner of Den Dikken (1998). The u-PP picks up the
possessor θ-role in SpecVapplP and then moves on to SpecTP, becoming the
subject of the clause. The complex ‘Vappl + Pred’ is spelled out either as byt’
‘be’ or imet’sja ‘have-refl’.
76
Chapter 4. Existing analyses of be-possessives














The possessor in the have-construction also originates as the locative
PP-complement of the small clause and then moves to SpecVapplP in order to
receive the possessor θ-role. The distinctive feature of the have-possessive is that
the P head is null and thus behaves as an affix that has to incorporate into the
next higher head (Baker 1988). Incorporation of P into Pred leaves the DP inside
the PP caseless, such that the DP is assigned the Nominative case by T. The
‘P+Pred+Vappl’ complex is spelled out as imet’ ‘have’.
Dyakonova’s analysis, though cleverly designed, encounters a series of problems.
Some of the problems are noted by Dyakonova herself, such as the unconventional
movement into a θ-position and the choice of spell-out as either byt’ or imet’sja in
(39). To deal with the first problem, Dyakonova refers to Lee-Schoenfeld (2006)
where θ-motivated movement is defended from a minimalist standpoint. As for the
spell-out of the Pred+Vappl complex in the anticausative possessive, Dyakonova
permits the possibility that, given the reflexive morphology on imet’sja, the
derivation for this construction may be more complex than indicated in (39).
Presumably, the derivation would have to employ two possessive PPs: a PP with a
null P is necessary in order to derive the imet’ -form (some kind of deletion of this
PP would probably lead to the spell-out of the reflexive suffix -sja), and a PP with
the overt u-P must enter the derivation at some point, perhaps base-generated in
a second VapplP projection (or as a locative predicate traveling to this second
VapplP). I abstain from attempting to construct this derivation here.
The dependence of the analysis on head-incorporation may turn out to be its
weakness, especially when it comes to deriving temporary be-possessives. I
presume that for Dyakonova, the subject position in the temporary possessive in
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However, in its movement to SpecTP from the subject position of the small clause
the possessum DP crosses the u-PP in SpecVapplP, thus violating the Minimal
Link Condition; the domain-extending incorporation of Pred into Vappl cannot
be appealed to in this case, as this movement renders the u-PP and the possessum
DP equidistant with regard to Vappl, but not T. Of course, in (41-b) another
head-incorporation is possible: incorporation of the Pred+Vappl complex into T
would render the possessum and the u-PP equidistant to T. This solution brings
about at least two potential problems which I merely indicate here. The first
problem concerns the spell-out of the T+Pred+Vappl complex. Given that the
Pred+Vappl complex is spelled out as jest’ in the alienable possessive in
Dyakonova’s proposal, it is expected that the addition of the functional head T
would not change the spell-out option – however, in the copular temporary









‘Arsˇavin is in the possession of the ball.’
The second problem is the scale of the effect of head-incorporation: namely, it is
questionable whether the incorporation of Pred+Vappl into T can facilitate the
movement of the Theme DP out of the small clause, as the Theme DP might be
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too embedded in the extended VapplP phase (on freezing effects of
head-incorporation see Den Dikken (2006)).
4.2.3 Jung 2011
Jung (2011) develops an analysis of the argument structure of the Russian
be-possessive with the intention of parameterizing the have/be alternation in
“possessive and possessive-related” constructions. At the base of Jung’s analysis is
Kayne’s (1993) model, augmented by the Low Focus projection of Belletti (2001)
and Erechko (2002).
Jung follows Hazout (2004) and Borschev and Partee (2002) in assuming that the
differences between locative and existential structures should be reflected in their
syntax: in particular, in existentials and possessives the “location” must be
construed as the external argument. Jung supports this standpoint by findings
from Serbian and Polish existential constructions (Hartmann and Milic´evic´ (2008),
Blaszczak (2007b)). She also presents an empirical argument of her own based on
Moro’s (1997) wh-extraction test that distinguishes between canonical and inverse
copular structures: Jung shows that according to this test the predicate behavior
in the Russian be-possessive is displayed by the possessum. The example sets in
(43) and (44) present wh-extraction out of the arguments in wh-questions and
relativization contexts. (43) contains extraction out of the possessor argument and






































‘She liked that novel, the author of which had some taste.’ Jung
(2011, 78)
The sharp ungrammaticality of wh-extraction in (43) may be ascribed to either
the subject status or the adjunct status of the possessor – here Jung refers to the
reflexive-binding power of the possessor and concludes that it must be the subject
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‘She liked that author, books of whom she had.’ Jung (2011, 78)
Jung suggests that the acceptability of the examples in (44) indicates that the
possessum is the predicate in the be-possessive.8 Jung proposes that the possessor
and the possessum are organized in an asymmetric small clause embedded under a
semantically void functional predicate F (‘have’ or ‘be’). In the choice of the form










The possessor DP is the subject of the small clause nP and the possessum is the
predicate. The possessor DP receives its Genitive case from the immediately
c-commanding P/D – a semantically empty functional head; a [+Case] P in
Russian is lexicalized as u ‘at’.
In Kayne’s original proposal (for the Hungarian data) the possessum NP must
move to a higher projection in order to enable remnant movement of the PP/DP –
such that the surface order is derived. In her critique of a Kayne-style analysis for
Russian possessives, Harves (2003:178) points out that it is not clear what this
higher functional projection harboring the possessum NP would be. Jung’s
solution to this problem is the LowFocus projection. Jung assumes that narrow
focus in Russian is achieved by the movement of the corresponding element into
the TP-internal Low Focus projection, as argued for in Erechko (2002). As the
8For a full discussion of the wh-extraction test and more examples see Jung (2011: 74-81).
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possessum NP in the Russian be-possessive usually constitutes new information, it
can move to LowFocP. The derivation of the be-possessive in (46-a) would thus
proceed as indicated in (46-b):





























The n’ -level containing the possessum NP moves to the specifier of the
TP-internal Low Focus projection. Because P is specified as [+Case] in (46-b), the
derivation does not need a case assigner other than Tense – this is why the
structure involves the [-Case] be-predicate. After the possessum vacates the
PP/DP, the possessor must move to SpecTP to satisfy the EPP, but cannot do so
on its own, because the prepositional complementizer P cannot be stranded. As a
result the whole PP/DP is pied-piped to SpecTP.9 In this way Jung accounts for
the constituent behavior of the preposition and the possessor DP that in her
structure do not make up a constituent.
One of the conspicuous features of Jung’s analysis is that it relies on n’ -movement.
Jung (2011:48) mentions Harves’s (2003) objection to P’-movement in Freeze
(1992) and does not find it well-motivated in view of recent minimalist works that
allow participation of X’-projections in syntactic operations. In particular, Mayr
and Schmitt show in their (2008) GLOW talk that the C’-phrase may participate
in coordination and possibly ellipsis and movement. I do not go into a discussion
9Jung (2008: 186) allows a possibility that on its way to SpecTP the PP/DP may stop over in
the IP-internal Low Topic phrase that immediately dominates LowFocusP.
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of Mayr and Schmitt (2008), but will note the following: in the Agree framework,
where movement is based on the checking of features, the XP-phrase does not
have a feature-set distinct from that of the X’-level. Thus, there is no featural
reason for XP to stay behind when the X’-level is moving. In footnote 18, Jung
(2011:92) notes that it is also possible that only the NP level moves to
SpecLowFocP. If I understood correctly, Jung opts for the n’ -movement in (46-b)
in order to make the structure more applicable to the deontic modal constructions
and North-Russian perfective constructions where X’ -movement is necessary if the
surface structure is to be derived within Jung’s analysis.
Jung applies her PP/XP structure to a variety of constructions resorting to varied
featural specifications of heads. The be-possessive contains an overt P with a
[+Case] feature responsible for the assignment of the Genitive case to the
possessor DP. The have-possessive differs from the be-possessive in that it involves
a null P with a [-Case] feature specification in a structure essentially identical to








As a consequence of the [-Case] feature specification of the P/D head, the [+Case]
allomorph of predicate F is inserted – this is imet’ ‘have’ (Jung 2011: 94). In the
rest, the derivation of the have-possessive is similar to that of the be-possessive:
the possessum raises to LowFocP and the PP/DP (with a null caseless P)
remnant-moves to SpecTP. Jung (2011) does not seem to discuss the
imet’sja-possessive, but it would not be problematic for her analysis, as the forms
of imet’ ‘have’ are not derived by P-incorporation (as they are in Dyakonova’s
(2007) analysis).10
Jung extends her analysis of possessives to what she calls deontic modal
constructions illustrated in (48):11
10See Jung’s discussion of Polish and Serbian possessives with an overt P and a have-verb
(Jung 2011: in passim).
11Jung also devotes significant attention to the perfect tense construction in North Russian
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‘Where did I have to leave for?’ Jung (2011: 107)
The constructions in (48) contain a Dative argument, the verb byt’ ‘be’ and an
infinitival clause. Jung assumes that these constructions are bi-clausal. For one of
the diagnostics Jung turns to Fleischer’s (2006) data on the position of negation





























‘The city was not surrounded by the enemy.’ Fleischer (2006)
Fleischer shows that in the modal construction negation follows byt’, in contrast
to the passive construction in (49-c) with the auxiliary byt’. The negation data
motivate the position of byt’ as outside of the infinitival clause in the modal
construction. The embedded clause, according to Jung, is a PP/CP-structure with
a null [+Case] prepositional complementizer P/C that assigns Dative:









‘Where did I have to leave for?’
which I do not discuss here, limiting myself to Standard Russian.
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The subject of the embedded clause mne ‘me’ raises from its external argument
position in vP to SpecTP where it is assigned Dative case by the immediately
c-commanding null P/C head. After this, the T’-level moves to the Low Focus
projection of the main clause. Finally, the embedded PP/CP containing mne in
SpecTP remnant-moves to the specifier of the main TP. Jung does not indicate
the positions of the wh-element in the derivation, but it is interesting to track its
route. With its final position in the specifier of the main CP, the wh-element kuda
‘where’ presumably originates in the embedded clause (e.g. as a VP adjunct).
From here there are two routes for the wh-element in Jung’s structure, both of
which involve left-branch extraction. The first route is where the wh-element
moves to the specifier of the embedded PP/CP. When the PP/CP remnant-moves
to the specifier of the main TP, the wh-element is still trapped inside, as the main
CP is not constructed yet. Thus, when the main CP is available, the movement of
kuda to its specifier constitutes extraction out of a subject. The second route
involves the wh-element ‘waiting’ in its base position in the embedded VP and
piggy-backing on the T’ when the latter moves to the specifier of the LowFocP in
the main clause. Although here the wh-element is closer to the main CP, it is still
trapped in a left branch (SpecLowFocP).
Coming back to be-possessives, Jung’s analysis may have problems with copular
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‘The secretary has your letter.’ Jung (2011: 39)
In order to be able to derive (51) from her structure, Jung must subscribe to a
dissociation of definiteness from the presence of the DP-layer: the possessum noun
must be expressed by an n’ -phrase in the structure proposed by Jung. (52) is the













The surface order in (51) is derived by the movement of the possessum n’-phrase
to SpecTP, either directly or through a Low Topic phrase. The PP/DP containing
the preposition u and the possessor DP must remain in situ (even though it is
focused) because there is no grammatical derivation that could transport the
possessum to SpecTP and the remnant PP/DP to LowFocP. If the PP/DP moves
to SpecLowFocP, the possessum cannot move out as that would constitute
extraction from a specifier. The only possibility seems to be for the PP/DP to be
“tucked into” the SpecLowFocP after the possessum has moved out – this option
is acceptable for those who do not mind countercyclicity of syntactic operations.
The non-constituency of the preposition and the possessor DP seems to be the
main problem of Jung’s analysis – it compels Jung to resort to such (Kayne-style)
solutions as evacuation of the possessum and remnant movement, making the
analysis complicated and more susceptible to error. The analysis is also to a
certain degree dependent on the possibility of X’-movement.
Still, there are several points that attract me in Jung’s analysis. First is that Jung
distinguishes between locative and existential constructions. Second, Jung
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constructs the possessum as the predicate – in Chapter 5 I claim this to be the
case for some of the be-possessives. Finally, Jung, though allowing for the
existential predicate, does not include it into the basic structure of possessives.
4.3 Discussion
All of the analyses presented in this chapter provide one underlying structure for
all be-possessives – constructions that, as we have seen in Chapter 3, display quite
diverse properties.
Constructed mainly to account for the existential be-possessive, the analyses
struggle with copular possessives and need additional assumptions – that do not
always work, such as the rule of ∃-deletion in Chvany (1975). In the three
post-Freezian analyses additional challenges are presented by the dependence on
re-ordering operations that are assumed to take place before the movement of the
possessor phrase to the subject position (SpecTP). The re-ordering in Harves
(2003) and Dyakonova (2007) is of Den Dikken’s (1993, 1995) type, i.e. mainly
aiming to avoid an MLC violation. The re-ordering in Jung’s analysis is of the
Kaynean type – striving to derive the constituent behavior of the non-constituent
u-PP. These re-ordering operations complicate the derivation to the degree that
some of the be-possessive constructions cannot be accounted for. Extension of the
accounts to the have-possessive in post-Freezian analyses brings further problems,
such as conflicting featural specifications of heads in Dyakonova (2007).
The assumption of one underlying structure for the be-possessives thus turns out
to be a weakness of these analyses. For the Minimalist analyses the unification
drive is generally determined by the cartographic enterprise. More specifically, the
motivation for the unification seems to be the UTAH. First, the analyses strive to
reduce the role of Possessor (independent of the encoding strategy) to one of the
macro-roles that the UTAH operates on; then, bound by the UTAH, the analyses
proceed to identify the universal structure for possessives: both for the locational
be-possessive and for the transitive have-possessive. In Dyakonova’s analysis a
Possessor θ-role is acquired by a locative element in SpecVapplP, which itself has
a fixed position in the clause. In Jung’s analysis a possessor is basically an agent
and is projected as the subject of a small clause. Even in Chvany (1975), a
pre-Freezian/pre-UTAH analysis, a possessor is always projected as an “Indirect
Object” (Goal). In Chapter 2 I have discussed in sufficient detail the issues of
meaning-to-structure mapping in general and with regard to possessive
constructions in particular. In the next chapter I develop an analysis of
be-possessives in which the possessor element does not have to be introduced in
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the same position in the clause: it must only be in a local relation with the
predicate responsible for the possessor semantics.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I reviewed the existing analyses of the Russian be-possessives that
can be divided into two groups: the transformational account of Chvany (1975)
and the post-Freezian analyses all couched in the minimalist framework (Harves
2003, Dyakonova 2007 and Jung 2011). In the review of these analyses one of the
issues has been to what extent an analysis accommodates the diverse properties of
the Russian be-possessives. I demonstrate that aspirations to derive all types of
be-possessives from one underlying structure meet a reality of data that is quite
unfriendly. The benefit of economy of representation that is achieved by having
one underlying structure for a variety of be-possessives is diminished by the
amount of operations (head-incorporations, remnant movements) that are
necessary in order to derive the attested word orders. We need a more flexible





In the previous chapter we have observed the need for an analysis of be-possessives
that can accommodate the diverse properties of these constructions. Moreover,
this analysis must be compatible with the dynamic syntax approach: priority
must be given to local configurations, with no reference to global considerations.
The proposal that I present in this chapter targets only the Russian
be-possessives, and namely the three types identified in Chapter 3: the existential
be-possessive, the copular property be-possessive and the copular temporary
be-possessive. The analysis may be extended to other languages that employ the
locational strategy for expressing predicative possession. I propose that
u-possessors are introduced by a predicate that is responsible for possessor
semantics. The different types of be-possessives are derived by the different
merging places of this predicate phrase. In my syntactic analysis I tap into the
observations from typological, cognitive and historical linguistics.
5.1 The nature of the u-PP: introducing AnchorP
How do we derive the meaning of possession in be-possessives? To tackle this
question we need another quick glance at the general tendencies in the literature.
There have been proposals that be-languages (languages that use a be-sentence for
the expression of predicative possession) do not have a notion of possession:
Isacˇenko (1974) describes the meaning of possessive u-PPs in Russian as “concern
or implication”. However, typologists like Heine (1997) and Stassen (2009) argue
5.1. The nature of the u-PP: introducing AnchorP
that possession is a basic notion of human cognition, independent of culture and
the stage of social development.
A popular view in various linguistic schools has been to equate possession with
location; this localist tradition includes such scholars as Benveniste (1960),
Lyons (1967), Clark (1978), Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev (1983), Freeze (1992),
Borschev and Partee (1998). In this approach possessors are minimally different
from locations only with regard to some [+Human] feature, as in Freeze (1992);
see also Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev (1983) who describe possessors in Russian as
‘personalized localizers’ (licˇnostnyje lokalizatory). We have seen, however, that
more is needed than a [+Human] specification for a morphologically locative
phrase to acquire a possessive meaning. For example, Freeze (1992) has to explain



































‘The table has carved legs.’
Examples like (1-a) demonstrate that the use of animate nouns in PPs other than
the u-PP does not yield a possessive interpretation; on the other hand,
u-possessors may have inanimate referents, as shown in (1-b) and (1-c).
In Chapter 2 I discuss a composite understanding of the notion of possession
where the two parameters involved are spatial unity and c-control.1 This view is
defended in such works as Seiler (1973, 1983), Hage`ge (1993), Heine (1997), Baron
and Herslund (2001), Stassen (2009). In Chapter 2 I state that a composite
understanding of possession yields more flexibility to an analysis that wishes to be
compatible with the diverse typological picture of possession.
1As discussed in Chapter 2, by c-control I refer to the cognitive notion of control, not to be
confused with the syntactic notion. Evans (1995) gives the following description of c-control in
possessive constructions:
(i) ‘X [the possessor] can expect Y [the possessee] to be in the same place as X when X wants,
and X can do with Y what X wants.’ Evans (1995, 146)
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The intuition that possession is something more than just location can in fact be
observed in several generative analyses. Dyakonova (2007), as discussed in
Chapter 4, proposes that a Possessor role is acquired by a locative element in the
specifier of VapplP, the projection that is also responsible for the assignment of
such roles as Benefactor, Malefactor, Experiencer, Goal. Jung (2011), although
including Freeze’s (1992) typological claims into the foundation of her analysis,
moves away from the Possessor-as-Location view and argues that the possessor
should be projected as the external argument – in this way Jung stresses the
association of possessors with the notions of agency and ergativity.
In cognitive linguistic research the prominent status of the possessor motivated
another useful imagery – reference points. A reference point in Langacker (1993)
is an entity that helps establish mental contact with another entity in the
conceptual space; a reference point is thus the prominent element in its dominion,
like a tower in a landscape. In the case of possessors the understanding of the
dominion shifts from physical proximity to personal sphere: the dominion of the
possessor is determined as its “abstract region of control”, as stated in
Cienki (1995: 83), who offers a cognitive analysis of possessive and locative PPs in
Russian and Bulgarian. I take the mechanism of reference points to be the
underlying base of the locational possessive strategy. The possessor acts as a
locative anchor for an expression – it is a red pin that helps us locate an
object/event/state on the map of the possible worlds.
The general tradition of meaning-to-structure mapping in generative linguistics
motivates making the possessor element ‘responsible’ for the meaning of
possession: if a structure contains a neutral argument and another argument that
has a more specific meaning, it is the latter argument that is supposed to
participate in some special syntactic configuration. For example, an Agent is
introduced by an agentive v, a Goal argument in some analyses is introduced by
an applicative predicate (Pylkka¨nen 2002). In the Russian be-possessive it is the
possessor argument that is characterized by a morphologically conspicuous form.
I assume that possessors in a locational possessive strategy are introduced by a
predicate that I refer to as Anchor. In the formulation of this predicate I refer to
typological and cognitive research. (2-a-b) provide the content of the predicate,
(2-c) gives a structural representation:
(2) Predicate Anchor introduces an argument X that:
a. serves as a reference-point (an anchor) for its sister phrase;





. . . Anchor XP
. . .
The description of the Anchor predicate in (2) is supposed to derive the duality of
prepositional possessors in locational possessive constructions such as the Russian
be-possessive: the possessors are associated with location and at the same time
exhibit c-control, which is a realization of the dependency (represented by the
arrow) between the u-PP and its sister phrase. The Anchor predicate introducing
u-possessors can take a variety of syntactic phrases as its complement. In what
follows I show how the merging of AnchorP at various points of the derivation
yields the observed types of be-possessives. I start the discussion from the
existential be-possessive in section 5.2: the construction has been the object of
much research and constitutes the prototypical type of predicative possession.
Section 5.3 presents the analysis of copular be-possessives.
5.2 The existentials
The existential be-possessive is usually grouped together with existential














‘There is no doctor in the village.’
The common properties include the distribution and behavior of the verb byt’ ‘be’
and the Genitive of Negation, discussed in Chapter 2. There are further
commonalities regarding the characteristics of Themes that I discuss in section
5.2.2. In section 5.2.1 I present an analysis for Russian existential be-sentences
and then go on to analyze the existential be-possessive as an existential
construction enhanced by the Anchor phrase.
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5.2.1 The existential construction
In my analysis of existential sentences in Russian I assume the existence of
predicate V∃, following a range of scholars who postulate an existential element in
Russian be-sentences in some disguise or other: lexical verb ∃ (Chvany 1975),
existential operator (Kondrashova 1996), existential byt’ ‘be’ (Pereltsvaig 2001).
In Russian, the “purest” spell-out of the existential predicate, without any
additional semantic flavors, is available in the form of the verb byt’ ‘be’. I do not
argue for a lexical status of the verb byt’ ‘be’ itself – at least not at this stage of
the language’s development. I hypothesize that byt’ may have started out as a
lexical predicate meaning ‘exist’, but later grammaticalized to functional usages
and is now used to spell out a range of verbal heads: T, Asp, ∃ and probably Pred
under certain circumstances. I subscribe to the following definition of predicate
V∃:
(4) Predicate V∃ is a lexical verb that states that an entity is instantiated in a
larger domain.
I start unraveling the content of the predicate from the relation it establishes with
the existee argument. In my understanding of the predicate’s content I am drawn
to the analyses of McNally (1998) and Paducˇeva (2000) who argue that the
existential predicate holds of property-denoting expressions or non-particulars.
Paducˇeva (2000) states that the predicate is a predicative quantifier and as such
posits a non-referentiality restriction on its argument; definite nouns are thus
generally excluded from existential constructions (the well-known ‘Definiteness
effect’) due to their referentiality.2 McNally (1998) ascribes the Definiteness effect
to the linguistically conventionalized pragmatic condition on the predicate that its
argument’s referent be novel in the common ground of the conversation (definite
NPs designate familiar referents). There are, however, contexts when definite
nouns are allowed in existentials:





















2Paducˇeva singles out three abstract predicate-lexemes: exist, exist in a world, and there
is. I collapse these lexemes into one predicate.
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‘Do you want to rest? There is an armchair on the veranda.’ Paducˇeva
(2000: 7)
McNally (1998) and Paducˇeva (2000) differ somewhat in their treatment of
examples in (5), but the common point is the following: semantically, the
post-verbal definite noun is a property, it denotes the class of objects that includes
the referent whose identity is familiar in the present discourse. McNally
emphasizes that the referent is not directly associated with the postverbal NP –
the existence of a particular individual simply supports the truth of the existential
claim. McNally and Paducˇeva do seem to be on the right track with regard to
Russian data, as it seems that definite nouns are always re-introduced into the
discourse in Russian existential sentences on the basis of their possible function,
usefulness. This can be seen in the few examples presented above: in (5-b) Kolya
is introduced into the discourse by virtue of the way he could be helpful to the
speaker; in (5-c), the Bolshoi Theater is relevant with regard to its ‘visitability’.
That is, it is not the ‘whole’ definite noun that is introduced in a given statement,
but some relevant property of this noun. A definite noun is not allowed in an






The property-type analyses of McNally (1998) and Paducˇeva (2000) also account
for the interpretation of strong quantifiers in existential sentences. According to
McNally, strong quantifiers that range over individuals (particulars) are
ungrammatical in existential contexts because they do not satisfy the lexical
restrictions of the existential predicate; on the other hand, strong quantifiers that
range over non-particulars (kinds, sorts) are allowed. The existential sentence in
(7-a) is grammatical only if vse knigi ‘all books’ is interpreted with regard to
book-titles, not individual books; the interpretation of the strong quantifier phrase
in (7-b) is likewise restricted to sorts.
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‘Moscow has all sorts of entertainment.’
The property-type view of the existee is also highly relevant for the Russian data
with regard to the Genitive of Negation – the case that appears on existees (among
other things) under negation. In section 3.2 I discuss the analysis of Partee and
Borschev (2004) and Borschev et al. (2008) who develop a property-type account
of the Genitive of Negation; I assume the position that in Russian GenNeg
appears under negation on property-type Themes. Thus, a negated existential

























‘Vanja is not at home.’
With definite DPs, as in (8-c), GenNeg is interpreted as ‘no trace of x ’: no trace
of Vanja is observed at home. Partee and Borschev observe that a common trait
for all instances of GenNeg is the decreased referentiality of the noun, which the
authors ascribe to the semantic type of the noun – {e, t}. Partee and Borschev
are aware of the property-type analysis of existentials by McNally (1998) and
Paducˇeva (2000), but they still allow a possibility of Nominative existees being of
type {e}. As already stated, I follow McNally and Paducˇeva in assuming that
existees in be-sentences are always of type {e, t}, independent of their
morphological case: this may be why existees in be-sentences are obligatorily
Genitive under negation, in contrast to transitive constructions where an NP can
either change to Genitive or remain Accusative.
As for its syntactic representation, Levin and Rappaport-Hovav (1995: 153) have
argued for a ‘direct internal argument’ status of the existee, and it has been
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common in the literature to refer to the existee as the Theme, a tradition that I
follow in this thesis. I furthermore assume that Themes in existentials are
projected as NPs, i.e. I adhere to the conservative position of category-type
correspondence, with {e, t}-type nouns represented in the syntax as NPs (and
{e}-type nouns as DPs). Thus far we have established the following syntactic




(9) demonstrates a lexical predicate V∃ with the existee argument represented as
its Theme; the Theme has an NP-structure and is of the {e,t}-type.
Furthermore, there is a view that if an entity exists it necessarily does so in some
location – this statement is not only motivated theoretically, but is also based on
the observation that cross-linguistically existential constructions tend to contain
locative-like elements. The association of existence with location has a long
tradition: Clark (1978), Kimball (1973), Lyons (1967), Arutyunova and Sˇirjaev
(1983), Freeze (1992), Partee and Borschev (2008). Location in these works is
understood in an abstract way and includes such notions as e.g. state,
spatio-temporal region, the speaker’s/hearer’s perceptual field, and also possessor
(Partee and Borschev 2008). When location is not explicitly stated (and not
motivated contextually), as in (10), “locativist” theories of existence assume an













According to Partee and Borschev, (10-a) denies the existence of unicorns in the
actual world – the same explanation would apply to (10-b). Arutyunova and
Sˇirjaev (1983) offer a more detailed interpretation of bare existential constructions.
According to the authors, sentences like (10-b) (involving abstract ‘existees’) are
encountered in contexts involving conflicting world-views: the Theme represents a
notion that constitutes a part of the speaker’s worldview, and the sentence may be
uttered as an argument against a different worldview, a reminder or a behavior
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directive (ustanovka na povedenije). In connection with the examples in (10) an
objection may arise as to whether a syntactic representation of implicit locatives is
licit. After all, all other kinds of predicates (such as ‘read’ or ‘die’) express events
or states that take place in some location, but no location arguments are posited
in the base structures of those predicates. One could thus take the sentences in
(10) to be instantiations of bare existential structures, containing only the
existential predicate and the Theme. The only half-formal test that I can think of
at the moment is the behavior of abstract existees with regard to location
expressions. Sentences like (10) can namely involve overt locations – and the only















































‘There are only two infinities in the world: the Universe and human
stupidity.’ (paraphrase of Einstein’s ‘Only two things are infinite. . . ’)
I take this restriction to ‘world’-locations to mean that the universe-location is
present in the syntactic structures of the seemingly bare existential sentences, and
is active. I follow the locativist tradition by assuming that existential statements
contain a second component besides the existee – the location, which is best
understood not as a physical place, but as an abstract domain.
Now that we have established that existential constructions involve a location
argument besides the existee, the question is where and how to project it.
Starting with Freeze (1992), the generative tradition has predominantly treated
existential constructions as an instance of locative inversion. In this line of
thinking the location argument is constructed as the locative predicate before





Note that in inversion-based analyses an existential predicate is unnecessary or
ruled out. In the analyses reviewed in Chapter 4 a derivation of this type is
attributed to existentials in Harves (2003).
On the other hand, a number of opinions has been expressed in the literature
(B laszczak 2008; Hartmann and Milic´evic´ 2008) arguing that existential and
locative constructions involve different basic structures. One of the inspirational
sources for these opinions can be found in the notion of Perspectival Structure
developed by Partee and Borschev in a range of works (Borschev and Partee 2002,
Partee and Borschev 2008). The authors state that the differences between
locative and existential sentences stem from the choice of the Perspectival Center
– the normally presupposed participant of the situation from whose point of
departure the situation is structured (Partee and Borschev 2008: 156). The
authors do not explicate the syntactic implementation of their proposal; their
provisional hypothesis is that the choice of Perspectival Center follows from the
choice of argument structure: a verb with two arguments, Theme and Location,
can project its arguments in two different ways, similarly to spray-load and
give-send verbs. This means that if the locative is chosen as the Perspectival
Center in existential constructions, there should be a way in the syntax to project
the locative in a prominent position, presumably without recourse to inversion.
B laszczak (2008) follows up on the proposals of Partee and Borschev and suggests
that existentials, locatives and possessives each involve a different base structure.
B laszczak (2008, 38) assumes that existentials and possessives involve a stative
lexical predicate that “describes (denies) the existence of an entity at a particular
location”. The predicate takes the existee as its internal argument, and the
location/possessor as its (non-agentive) external argument, as illustrated in (13-b):
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I follow the intuitions of Partee and Borschev (2002, 2007) and B laszczak (2008)
and assume that the location element of the existential predicate is projected in a
position c-commanding the Theme.3 In the process of writing I have considered
two structural possibilities: one where both the location and the Theme are
construed as arguments of the existential predicate (14-a), and the other where








The dyadic unaccusative structure satisfies the location requirement in a
straightforward way. The composite structure is also compatible with the location
requirement: the need of the existential predicate for a larger domain is satisfied
by the predicate introducing such a domain. The semantic analysis of McNally
(1998) is probably compatible with both structures in (14): on the one hand, she
develops a ‘1-place property of properties’ analysis of the existential predicate, on
the other hand, the existential predicate in her analysis is represented by ‘there
be’ which she treats as an unanalyzed unit, partly in order to simplify the
discussion. Note that Partee and Borschev (2007, 8), despite their ‘Existence is
relative’ Principle, do not promote a dyadic unaccusative view of existential
predicates – they state that rather than viewing Thing and Location as roles of
the verb byt’, ‘it is undoubtedly better to consider them roles of the participants
of the situation (or state) of existing’, which is compatible with the composite
structure. The precise argument structure of the existential construction is not of
principal importance in this thesis, as long as the location argument is constructed
above the Theme. I do not pursue this issue further and adopt the structure in
(14-b) for existential constructions.
5.2.2 The structure of the existential be-possessive
I assume that the structure that the existential be-possessive shares with an
existential be-sentence is V∃P, containing the existential predicate and the Theme.
The domain requirement of the existential predicate is satisfied by the Anchor
phrase: all that a V∃ needs is a reference domain in the conceptual continuum to
3For locative sentences I assume a small-clause structure, with the Theme projected as the
subject and location as the predicate.
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which it can be ‘pinned’, and the u-PP satisfies this need by providing a reference

















In (15) predicate V∃ asserts the existence of an entity of the designated type –
masˇina ‘car’. This state of existence takes place in the domain anchored and
c-controlled by the referent of the u-PP, which is interpreted as the possessor of
the Theme.
The V∃P-layer that the existential be-possessive has in common with the
existential be-sentence is the structural source of the common properties that have
been discussed in Chapter 3: the behavior of the verb byt’ ‘be’, the negated forms
of the predicate and the occurrence of GenNeg. Furthermore, Themes in the
existential be-possessive have general existential characteristics with regard to the
following properties: interpretation of strong quantifiers, qualitative modification
and definiteness. Universal quantifiers like vse ‘all’ and deictic determiners like

























‘I have this book (title).’
The pronoun jego ‘his’ in (16-a) facilitates a type-interpretation by designating
the author of the CDs; without the pronoun a type-interpretation would be
difficult to attain and the quantifier vse ‘all’ would be interpreted as a universal
quantifier over individuals, causing ungrammaticality. The deictic phrase e`ta
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kniga ‘this book’ refers to a book-title, not a particular book.
Qualitative modification of the Theme in the existential be-possessive implies a






















‘We don’t have interesting books.’/‘Among our books there are no
interesting ones.’
The use of a qualitatively modified Theme in combination with jest’ in (17-a)
creates a strong implication that the mentioned red dress is not the only dress in
the speaker’s possession. The same applies to (17-b), where the use of the
adjectival modifier presupposes a larger set of books including also non-interesting
ones.
Definite Themes, that were discussed earlier in the context of existential
be-sentences, are also allowed in the existential possessive – the construction then





















According to Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev (1983: 151), names and pronouns in
possessive contexts tend to be interpreted relationally: in terms of the role that
the given referent plays in someone’s microworld (spouse, family) and in terms of
the ways this person could be of help to the referent of the u-PP. The examples in
(18) are possessive parallels to the existential examples with definite nouns in (5).
A possible interpretation of (18) is that the referent of the u-PP has some
particular person to rely on, to love, etc. We have seen in the previous section in
example set (5) how definite existees are re-introduced in existential constructions
by virtue of a property that is relevant in a given context – the same seems to be
happening in (18), where a familiar referent (expressed by the definite possessum)
is re-introduced in the existential possessive on the basis of some relevant
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property.4 Note that the other two Russian predicative possessives (to be
discussed in Chapter 6) cannot have definite Themes. (19-a) illustrates the

















Whatever account one assumes for the definite Themes in (18), it has to be
associated with existentiality, not possession on the whole.
A further argument in favor of assuming an existential statement in the base of
the existential be-possessive comes from the fact that the verb susˇcˇestvovat’ ‘exist’







































































‘Although they live in one house, he has another woman.’ (Pisemskij,
1877)
4See also the discussion of definite possessums in the context of modal possessive constructions
in Chapter 7.
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Such examples are attested both in contemporary discourse and in older texts. I
assume that the occurrence of the verb susˇcˇestvovat’ with u-possessors supports
the presence of predicate ∃ in the existential be-possessive.
There are also properties in which the existential be-possessive and the existential
be-sentence differ – this is likewise captured by the structures proposed for these
two constructions. There are namely at least two types of Themes that behave
differently in the two constructions: concept Themes and relational Themes.
Concept Themes may occur in existential be-sentences (either bare or with an
























As you can see in (21-c), however, the be-possessive does not allow such concept
Themes. My explanation of the contrast in (21) is trivial: concept Themes must
occur with an implicit or explicit domain argument that means ‘the world,
universe’. Such type of domains are not available in the possessive structure in
(15-b), not even if one assumes a silent adverbial meaning ‘the world’ embedded in
the Anchor phrase, because this world -domain would be modified by the u-PP
and mean something like ‘my world’.
Relational Themes have a distribution reverse to that of concept Themes – they
























‘There is a sister in Moscow.’
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It has been argued that relational nouns like sestra ‘sister’ contain a possessor
variable – Partee and Borschev (2001) refer to this variable as the relation
variable R. In the existential possessive in (22-a) the possessor element provides
an entity to bind the relational variable. Relational nouns introduced in an
existential context do not have a contextually defined possessor, and so (22-b) and
(22-c) are ungrammatical. The only grammatical interpretation for sestra ‘sister’
in (22-c) is the speaker’s sister – the construction then has the same meaning of
availability as with definite possessums; this contextually defined referent for the
‘possessor’ of the sister can be observed in all non-existential contexts where
relational nouns are used.
Going further with the properties of the existential be-possessive, the base
structure proposed in (15-b) is compatible with Jung’s (2011) findings on
wh-extraction possibilities, discussed in section 4.2.3. Recall namely that Jung
demonstrates that wh-extraction out of the possessor argument is sharply
ungrammatical, whereas extraction out of the possessum is relatively acceptable –
this allowed Jung to conclude that the possessor must be the ‘subject’ and the
possessum the predicate in the base structure. The structure in (15-b) is different
from Jung’s PP/DP-small-clause, but the main configuration is still compatible
with the wh-extraction pattern.
Furthermore, in Chapter 3 we have seen how the existential be-possessive fares
with regard to Keenan’s (1976) presupposed reference test: the u-PP clearly
comes out as the element with the more stable reference, whereas the reference of
the Theme can be suspended under negation, questioning and conditionalization.
Besides the structural implications about subjecthood, these results find an
additional account in (15-b): the u-PP serves as the reference point for the rest of
the structure and is thus endowed with a stable reference at the conceptual level.
The reference of the Theme can be easily suspended due to its {e,t}-type, i.e. the
fact that it does not refer to a specific entity. The u-PP in the existential
be-possessive can undergo movement to the subject position (that in the
traditional Minimalist view is SpecTP) and there is no need for a preliminary
re-ordering of structure that some of the analyses reviewed in Chapter 4 have to
resort to.
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In the representation in (23) I also indicate that the proposed structure is
compatible with the LowFocus projection of Erechko (2002), discussed in Jung
(2011). Crucially, the derivation does not depend on the presence of this
projection: remember that in Jung (2011) the possessum must move to LowFocP
in order to enable remnant movement of the PP/DP to the subject position. In
(23) the u-PP is a constituent to the exclusion of the Theme, such that no
possessum-evacuation is necessary for the u-PP to be able to move to a higher
position; both the possessor and the possessum may move to the Low Focus
position on their own. The relation between the Tense head and its dependent is
spelled out on the existential predicate that takes on different tense-forms of the
verb byt’ ‘be’. In the negated be-possessive the derivation is minimally different













NegP in (24) acts as sentential negation and takes the V∃P as its dependent.5
The dependency with Neg is spelled out on the predicate V∃ as a negated form of
byt’. For the form net I assume a continuous spell-out of elements: the sequence
Neg-V∃ is spelled out as net.6 The dependency between Neg and its sister phrase
also finds an expression on the Theme NP as GenNeg.
In Chapter 3 we have seen that the u-PP in the existential be-possessive binds
reflexives within the possessum and in the rest of the clause. The structure
proposed for the existential be-possessive is compatible with several theoretical
models of binding. The position of the u-PP in SpecTP satisfies the mainstream
subject-oriented model. According to the derivational model of binding
represented by Williams (2006) and Bailyn (2009), the configuration relevant for
Principle A must be established before vP – in the structure in (23) the relevant
binding configuration is established at the level of AnchorP. Zwart (2006a)
presents binding as a realization of the dependency between the controller and the
dependent XPs: in (23) the u-PP is the controller of the phrase containing the
possessum, at every stage of the derivation. The PP layer of the u-phrase does not
form a barrier for c-command relations – this is an assumption made in all
analyses of the be-possessive and that I also allow myself to resort to.
Yadroff (1999) and Franks and Yadroff (2002) show that functional prepositions
(that contain preposition u ‘at’ among their ranks) in general do not create
opaque domains for the purposes of c-command.
In Chapter 3 I also discussed PRO-diagnostics applied to be-possessives – I
observed that in none of the be-possessives can the Nominative possessum be
substituted by PRO. For the existential be-possessive this may on the one hand be
accounted for in terms of structure: the Nominative Theme never gets to raise to
SpecTP, where PROs are supposed to be, according to some models of control
(Landau 2000). On the other hand, substitution by PRO may also fail due to the
category/type status of the Theme: PROs must be entities of type {e}, whereas in
the existential be-possessive the Theme is of type {e,t}.
This concludes my proposal for the existential be-possessive. In the next section I
extend the analysis to the copular (temporary) be-possessives.
5I assume that constituent negation is also constructed with the help of NegP, the difference is
the structural level at which the negation element is merged.
6I follow Sˇimı´k (2011) in this assumption; the continuity requirement on the spell-out of net
becomes relevant in the context of modal existential constructions that are argued to include the
existential predicate but do not display the net-form. The negation particle in these constructions
seems to be encliticized to the wh-element. See Sˇimı´k (2011) for details.
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5.3 Copular be-possessives
As described in Chapter 3, there is a subset of be-possessives that employ the
copular frame. Copular possessives have not enjoyed as much attention as the
existential possessive – as a result, less research has been done in this area, fewer
properties registered, and the constructions have been lumped together into one
group. In Chapter 3 we have seen that the copular be-possessives do not
















‘Vanja has beautiful eyes.’
I refer to (25-a) as the copular temporary be-possessive: here an object is claimed
to be in someone’s temporary possession and the neutral order of these
constructions involves a definite sentence-initial possessum. (25-b) illustrates the
copular property be-possessive, with a sentence-initial u-PP and a property-type
possessum. These constructions share the following characteristics with copular
be-sentences: the form of byt’ ‘be’ in the present tense is null, and the Nominative
argument does not participate in the GenNeg alternation under negation.
In Chapter 4 we have seen that copular possessives are problematic for the
existing analyses that try to derive all types of be-possessives from one underlying
structure. At the moment I cannot offer much insight into the nature of copular
be-possessives, as they have not been in the center of my research for a long time
(like many others before, I concentrated on the existential be-possessive). Still, I
believe that the proposal put forth in this section has the potential of deriving the
properties of the copular be-possessives. I discuss each type of the copular
possessives in a separate section.
5.3.1 Copular temporary be-possessives






















The structure in (26) is a small-clause configuration, similar to what is assumed to
be the structure for be-sentences with NP/AP predicates. The Anchor phrase
introducing the u-PP is the predicate of the small clause. The subject of the small
clause is a DP that receives the interpretation of a possessum. The possession
relation is interpreted as temporary due to the low position of the Anchor phrase:
it is presumably the failure of the u-PP to c-control the phrase containing the
possessum that results in a non-canonical (in the typological sense) temporary
possession interpretation.
I assume that the possessum in the copular temporary be-possessive is an {e}-type


















‘Anna has this book (at the moment).’
The Nominative noun phrases in (27) refer to particular entities, i.e. they receive
an absolute interpretation. As discussed in section 5.2.1, McNally (1992) assumes
that the absolute interpretation of universal quantifiers and determiners indicates
the {e}-type of the argument – it is namely an individual or a particular, in
McNally’s terminology.7 In keeping with my position on category-type
correspondence, I claim that the {e}-type definite possessum in temporary copular
possessives is a DP syntactically.
7Cf. (27) with the existential be-possessive in (16), where only a type reading of the Theme is
allowed.
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The head of the small clause Pred has a null form in the present tense, but is
spelled out as the forms of byt’ ‘be’ in the past and future tenses. In Chapter 3 I
discuss certain conditions that license the occurrence of jest’ in copular
be-sentences, namely after emphatic i and in tense coordination. In the temporary
be-possessive jest’ seems to be possible following emphatic i, as illustrated in
























‘Petya does have it.’ (my examples)
The possibility of jest’ in the emphatic environment in (28) is in line with what
happens in copular be-sentences (see example set (31) in Chapter 3). I do not
provide a mechanism for the spell-out of jest’ after the emphatic i, but simply
assume that both in copular temporary be-possessives and predicational
be-sentences it is Pred that can be spelled out as jest’ when properly licensed. As
is the case for copular be-sentences, the occurrence of jest’ after emphatic i is not





































‘Petya doesn’t have it.’
Given that net (in contrast to jest’ ) is only sensitive to the presence of V∃, the
ungrammaticality of (29-b) is expected. Tense coordination with jest’ does not

































‘Russia has been, is and will be a great country.’
I assume that the explanation lies in the meaning: namely, in (30-a) the meaning
of temporary possession clashes with the intended meaning of tense coordination
that emphasizes the enduring nature of a relation over time.
The possessum DP raises from its base position in the small clause to SpecTP to
become the subject of the clause. Speaking in terms of Borschev and Partee
(1998), the possessum in copular temporary possessives is constructed as the
Perspectival Center, reflected by its prominent position in the base structure in
(26-b). From its position in SpecTP, the possessum DP can to some degree bind
possessive reflexives within the possessor phrase. Examples are not as readily




















‘The car is in its owner’s disposal.’ (my examples)



















‘His car is at Ivan’s disposal./ Ivan has his car (at the moment).’ (my
examples)
(32-a) shows that a 1st person possessive pronominal is the preferred option,
whereas the possessive reflexive svoj does not have the intended bound reading.
In (32-b) neither the possessive pronominal nor the possessive reflexive are
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grammatical; see Bailyn (2004a) for an analysis of examples like (32-b) as a
Principle B violation. I do not go into the discussion of binding characteristics of
possessive pronominals in Russian (1st/2nd person as opposed to 3rd person
pronominals) – the examples with the possessive pronominals are presented merely
for the reader’s interest. What is relevant for our discussion at the moment is the
contrast in grammaticality of the reflexive in (31) and (32) that supports the
structure posited for this copular possessive in (26-b). Before we leave the area of
reflexives, I would like to point to one peculiarity of examples in (31): in order for
the reflexive to be possible, the possessor must be expressed by some relational
term, such as ‘adressee’, ‘owner’. A noun that cannot be immediately interpreted









#‘Its boy has the letter.’
I treat the contrast in (31) and (33) in the following way. The possessive reflexive
svoj requires a possessor-possessum configuration opposite to the one in the
copular temporary possessive: while in the temporary be-possessive the possessum
c-commands the possessor, according to the structure in (26-b), the reflexive svoj
is supposed to modify the possessum and be bound by a c-commanding (or
arbitrary) possessor. So, in (33) the structure of the temporary be-possessive
requires an interpretation where pis’mo ‘letter’ is the possessum and the boy is the
possessor, whereas the possessive reflexive pushes for the opposite interpretation,
which results in a clash. Relational nouns help to avoid the clash in some way, e.g.
via the relation variable R – the semantic possessor argument that according to
Partee and Borschev (2001) is present in relational nouns. In the structure in (34)
there are two formal possession relations: one between the DP ‘car’ and the u-PP
and the other between the variable R and the NP ‘owner’. The possessive reflexive
svoj participates in the second possession relation and is bound by the variable R.8
















Simple, non-relational nouns do not contain a relation variable and as a
consequence cannot resort to the escape hatch proposed in (34).
The assumed {e}-type of the definite possessum in the copular temporary
be-possessive is compatible with how the construction behaves with regard to the
Genitive of Negation and the presupposed reference test. In Chapter 3 I assume
that GenNeg is a case that occurs on {e, t}-type Themes under negation of the
predicate. The Nominative possessum in this be-possessive is neither a Theme,
nor of {e, t}-type, so GenNeg is not expected. As for the presupposition of
reference, in Chapter 3 we have seen that the reference of both the possessum and






























‘There are no flying carpets.’
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Negation in (35-a) and questioning in (35-b) cannot suspend the reference of
either argument, as it is not possible to continue either of the sentences with
either (35-c) or (35-d). This is presumably due to the fact that the possessum DP
is of the {e}-type and is in the subject position; the u-possessor has a stable
reference due to its role as the Anchor element.
While yielding more or less adequate results for GenNeg and presupposition of
reference, the {e}-type and the subject status of the possessum predict
substitution by PRO to be possible in the copular temporary possessive, contrary













‘#Your letter plans to be had by the secretary.’
In Chapter 3 I ascribed the failure of the possessum in the copular temporary
be-possessive to be substituted by PRO to the absence of volition on the part of
the possessum. This seems to be the only relevant explanation, taking into
account the fact that copular be-sentences with AP/NP predicates that are
structurally similar to copular possessives, allow PRO-substitution and involve
volitional subjects.9 The configuration in (36) is ungrammatical because it
imposes a characteristic of volition on an inanimate entity.
5.3.2 Copular property be-possessives
Copular property be-possessives receive an analysis different from the one
presented in the previous subsection. I include the word ‘property’ into the name
of these possessives because I assume the possessum to be of the {e, t}-type; the













#‘The boy had grey both eyes.’
I interpret the ungrammaticality of strong quantifiers in (37) as an indication of
the {e, t}-type of the possessum glaza ‘eyes’. On a more descriptive level, the
possessum in these be-possessives can often be interpreted as characterizing a
property of the referent of the u-PP: (38-a) says that the boy is grey-eyed. By
category-type correspondence I adhere to in this thesis, an {e, t}-type nominal is
9See the relevant examples of controlled be-sentences in section 3.4.2.
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In (38-b) AnchorP is merged to an NP (the possessum) and the NP is a property
that is predicated of the u-PP.10 In Russian, bare nominal phrases can constitute












‘It’s good weather outside.’
The nominals can occur on their own, as in (39-a), or with a temporal/locative
element, as in (39-b). The nominal can be bare, as in (39-a), or modified, as in
(39-b). Given that a bare NP structure can be assumed for the propositions in
(39), it is thinkable that this option would be available for be-possessives as well.
A nominal proposition can be situated in time, thus it is expected that the Tense
projection can be merged to the base structure in (38-b); the u-PP, as the highest
element, would move to the subject SpecTP position. It is the Tense head that is
spelled out by the future and past forms of byt’ ‘be’.
I can offer two pieces of indirect evidence to support the structure proposed in
(38-b). Copular property be-possessives, in contrast to copular temporary
possessives, do not allow jest’ after emphatic i – observe (40-b) that is uttered in
response to (40-a) and is supposed to provide a licensing environment for copular
10The structure in (38-b) is reminiscent of what Jung (2011) proposes for all types of possessives:
the u-PP and the NP are projected in a nominal small clause. (38-b) differs from Jung’s structure
with regard to the constituency of the u-PP that I assume in my analysis.
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‘Her eyes are blue.’ (my examples)
Earlier I assumed that emphatic jest’ in copular environments is the spell-out of
the Pred head – according to the structure in (38-b), there is no Pred in copular
property possessives and a sentence like (40-a) is not expected to be grammatical.











































‘My child was (and is) absolutely calm.’
I assume that tense coordination is a coordination of TP-phrases (with ellipsis of
identical material) and that the verb byt’ ‘be’ can spell out the T element. It is
then expected that tense coordination is possible in copular property possessives.
The second piece of indirect evidence comes from long and short adjectives. As









‘She has thick hair.’
Babby (2010) argues that the two adjectival forms in Russian have different
syntactic structures: the short adjective is a small-clause predicate, whereas the
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long adjective is an adjunct secondary predicate. I assume that the long adjective
can occur in this possessive because it can be constructed as an attributive NP
modifier. The short adjective, however, must be constructed as a small-clause
predicate, and there is no place in the structure of (38-b) to accommodate this
requirement.
The compact structure of the copular temporary be-possessive has consequences












‘#He has his own gray eyes./His own eyes are gray.’
Although (38-b) provides a necessary c-command configuration, the reflexive svoi
in (43) is ungrammatical. I ascribe this ungrammaticality to the circumstance
that the Anchor projection (together with the u-PP) competes with the possessive
reflexive for the position, i.e. the two are in complementary distribution. Such
direct dependence of the possessum NP on the u-PP for its reference also has
consequences for the presupposed reference test. (44) suggests that both the u-PP




































‘She doesn’t have a tail.’
Negation in (44-a) and questioning in (44-b) are an attempt to suspend the
reference of one of the arguments – however, it is not possible to reply to either
sentence with either (44-c) or (44-d). I assume that the possessum NP has a
stable reference as a consequence of its referential dependence on the u-possessor
which serves as the Anchor element for the whole construction.
In Chapter 3 we also observed that copular property be-possessives do not appear
in control configurations, and hypothetical examples are harder to construct than
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it was the case for other be-possessives. This is more or less expected in my
analysis as the structure in (38-b) does not provide a ground for a control
configuration. First, there is no predication layer that could host PRO, and
second, the Nominative NP is of the {e, t}-type, whereas PROs should be of the
{e}-type.
When it comes to the Genitive of Negation, it seems that the structure proposed
in (38-b) incorrectly predicts the occurrence of this case in copular property
be-possessives: the Nominative possessum is of the {e, t}-type and it merges with
a lexical predicate (Anchor). The only explanation I can offer at this point
consists in hypothesizing that the Anchor predicate cannot be negated: it is a
predicate that irreversibly connects two entities in a possession relation. Negation
in copular property be-possessives is usually of the constituent type, here are






















‘Ivan hasn’t very pretty eyes.’ Chvany (1975: 268)
Even though the presence of the adverb ocˇen’ in (45-b) is supposed to show that
the negation particle ne is not a lexical part of the adjective (in (45-a) the
negation particle is written together with krasivye and the whole word means
‘ugly’), ne in (45-b) is still constituent negation – this is the closest a copular
temporary be-possessive comes to a negated variant (see the discussion of
affirmative-negative sentential pairings in section 3.3).















The possessum in these constructions is an event in which the referent of the u-PP
participates. It is possible to assume that the structure of event-nominals is bigger






Research on nominals has posited comprehensive internal structures with different
positions for various arguments (Adger 2003; Procha´zkova´ 2006). The participant
argument in (47) can be situated in SpecnP if it is an agent, or projected as a
complement of N, if it is a patient, etc. The u-PP can become associated with this
participant variable through binding.
5.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter I have proposed a range of different structural configurations for
constructions that have been referred to as be-possessives in the literature. One
underlying structure would perhaps be the preferable theoretical option in
principle – but at present this option unfortunately faces overly complicated and
sometimes disfunctional derivations. Moreover, I have shown that what is referred
to collectively as ‘be-possessives’ is not a homogeneous group; not only is there the
well-known existential-copular distinction, but also among the copular
be-possessives predication relations are not formed in the same manner. I thus
invite the contemporary generativist to consider a theory with many underlying
structures. This may to some extent mean going back to the insights of the
transformational era – except that now we have better tools and hopefully more
knowledge.
Considerable attention in the chapter has been granted to the existential
be-possessive – this is a reflection of how much has already been written about
this construction: there are many theoretical statements that must be supported
or disproved. An analysis of the existential be-possessive requires that one take a
particular standpoint with regard to the existential construction, which is a huge
topic by itself.
In this chapter I try either to derive the properties of be-possessives (such as
reflexive binding, substitution by PRO) or make the analysis compatible with
some properties, without providing a principled explanation for them (such as the
occurrence of jest’ in copular be-possessives).
One of the benefits provided by this analysis of be-possessives is the flexibility
with regard to the properties of these constructions. In Chapter 4 I discussed how
the negated copular temporary possessives are problematic for analyses like
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Chvany (1975) and Harves (2003). The absence of GenNeg and non-occurrence of
net in copular be-possessives is expected in my analysis. I assume that GenNeg is
a case that occurs on {e,t}-type Themes under negation, and net is a conflation of
the negation particle with V∃ (that occurs in the present tense); the structures
proposed for the copular possessives do not satisfy these requirements in one way
or another, which results in the ungrammaticality of net and GenNeg. In
Chapters 6 and 7 I go beyond the area of be-possessives and apply the Anchor
projection to more structural configurations.
In what ways can my analysis be considered compatible with the dynamic syntax
approach? I restrict possessor semantics to a local configuration: the possessor
element is introduced by the Anchor predicate. I demonstrate that AnchorP can
in principle be merged in any position – to pacify a more traditional linguist, let
me point out that the analysis does not go against the UTAH by proposing
different merging sites for the possessor projection: as long as the possessor
argument is introduced in the local configuration with its predicate, the UTAH is
satisfied. With several possible merging sites of the Anchor phrase, the possessum
element is also determined dynamically: it is the sister phrase of the Anchor
predicate, which may be a variety of phrases, depending on what kind of
construction we are looking at. In copular property possessives the possessum is
the NP merged with AnchorP. In the existential possessive the ‘possessum’ is the
existential statement – V∃P containing an entity that is interpreted as possessum.
In copular temporary possessives AnchorP is the ‘old’ element to which a new
element merges – this creates a dependency relation different from what is
observed in the other two types of possessives.
Seen in this light, the semantic types of possession discussed in Chapter 2 are a
product of structure as much as the nature of the phrase that merges with the
Anchor phrase, the possessum element.
In the next chapter I discuss the Russian have-possessive and propose an analysis
that does not involve the Anchor predicate; the latter does find an application




The chapter presents my view on the have-possessives in Russian – the

















‘I have a car.’
These constructions were introduced in Chapter 2 and are described as two other
means of encoding predicative possession in Russian, besides be-possessives.
In Chapter 2 I argued that there are no typological or cognitive reasons to assign
one underlying structure to different predicative possessive constructions, in
contrast to what is commonly believed. Theoretically, differentiation of structures
is also beneficial; moreover, formal objections to head-incorporation analyses of
‘have’ have already been raised in the literature. Ultimately, I propose that the
Russian have-possessives should have a structure distinct from that of
be-possessives.
6.1 The typological, cognitive and formal discussion
In the generative tradition of the last five decades a very popular approach has
been to posit one underlying structure for all types of predicative possessives.
According to Belvin and Dikken (1997: 154), the unification research tradition was
6.1. The typological, cognitive and formal discussion
inaugurated by Benveniste (1966), who stated that have was simply be and a
preposition inverted.1 The statement referred to examples like (2), where the





















‘Marie has the flower.’ Dyakonova (2007: 23)
The main milestone of unification was set in Freeze (1992) who proposes one
underlying structure for all predicative possessives (or have-predications, using
Freeze’s term), including them into the universal locative paradigm. As discussed
in Chapter 4, Freeze proposes the following common underlying structure for














The possessor argument is argued to always originate as the locative predicate of
a PP small clause. The structure in (3) is posited as the underlying representation
for locational possessives and have-possessives, and the surface differences are
attributed to different derivations: in particular, P-to-BE incorporation is
supposed to yield a have-verb. This proposal spawned numerous analyses
attempting to connect have and be derivationally – represented, first of all, by
Kayne (1993) and Den Dikken (1995); in Chapter 4 I discussed the treatments of
the Russian be-possessives that are based on these two analyses.
Freeze (1992) supports his claims by typological observations, namely that
cross-linguistically predicative possessives are expressed either through the
1‘. . . avoir n’est rien autre qu’un eˆtre-a` inverse´’ Benveniste (1966: 197), cited from Belvin and
Den Dikken (1997: 154).
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locational strategy or through the have-strategy. In Chapter 2 I describe the
typological picture of predicative possession and show that it is more complex
than presented by Freeze. In fact, already Heine (1997: 215-222) criticizes the
selectivity and misrepresentation of Freeze’s typological sample: on the one hand,
mainly constructions of the Locational possessive type are chosen; on the other
hand, non-Locational possessive types are represented as Locational. Heine states
the following in particular:
(4) ‘treatments of the kind presented by Freeze (1992) or Kayne (1993) also
ignore the fact that possessive constructions derive from a small range of
quite different conceptual sources. Any attempts at reducing these sources
to one, be that within a diachronic or a synchronic framework, are likely to
result in an inadequate analysis.’ (Heine 1997: 222)
Heine’s critique has largely gone unnoticed in generative research: analyses as
recent as Jung (2011) still assume Freeze’s typology of possession.
Coming back to the types of possessives presented in Chapter 2, the Topic
possessive and the with-possessive are problematic for Freeze-inspired analyses.
Remember that in the Topic possessive both the possessor and the possessum are
non-oblique (the construction has also been referred to as a ‘double subject








‘Baa’ has sheep.’ Stassen (2009: 61)
The P head assumed by Freeze (1992) does not appear either on the possessor or
in the predicate. Freeze (1992) is indeed aware of possessives that employ a
copular predicate and a non-prepositional possessor, but he writes them off as an
idiosyncrasy of human possessors, cf. Freeze’s (1992:585) discussion of Tagalog
examples. However, as shown by Stassen (2009) Topic possessives constitute one
of the four major strategies of encoding predicative possession and there are
languages where the ‘double subject’ pattern is consistent with no regard to
whether the possessor is human or not.
With-possessives present an even bigger challenge for Freeze (1992), as here it is
the possessum argument that is oblique, whereas the possessor comes in an
unmarked case:
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‘The chief has slaves.’ Stassen (2009: 57)
A derivation departing from an underlying stage containing an oblique possessor
and arriving at a surface stage with an oblique possessum instead would be quite
complex, I surmise, and what is more important – empirically unmotivated and
theoretically forced.
Freeze’s unifying analysis of possession is thus not motivated typologically.
Furthermore, Freeze (1992) and the analyses it brought about, such as Kayne
(1993) and Den Dikken (1995), have been subject to formal criticism in the
generative forum, especially with regard to P-movement.
B laszczak (2007a, 2008) provides a range of critical comments on Freeze (1992).2
First of all, there is the issue of double case-marking. The possessor NP is
expected to be case-marked by P before P moves to incorporate into BE; then, on
top of the lexically assigned case, the possessor NP is assigned Nominative in
SpecTP. Second, B laszczak (2008) points out that Freeze makes wrong predictions
on the possible possessive construction patterns. In particular, the ‘PP HAVE
NP’ pattern is ruled out in Freeze’s analysis – but the pattern is actually attested
in some Slavic languages:





























‘Peter has no car.’ (Ukranian)
In (7) a have-form is attested together with a PP: a locative PP in (7-a) and (7-b),
and a possessor PP in (7-c). If have is supposed to be derived by the incorporation
of a preposition into be, it is not clear where the have-forms in (7) come from.
Finally, B laszczak questions the syntactic motivation for P-to-BE incorporation.
In the minimalist framework where movement must be triggered by
2I discuss B laszczak’s criticism of Freeze’s treatment of existentials and locatives in Chapter 4.
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uninterpretable features, a P-incorporating be would have to have an
uninterpretable [P] feature. This would basically mean that we are positing two
kinds of BEs (cross-linguistically and within one language): with and without a
[P] feature – this, however, would not be different from simply positing two
distinct verbs, have and be.
Kayne (1993) adopts Freeze’s head-incorporation proposal in his analysis of








In Kayne’s analysis a predicative possession construction is an extension of a
possessed DP. The possessor argument is projected as the external argument of
the nominal small clause and assigned case by the governing P/D. The verb have
is derived by the incorporation of the P/D head into be. Den Dikken (1995, 1997)
observes that such incorporation makes it impossible to derive possessive
sentences with definite possessums, such as ‘I have the car ’. In Chapter 4 we have
seen that Jung (2011), who modernizes Kayne’s (1993) analysis, expressly argues
against a head-incorporation analysis of have, stating that this verb is a spell-out
of Caseless functional head F.
Den Dikken (1995, 1997) and Belvin and Dikken (1997) present another attempt
at perpetuating the incorporation campaign.



















In (9-b) have is derived by a complex incorporation sequence. The phonologically
null P must incorporate, in keeping with Baker’s (1988) view on incorporation as
morphological licensing. Agr, in turn, incorporates into F in order to extend the
domain for the movement of the possessor PP.3 B laszczak (2008: 33) criticizes this
proposal with regard to the status of the domain-extending head-movement in
recent minimalist theory. According to Chomsky (2000: 122), ‘terms of the same
minimal domain are ‘equidistant’ to probes’, which with regard to (9-b) means
that the possessum DP and the possessor PP are equidistant from F – the PP can
thus freely move to SpecFP. There is no need for domain-extending movements
and incorporation of Agr+P into F will not take place. B laszczak’s point can also
be applied to Dyakonova (2007), who develops Den Dikken’s proposal (see section
4.2.2).
Thus, any existing attempt to derive have from be+X faces some theoretical and
empirical objections. The recent minimalist analyses have realized that a
differentiated treatment of have and be is the preferred option. B laszczak (2008)
posits different base structures for locative be-sentences, existential be-sentences
and have-possessives, assuming among other things that have is a lexical verb.
Even Jung (2011), who assumes that have and be are spell-outs of one and the
same functional head F, differentiates between the two allomorphs by giving them
opposing values of the [Case] feature.
A P-to-BE-incorporation analysis of have also becomes suspect with regard to
grammaticalization patterns described in Stassen (2009). Stassen presents
interesting observations on the phenomenon of have-drift – a process of reanalysis
of a possessive strategy into the have-strategy. The possessive strategies that
‘feed’ into have-drift are Topic possessives and with-possessives. Locational
possessives can never act as a direct source for the have-possessive (Stassen 2009,
231) – this observation is quite negative for a Freezian linguist, as there turns out
3Note that it is a ‘beheaded’ possessor PP that moves (Belvin and Dikken 1997: 155).
126
Chapter 6. Have-possessives
to be no broader grammaticalization counterpart for the syntactic derivation of
have from be and a locative preposition. The only way a locational strategy can
participate in the process of have-drift is through the rare process of first being
re-analyzed into a Topic-Locational hybrid where the possessor element is
represented twice in the sentence, as the sentential topic and as a locative element.
Stassen hypothesizes that this process might have happened in Cornish – the


























‘the beauty which you have’ Lewis and Pedersen (1961, 210-211)
Example (10-a) is from Early Cornish and represents the Locational possessive,
with a prepositional possessor and the verb ‘be’. (10-b) illustrates the hybrid
Topic-Locational possessive, where the possessor is expressed as the topic of the
sentence and doubled as a locational element inside the sentence; the verb ‘be’
agrees with the possessum. Sentence (10-c) represents the final step in the
process, as the Dative pronoun and the verb ‘be’ are reanalyzed into the transitive
verb ‘have’.
What P-to-BE incorporation may indeed be suitable for are have-possessives
stemming from with-possessives. A reanalysis of a with-possessive into a transitive
possessive can be clearly observed in African languages. In Nuer the possessum is
marked with the preposition ke` ‘with’ and the verb can be either a` ‘to be present’
or taa/tEkE ‘to remain, to stay’ – the latter is illustrated in the with-possessive in
(11-a). The combinations verb+with often merge into monomorphemic items, as
in (11-b), that may be analyzed as the verb ‘have’.
(11) Nuer (Nilo-Saharan, East Sudanic, West Nilotic)





6.1. The typological, cognitive and formal discussion
3pl.be.with/have cattle.
‘They have cattle.’ Stassen (2009, 211)
The fusion of a verb and the oblique marker in (11-b) is just what a
head-incorporation analysis of have is looking for. However, as discussed above,
the oblique marker in with-possessives marks the possessum, such that appropriate
changes should be made to Freeze’s analysis before it can be applied to these data.
The tenacious idea that is present across analyses is that possessors are locations
semantically and PPs syntactically – the idea is there even though it may
contradict the general spirit of an analysis. Jung (2011) does away with a
head-incorporation analysis of have and argues that possessors are agents, but still
posits a P/D head in have-constructions. B laszczak (2008), who presents Polish
possessors as external arguments with no P-projections, still assumes that
possessors are a type of location. In current generative practice this idea may in
part be the legacy of Freeze’s typological misrepresentation, but it is to a greater
degree rooted in the localist approach to possession that assumes the proximity
relation to be the defining (and the only) characteristic of a possession relation:
prototypical possession entails proximity, ergo some argument in this relation
must be constructed as location and this argument must be the possessor.
Analyses like Jung (2011) and B laszczak (2008) stumble on this powerful
assumption. In section 2.1.1 I point out that inclusion of proximity into the
cognitive notion of possession should not be interpreted as a cognitive requirement
to construe possession as a subcase of location, and propose to interpret Heine’s
(1997) event schemas as several ways to achieve proximity. In particular, in the
Action schema that serves as the cognitive source for the have-possessive, the
effect of proximity is derived by the ‘direct action’ nature of the predicate. This is
reflected by the tendency of the transitive sources for have-predicates to have the
general semantics of ‘grab, seize, hold ’ – predicates that require direct contact.
Once it is clarified that the representation of possessors as locations does not have
the status of a higher cognitive truth or a universal constant, there should not be
any conceptual objections for an analysis that assumes different syntactic base
structures for different possessive types. In particular, one of the main tools of a
cartographist – the UTAH, does not have anything to say about different
structural representations once different conceptualizations of a relation are
appealed to. As discussed in Chapter 2, Baker (1997) explicitly allows variation at
the conceptual level.
In Russian, the verb imet’ ‘have’ stems from the now obsolete verb imat’ ‘take’;
the two verbs even shared inflectional paradigms for some time (see McAnallen
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2011).4 The etymology of the verb indicates that the construction arose from the
Action schema, and not as a result of a grammaticalization drift from some other
possessive strategy.
I assume that the preceding discussion can be considered as sufficient ground to
claim that have-possessives in Russian have a structure different from that of the
be-possessive(s).
6.2 The properties and the structure
The Russian have-possessive has not received as much attention in the literature
as be-possessives, which is due to the minor status of the former strategy in the
language. The construction has various semantic restrictions acquired gradually as
it lost its ground to the be-possessive. Safarewiczowa (1964), for instance, notes
that the have-construction has become obsolete when the ‘possessum’ is a physical
property of an animate entity, a sickness or an event (McAnallen to app.: 44) – see






























































4According to McAnallen (2011, 25), the various have-verbs arose in the individual Indo-
European languages after the break-up of Proto-Indo-European (in contrast to the Dative posses-
sive construction that has been traced back to Proto-Indo-European).
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At the same time, according to Safarewiczowa (1964) and Popov (1974), the






































See Safarewiczowa (1964) and Popov (1974) for a more detailed overview of the
restrictions. The verb imet’ does not display uses that are immediately
identifiable as auxiliary or functional, although according to McAnallen (2011,
43), early Russian used to employ imet’ as a future auxiliary and a modal verb.
Although the use of the have-possessive is rather restricted semantically,
syntactically the have-possessive enjoys greater freedom than the be-possessive
and the anticausative possessive due to the Nominative encoding of the possessor.
The have-possessive is widely used in non-finite environments, where the semantic
restrictions seem to be lifted. For instance, imet’ is generally avoided with













































‘In order to have beautiful eyes, you have to get enough sleep.’
The same ameliorating effect of syntactic surroundings can be observed with
possessums that denote a physical property, as shown in the grammatical example
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in (16-c). In finite clauses the possessor argument can be dropped without
creating an ambiguity due to the presence of imet’.5 The ability to drop the
possessor argument in finite clauses allows the have-possessive to participate in


















‘His whole life he had a wife and now he is looking for a nanny!’
The syntactic flexibility of the have-possessive may be the reason why it has not
completely yielded its ground to the be-possessive.
The anticausative possessive is the third means of expressing predicative
possession in Russian. The construction consists of the reflexive form imet’sja
‘have-refl ’, an u-possessor and a Nominative possessum. I have encountered
conflicting opinions on the status of imet’sja in the language – I hypothesize that
this might be due to the development of imet’sja over time (this is merely a
surmisal, not based on any actual diachronic data). Chvany (1975) states that



























‘We don’t know whether there is life on Mars.’ Chvany (1975, 49)
5Cf. the be-possessive that can be mistaken for an existential if the u-possessor is dropped. Of
course, the context provides the possessor argument, but in the absence of the u-PP the possessive
structure is not that visible as in the have-possessive.
6See Chvany’s structure for imet’sja-constructions in Chvany (1975, 54).
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In contrast to Chvany (1975), Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev (1983) cite possession as
one of the applications of imet’sja, though with some reservations. The authors
namely state that the verb is rare and stylistically marked: it is mainly used in
the official/business register, in other contexts it can be used to create irony. (19)


























































‘Do they have a summer house? – They have not only a summer
house, but also a means of transportation to that house, namely a
motor boat.’ Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev (1983: 30-31)
In view of the possessive examples in (19) one could surmise that either Chvany
had incomplete data, or the ‘slice’ of Russian represented in her 1975 book is older
than that of Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev’s: Chvany namely acquired Russian from her
emigrant parents. I have found examples of the imet’sja-possessive from as far
back as 1726, illustrated in (20), but I do not have data on how frequent the
anticausative possessive was at that stage.







































‘it has been ordered to give the three thousand table books that the
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librarian has to Moscow academic office.’ (1726)
The recent analysis of Dyakonova (2007) presents the imet’sja-construction as one
of the ways of expressing predicative possession in Russian, with no stylistic
reservations. A brief search in the Russian corpus reveals numerous examples from
everyday speech, not restricted to any special register. Thus it seems that imet’sja
has become more normalized in possessive sentences. Dyakonova furthermore
asserts that imet’sja only has a possessive reading – I am inclined to agree with
her.7 Although imet’sja can be used in seemingly existential constructions like




























‘There are structures of a rather big size in the Universe.’
In (21-a) the implicit possessor is the humanity or the scientific community, in
(21-b) the possessor in this part-whole relation is the Universe.8 The presence of
possessive semantics in imet’sja may be observed in the fact that the verb cannot




































7For example, imet’sja in Chvany’s example in (18-b) sounds quite awkward to me.
8I am not stating that the locational phrase vo Vselennoj ‘in the Universe’ directly represents
the possessor argument. Rather, the Universe is understood to be the implicit possessor, even
though the sentence is built as a locative existential.
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I discuss in section 5.2.1 that sentences like (22-a-b) can be uttered in what
Arutjunova and Sˇiryaev (1983) refer to as contexts of conflicting worldviews: here
the existence of some entity is (re-)asserted. Presumably, entities like God and
black holes resist the notion of a possessor and that is why imet’sja is
ungrammatical in (22).
The anticausative possessive, on a par with the be-possessive, cannot compete
with the have-possessive in syntactic operations that require a structural-cased
(Nominative) subject (control infinitives, infinitival subjects, gerunds); however,
when the gapped argument does not have to be the highest but merely
structural-cased, the anticausative possessive and the be-possessive are allowed, as














































‘All the doubts and frivolous thoughts that I had on the 12th of
december, disappeared.’
The anticausative possessive may be said to be the possessive that is most
restricted in its use: this is due to semantic restrictions on the verb imet’ on the
one hand and the PP-encoding of the possessor on the other. This possessive
construction seems to be particularly frequent in participial constructions as in
(23-a), maybe because it constitutes the most effective way of constructing a
(possessive) modifier. The past participle form byvsˇij as in (23-b) is quite rare,
and in the present tense a participial form of imet’sja (imejusˇcˇijsja) is
uncontested by byt’.
I derive both of the have-possessives from one vP-base. I first discuss the



















I assume that the verb imet’ ‘have’ is a lexical predicate that takes two
arguments, the possessor argument in SpecvP and the possessum (Theme)
complement.9 I assume that the Theme NP in the have-construction is of the {e,
t}-type, as strong quantifiers like e`tot ‘this’ and vse ‘all’ receive a



































‘The children have all the necessary amenities.’
In (25-a) e`tot ‘this’ refers not to a particular flower, but to a type of flower.
Likewise, vse ‘all’ in (25-b) refers to all types of amenities. Furthermore, the

































9This is similar to B laszczak’s (2008) proposal for the Polish have-possessive.
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‘I don’t know of any one state that doesn’t have debt.’
There are also some examples of Accusative Themes under negation, these seem
to be exclusively abstract nouns or idiomatic possessums; GenNeg is also
grammatical in these contexts. The Themes in the following examples from the




























































‘For me appearance was almost insignificant.’
Examples of Accusative Themes under negated imet’ are rare, however; GenNeg
occurs in the vast majority of examples in the Russian corpus. In section 5.2.1 I
assume that obligatory replacement of a structural case by GenNeg signals
NP-status of the argument.
The weak referentiality of the possessum may be the reason for why the
have-possessive is not pronouncedly agentive: when the Theme is a property,
there is no need for a strongly volitional agent. Still there are some traces of
agentivity according to some diagnostics. First of all, the have-possessive can be
used in the imperative form, and imperatives are associated with agentivity:
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according to Han (1998: 168), ‘the situation described by the imperative



























































‘And have a good medicine closet, read medical books.’
Instantiations of imperative have-possessives in the Russian corpus are dominated
by idiomatic expressions as in (28-a); also frequent are examples with abstract
possessums (like and terpenije ‘patience’ in (28-b)) – this correlates with the
general ‘preference’ of imet’ for abstract possessums, not only in imperative
contexts. Furthermore, there are examples with concrete possessums as in
(28-c-d), which shows that the imperative use of the have-possessive is not
restricted to idiomatic expressions, but is relatively productive.
In contrast to the have-possessive, neither the anticausative possessive nor a
be-possessive can be used in an imperative construction. It is the meaning of the
imperative, not its structure, that these possessives are incompatible with. The
imperative singular form in Russian can be used with a subjunctive conditional
meaning and all of the possessives can be used in this subjunctive imperative
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‘Such information, if anyone had it, would have the degree of
confidentiality “destroy before reading”.’
Besides the use in imperatives, the somewhat agentive nature of the possessor in
the have-possessive is observed in the compatibility of the construction with such


































‘I always tried to have some stash.’
The control predicate starat’sja requires agentivity from (the PRO in) its
infinitival complement – the grammaticality of examples in (30) shows that the
possessor argument in the have-possessive satisfies this requirement. In view of
the imperative and the control tests I conclude that the possessor argument in the
have-possessive must be projected as the external argument, whose position is
usually understood to be SpecvP.
The have-possessive has presumably inherited its vP-structure from its
etymological source – the transitive verb imat’ ‘take’. Incidentally, the
have-construction can be used with animate Themes in a vulgar style of speech
with a meaning of ‘have sex with’ – as an example, consider the following pun from





















‘It’s not me who has the car, it’s the car that “has” me.’ (Grigorij
Zarecˇnyj)
This ambiguity of imet’ ‘have’ may be due to either the agentive nature of the
possessor or the verb’s etymological source.
The anticausative possessive in my analysis is derived via the application of the
AnchorP projection to the have-base. I assume that reflexive verb forms in
Russian are characterized by the absence of the external argument; there may be
an implicit semantic argument x whose presence is signaled by the reflexive
morphology on the VP-dependent. This reflexive vP becomes the complement of























As in the existential be-possessive, the u-PP becomes the ‘possessor’ of the whole
verbal event – in this case, the vP. The merging of the Anchor phrase is a local
‘decision’: the reflexive configuration can also proceed without the introduction of
an u-PP which would result in constructions like (21).
The NP-status of the Theme is, as in the other possessives, diagnosed by the











‘Anna has this book.’
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‘He doesn’t have a debt in the budget.’
The determiner e`ta ‘this’ in (33-a) refers to a particular book type, not a book
token; under negation, the possessum is obligatorily Genitive, as shown in (33-b).
Neither of the have-possessives can take a DP Theme which can be observed in
the ungrammaticality of temporary possession in (34) or R-expressions in (35),
repeated from Chapter 5. (34) shows that whereas temporary possession can be





























In Chapter 5 I posited a small-clause configuration for the copular temporary
be-possessive in (34-a) where the Anchor phrase can combine with a DP. The
ungrammaticality of the examples in (34-b) and (34-c) presumably indicates that
have-possessives can take only NP-Themes. Constructions like (35-a) were also
discussed in Chapter 5; there I assumed that the occurrence of R-expressions in
existential be-possessives is part of the general ability of the existential predicate
to re-assert the existence of a definite Theme with regard to its
function/usefulness. The imet’ predicate does not seem to have such



























Earlier in the section I talked about the ameliorating effects of non-finite syntactic
environments on semantic restrictions on the verb imet’ ‘have’. Definite Themes,






















#‘I want to have Petya.’
This shows that the restriction on definite Theme is not merely a semantic
restriction, but is a result of what kind of complements are allowed in the
structure of imet’.
The possessor arguments in the two have-possessives have a subject status. For
the possessor in the have-possessive one of the subjecthood diagnostics is
presented in (30) which shows the substitutability of the possessor argument by
PRO. In both constructions the possessor arguments can bind reflexives: (37)






















































‘They have incriminating evidence on each other.’
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The structures in (24-b) and (32-b) allow movement of the possessor arguments to
subject positions without preliminary re-ordering operations.10
The general manner in which the have-possessive and the anticausative possessive
seem to substitute the be-possessive in non-finite environments (plus the
ameliorating effect of non-finite environments on the semantic restrictions of
imet’ ) may be regarded by some as an argument in favor of a common underlying
structure for the three possessives. My position is that the three predicative
possessive constructions exist side by side in Russian and if one construction
cannot occur in a specific context due to syntactic or semantic restrictions, the
language has the luxury of offering another construction. The assumption of
different structures for the three types of predicative possessives is another step in
the direction of dynamic economical syntax in that there is no need for re-ordering
operations and incorporating movements.
6.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter I propose that the structure of the have-possessives in Russian is
different from that of the be-possessive(s). The have-possessive has a
quasi-transitive vP-structure, whereas the anticausative possessive is built on the
imet’ -base enhanced by the u-possessor. After decades of Freeze-inspired research,
such a proposal may be hard to come to terms with – which is why I dedicated a
separate section to the various (theoretical, typological, etymological) arguments
in favor of the differentiating approach. First of all, I have referred to the
typological observations of Stassen (2009) who describes four major types of
predicative possessives – I point out that it would be difficult to derive all four
construction types from one underlying structure. Furthermore, there are
theoretical arguments in the literature against a head-incorporation analysis of
have – with that off our theoretical agenda, doubts start emerging about the
structural and conceptual status of the possessor element. In this thesis I assume
that the notion of proximity that is argued to be essential to the relation of
possession can be derived by event schemas other than location. In the end I come
to the conclusion that have-possessives should have their own underlying
structure, distinct from locational and other types of possessives.
I am convinced that a differentiating analysis does not go against the principles of
economy that are so central to the Minimalist program. The assumption of several
possible ways of forming a possessive construction seems to be uneconomical – if
10Cf. the analyses of Dyakonova (2007) and Jung (2011).
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one assumes that a possessive relation is conceptualized in the same way in all
languages. If, however, one allows the possibility of different conceptual
formulations of the possessive relation, positing different structures seems to be
the more economical representation option. The differentiating option is certainly
preferable with regard to economy of derivation: the availability of different base
structures decreases the amount of necessary movement operations and (for those





In this chapter I consider constructions that employ seemingly possessive u-PPs,
these include the locative modifier use of u-PPs, external possession and

































































‘According to you, everybody is a fool.’















‘I have something with which you can repair the bike.’
Attempts to group u-PP constructions in some way or another have long been
present in the literature. Chvany (1975), discussed in Chapter 4, extends her
analysis of be-possessives to the locative modifier use in (1). Mra´zek and Brym
(1962) discuss a range of u-PP constructions and define the general meaning of
the Russian preposition u as a “relation of a very close participation of something
in something”. Cienki (1995) presents a unified cognitive linguistic analysis of
u-PP constructions where the u-PPs serve as reference points with a different
degree of subjectification.1 Jung (2011) includes modal possessive constructions
into her analysis of be-possessives.
In this chapter I show how the Anchor projection proposed for be-possessives can
be applied to the constructions in (1)-(5).2 Positing the Anchor predicate for
these constructions expands the range of structural complements that the
predicate can combine with. The analysis provides a possibility of derivational
economy without recourse to complicated derivations.
1Cienki (1995: 85) defines subjectification as a process where the meaning changes from re-
ferring ‘less to the described situation and more to the discourse situation.’ Subjectification is
supposed to play an important role in the process of grammaticalization. See more on the notion
of reference points in Chapter 5.











‘He borrowed money from me.’ Mra´zek and Brym (1962, 101)
Ablative u-PPs seem to behave as subcategorized arguments of a group of verbs with the general
meaning of removal of possession. Inasmuch as I associate possessive semantics with the Anchor
predicate, perhaps this predicate should be posited in (i) as well. I leave this issue for future
research.
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7.1 The locative uses of possessive u-PPs
As noted earlier in the thesis, an u-PP can be used with the locative meaning ‘at
X’s place’, as in (6-a); furthermore, an u-PP can modify overt locative


















‘The book is on Vanya’s desk.’
In Chapter 3 I discuss examples like these and stress that they should not be
analyzed as be-possessives, as the possessive relation that is present in these
structures takes place between the u-PP and the locative element. For these
constructions I assume that the Anchor phrase merges with a locative element.
The logic of the structure is the same as proposed in Chvany (1975), but the
construction is simpler, because the possessive semantics in my analysis is not tied
to the presence of V∃. The locative element can be overt or silent and the whole
Anchor-modified location can occur in a variety of configurations. In (6) the











An Anchor-modified Location can also serve as the location argument in













‘He has strawberries in his garden.’/ ‘There are strawberries in his
garden.’
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The sentence in (8-a) is existential and has the structure in (8-b): the u-PP here
modifies the location argument. Any possessive meaning that is present in (8) is
attained by extension – it is a consequence of the c-control relation between the
u-PP and the location containing the NP: the strawberries can be found in the
garden owned by some individual (the referent of the u-PP) and thus by extension
belong to the same individual. An Anchor-modified locative phrase can also be a


















‘I will spend the night at Vanya’s.’
In Chapter 3 I observed that it is difficult to find examples of be-possessives where
the u-possessor is expressed by the reflexive sebja.3 The locative modifier u-PPs





























‘As for the rest of the money, the governors will have to search for
them in their own pockets.’
I assume that the distribution of possessive u-PPs that modify locative elements
follows the distribution of the latter.
3I presented one example from the Russian Corpus on p.46 – that, however, was an example
of the arbitrary use of the reflexive.
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7.2 External possession and involuntary causer
constructions
In external possession constructions the possessor contributes to the referential
specification of the possessed nominal but is encoded outside of that nominal.
Some researchers describe this situation as the possessor being a semantic
argument of the possessum, but a syntactic argument of the predicate
(Paykin and van Peteghem 2003). This is in contrast to adnominal possession
where the possessor is constructed as a semantic as well syntactic argument of the
possessum. External possession has been discussed in such works as Kayne (1977),
Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992), Landau (1999), Sˇaric´ (2002), among others.
In Russian, external possession has two modes of expression: a construction
involving an u-PP as in (11) and a Dative construction as in (12). In addition to
expressing possession, the external possessor arguments are claimed to emphasize




























‘My son will go to school this year.’
In (11-a) the u-PP is analyzed as the inalienable possessor of the noun golova
‘head’. In (11-b) it is the relational noun syn ‘son’ that depends on the u-PP for
its reference. In (12) the Dative DPs refer to the possessor of the Direct object




















‘I stepped on his foot (I stepped him on the foot).’
The Dative external possession construction is different from the u-PP external
possession construction in certain properties, such as e.g. the scope of the external
possessor: the Dative DP cannot scope over subjects, whereas the u-PP can, as
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demonstrated in (11). Works like Paykin and van Peteghem (2003) and
Strahov (2006) provide a review of the differences between the two constructions.
In this thesis I am only concerned with external u-possessors and my analysis is in
principle constructed to account only for this construction. The possessor in
external possession constructions is characterized by special salience and can be
used as a sentential topic of sorts, introducing a statement into the discourse.













‘I have a sister who is studying in China’











‘My sister is studying in China.’
(13-a) eases the previously unmentioned sister into the conversation; (13-b) with
an adnominal possessor moja ‘my’ is awkward in an out-of-the-blue utterance,
when the listener does not know whether the speaker has a sister at all.























‘My cat lives in the garden.’













‘A/my child broke my window today.’
‘My child broke a window today.’ Strahov (2006: 60-61)
The possessum can be the argument of an unaccusative predicate as in (14-a), an
unergative as in (14-b), or a transitive predicate as in (14-c). In addition, Strahov
(2006) points out that the u-possessor can be associated with multiple nouns in
the clause: in (14-b) the u-PP can be interpreted as the possessor of both the cat
and the garden, in (14-c) the same can be stated of the child and the window.
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The examples so far have involved sentence-initial u-PPs, but external



























‘He cannot get the girl off his mind.’ Paykin and Van Peteghem
(2003:339)
Paducheva (2004) observes that the middle-field external possessors associated
with objects are highly lexicalized, as shown in Podlesskaya and Rakhilina
(1999).4 Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain a copy of Podlesskaya and
Rakhilina (1999), but it does seem that all middle-field u-PPs that are associated
with objects, are restricted to part-whole relations, such as body-parts, emotions,

























































‘One mention of school cause the child to tremble nervously.’
(Ruscorpora)
In addition, the predicate must satisfy certain requirements, e.g. a middle-field
u-PP cannot be used with a verb that expresses an action directed at the
4Paducheva (2004:354) uses the words ‘splitting in the object position’.
151
7.2. External possession and involuntary causer constructions

































‘The wind was tousling his hair.’ Paykin and Van Peteghem
(2003:339-340)
When the verb expresses movement within a specific space, both types of external
possessors are allowed, as in (17-b). A middle-field u-PP is also allowed when the
verb expresses an action coming from the possessum, as illustrated in (15-b). For
middle-field external possessors it is possible to conceive of an analysis where an
Anchor predicate merges directly with the object DP – whether this yields a
grammatical result would probably depend on the verb’s specifications. Perhaps
the ablative use of the u-PPs mentioned at the beginning of the chapter can be
assigned the same analysis as middle-field external possessors. Sentence-initial
u-PPs do not seem to be characterized by similar restrictions on the type of
predicates, and they are not restricted to body-part possessums. In this section I
focus on sentence-initial external u-possessors.









































‘I will show you!’ (lit. ‘I will make you dance!’)
In (18) the u-PP refers to a Causer with a varying degree of volition which can be
described as increasing from (18-a) to (18-c). A possession relation between a
Causer u-PP and a nominal inside the clause is not obligatory (in (18), for
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instance, there is no clear possession relation established between an u-PP and















‘Ivan causes (his) computers to break on the second day.’
In (19) Ivan can be interpreted both as the possessor of computers and an
involuntary Causer of their breaking. Causer u-PPs are discussed in Rivero and
Savchenko (2004) who propose a unifying account for external possession and
causer constructions. In general, however, it is external possession that receives
the most attention in the literature.
At the moment I can identify two types of analyses of external possession
constructions. Both types assume that the external u-possessor is some kind of
topic – what they differ in is where the u-possessor is generated: directly in this
topic position, or inside the possessum, raising subsequently to the topic position.
The direct projection analysis is represented by Rivero and Savchenko (2004) who
I follow in this thesis. The raising analysis is represented by scholars such as
Landau (1999) and Strahov (2006).
Strahov (2006) follows Landau’s (1999) analysis of external possession in Hebrew
by assuming that in Russian the u-possessor originates in the specifier of the
possessed DP. Strahov (2006: 63) presents arguments that the u-possessor does
not originate in the specifier of NP: namely, the u-possessor can co-occur with
prenominal possessives which, according to Babyonyshev (1997), originate in













‘Dima broke grandfather’s glasses on Ira.’ Strahov (2006: 63)
The possessum ocˇki ‘glasses’ in (20) is simultaneously modified by the adnominal
possessive modifier dedusˇkiny ‘grandfather’s’ expressing the true possessor and the
u-PP expressing a transient possessor. The possibility of co-occurrence of the two
modifiers in (20) suggests, according to Strahov, that they do not compete for the
5I should note here that for me the u-PP in (20) does not have the meaning Strahov assigns
to it. The only interpretation available to me is the locative reading ‘at Ira’s place’. I have not
researched the issue further and ascribe the difference in interpretations to the possible differences
between my and Strahov’s dialects.
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same structural position. From SpecDP, the u-PP moves to a Topic position
driven by the [+Topic] feature. In contrast to the Dative external possessor that is
dependent on the verbal predicate for case, the u-possessor receives its case
directly from the preposition and thus enjoys greater structural freedom.6 A
raising analysis of external possession has to account for binding of multiple DPs
of the type observed in (14); furthermore, it is unclear how a raising analysis
would explain how external u-possessors can raise out of subjects. Strahov’s
(2006) analysis of external possession is reminiscent of Jung’s (2011) treatment of
be-possessives. Note that Jung herself, however, does not extend her PP/XP
structure to these constructions, proposing instead that the u-PP in external
possession is introduced by a high applicative, in the sense of Pylkka¨nen (2002).7
This is a non-raising type of analysis, similar to what is proposed below.
In a study of anticausative constructions with external possessors, Rivero and
Savchenko (2003) propose that external u-possessors are constructed as semantic
topics, introduced by a high Applicative predicate. The authors further assume
that the u-PP can be interpreted either as the possessor or as the causer, as
indicated in the translations in (21-a). The structure for the two interpretations is






















6Strahov assumes that the Dative external possessor moves to SpecVP which explains why it
cannot scope over subjects.
7Jung does not discuss external possession at much length.
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The external possession interpretation in (21) is achieved by the u-PP binding an
empty possessor θ-role within the clause-internal NP. For a Causer interpretation,
the u-PP binds the implicit (semantic) Causer argument in the CauseP
projection.8 I follow Rivero and Savchenko (2004) in the non-raising analysis for
external possession constructions – namely, I claim that Rivero and Savchenko’s






























tj vyigral . . .
In (22) the whole TP complement is constructed as the possessum of the u-PP,
i.e. the complement of the Anchor predicate. Particular clause-internal DPs come
to be interpreted as possessums of the u-PP when the latter binds a relational
variable inside those DPs: this relational possessor variable has been argued for in
Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992) and assumed in Rivero and Savchenko (2004)
and Paykin and Van Peteghem (2003). The binding between the u-PP and the
relational variable brings forth the adnominal possession ‘feel’ of the construction.
A non-raising analysis of external possession allows us to associate the u-PP with
multiple DPs in its scope and not run the risk of Left-branch extraction when
subjects are interpreted as possessums.
Rivero and Savchenko assume that external u-possessors are quirky subjects and
situate them in SpecTP; I assume that the complement of the Anchor predicate is
the TP, which means that the u-PP is higher than the traditionally assumed
subject position in SpecTP. One of the reasons for me to do so is the inability of
the external u-possessor to bind reflexives. Rivero and Savchenko observe that
8I cannot discern the causer reading that the authors claim to be present in (21). The only
reading available to me is that of possession.
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‘Gosˇa likes his house very much.’ Rivero and Savchenko (2004:8)
For Rivero and Savchenko, who situate external u-possessors in SpecTP, the
ungrammatical reflexive in (23-a) is a problem: they have to explain why u-PPs
cannot bind reflexives, while Dative quirky subjects can, as shown in (23-b). The
account they provide employs the assumed idiosyncrasies of the semantic
Causer-argument that is involved in external possession constructions and cannot
act as a syntactic binder (see Rivero and Savchenko 2004 for further details).
Once we assume that the u-PP is situated beyond TP, as in (22-b), no
reflexive-binding is expected.
Positing AnchorP under CP for external u-possessors is motivated by the fact that




























‘I told him that my son got sick.’
The structure in (22-b) is also assumed for u-Causers; in (25) the u-PP is
introduced by the Anchor predicate and takes the whole clause as its possessum.
The Causer construction differs from external possession constructions in that











‘He makes fifth-graders read Tolstoy.’
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cˇitajut . . .
Speaking in cognitive terms discussed in Chapter 5, the u-PP has c-control over
the situtation described by the clausal complement – hence Causer semantics.
My analysis of external possession makes clause-internal possessums that are
found in these constructions more or less an ‘accident’. What the Anchor
predicate takes as possessum is actually the whole clausal complement; if the
clause happens to contain a DP with an unbound R-variable, that DP comes to be
interpreted as the possessum. A Causer construction arises when there is no
binding relation between the u-PP and a clause-internal DP.
7.2.1 External possession and be-sentences
Paykin and van Peteghem (2003) observe that be-sentences with external









a. ‘Her coat is warm.’
b. ‘She has a warm coat.’ Paykin and Van Peteghem (2003:332)
The authors provide two possible interpretations in (26-a) and (26-b) and explain
the differences in terms of information structure. (26-a) is an external possession
construction: here the adjective is the predicate at the clause level, and the u-PP
is a semantic modifier of the possessum NP – the topic of the sentence includes
both the possessor and the possessum. Alternatively, the sentence can be
interpreted as a be-possessive as in (26-b): here the u-PP is the topic of the
sentence, whereas both the adjective and the possessum are the focus. For the
external possession interpretation in (26-a) to be possible, the adjective must be
emphasized intonationally. A more natural word order for this interpretation



















In my analysis I assume two different structural configurations for the two
interpretations in (26). The be-possessive interpretation in (26-b) has the copular






In (28) the Anchor phrase merges directly to the modified NP. For the external
possession interpretation in (26-a) and (27) the structure is the same as proposed





. . .R . . .
Pred′
Pred AP
The Anchor phrase is merged to a TP projected by a small clause; the u-PP acts
as an external possessor for the DP projected in the subject position of the small
clause of which the adjective is the predicate. (29) states that in the region of
control of the Anchor element the given predication relation takes place. The
structures in (28) and (29) correspond to Paykin and Van Peteghem’s descriptions
of topic-focus relations.
The diagnostics that can be used to distinguish between the two structures are the
use of short adjectives and strong quantifiers. In Chapter 5 I use Babby’s (2010)
analysis of Russian short adjectives as small-clause predicates to motivate the
compact structure for copular property be-possessives in (28): the
ungrammaticality of short adjectives in these be-possessives indicates that there is
no space for a small-clause predicate. In external possession constructions,










Chapter 7. Related constructions with u-PPs















‘As you can see, both of my ears are intact.’
In addition, the possessum that has the status of an {e}-type DP in external
possession constructions, can be modified by a strong quantifier like oba ‘both’, as
shown in (30-b). In Chapter 5 I demonstrate that the {e, t}-type of NP
possessums in copular property be-possessives results in the ungrammaticality of
strong quantifiers.
Copular be-sentences with external possessors also seem to allow the emphatic use
















































‘Well, they are blue.’ (own examples)
In contrast to copular property be-possessives, copular be-sentences with external
u-possessors do contain a Pred which can then be spelled out as jest’ under
emphasis. Tense coordination, where T may be spelled out as jest’ in copular

















‘Her hair has always been and will be thick.’
In this section I presented an analysis of external u-possessors and u-causers,
showing how the AnchorP predicate can be employed in these constructions as
well. I also provided some diagnostics for distinguishing between be-possessives




The construction to be discussed in this section is mentioned already in Mra´zek
and Brym (1962), but has been ignored in generative research, as far as I know.











‘The strong one always holds the weak one as guilty.’ Mra´zek and Brym
(1962, 101), cited from Cienki (1995)
(33) describes a point of view of some individual (expressed by the u-PP).9
Boguslavskij (1996) states that the u-PP in these constructions has a
‘world-creating’ function (miroporozˇdajusˇcˇaja funkcija): the u-PP provides the
world within whose boundaries the opinion is true. In this thesis I use
Boguslavskij’s term when referring to these constructions. A world-creating u-PP













































‘How come according to you all good books must necessarily end
badly?’ Goritskaya (2007)
(34-b) shows that the u-PP can also refer to the speaker himself: here the speaker
is aware of the erroneous nature of his belief about the general goodness of people.
Goritskaya (2007: 137), writing within the framework of functional grammar,
provides some characteristics for constructions with world-creating u-PPs. In
particular, statements with world-creating u-PPs are mainly generalizations and
thus often display universal quantifiers, such as ves’ ‘all’, vs’akij ‘any’, kazˇdyj
‘every’, vsegda ‘always’ – see the examples above.
9Cienki (1995: 96) describes the referential meaning in (33) as peripheral to the category of
possession, ‘bordering on the pragmatic’.
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The ‘point-of-view’ nature of the clausal complements is achieved by the use of
evaluative or epistemic/deontic components. The evaluative lexemes in the
previous examples are vinovat ‘guilty’, duraki ‘fools’, xorosˇije ‘good’. (34-c) also
contains a deontic modal that is used to describe a desired situation; compare















‘According to you, all good books end badly.’
The u-PP in (35) cannot have a world-creating interpretation, presumably due to
the absence of deontic modality or evaluation in the main predication.10
Strictly speaking, it is not the u-PP itself in these constructions that should be
called world-creating: universal quantifiers and modals ‘create’ a world, whereas
the u-PP delineates the boundaries of this world. I suggest that the














Some evidence showing that the analysis may be on the right track comes from
the impossibility of embedding and reflexive-binding. (37) demonstrates that a
world-creating construction cannot be embedded:
(37) *Ja duma-ju, cˇto u tebja vs-e durak-i.
I.nom think:prs-1sg that at you.gen all-nom fool.m-nom.pl
‘I think that according to you, everybody is a fool.’
A complementizer like cˇto presumably takes TP-complements, whereas the
Anchor predicate introducing a world-creating u-PP takes a proposition CP as its
complement; as a result, embedding of the type in (37) cannot be derived.
10The u-PP in (35) is rather interpreted as the author of the books: the good subset of this
author’s books end badly.
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‘According to you, all of your pupils are lazy.’
The ungrammaticality of reflexive-binding in (38) is supposedly due to the size of
the complement of the Anchor predicate.
At the moment I cannot offer more on these constructions. Hopefully, this section
motivates further research into world-creating u-PPs. In my analysis these
constructions represent the biggest structural complement that an Anchor
predicate can take.
7.4 Modal possessive constructions
The u-PP with its possessive meaning is also used in constructions that I refer to
as modal possessives, following Livitz (to appear). The construction contains an


























‘I have something with which you can repair the bike.’ Sˇimı´k (2011:
203)
The sentences in (39) are possessive, the infinitival clauses describe a possessum
with regard to its function: something to read, something to repair the bike with.
Modal possessive constructions (MPCs) of the type in (39) exist side by side in










‘There is something for Masˇa to read.’ Livitz (to appear: 2)
The MEC in (40) also involves existential byt’ ‘be’ and an infinitive with a
wh-word; instead of an u-PP a Dative DP is used here. A detailed analysis of
MECs cross-linguistically (including Russian) is provided in Sˇimı´k (2011).
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Livitz (to appear) compares MPCs and MECs with regard to their syntactic and
semantic properties. The two constructions differ in what their ‘possessor’
arguments can do. First of all, the option of having different referents for the














‘Masˇa has something for Vera to wear.’
b. *Masˇ-e jest’ cˇto Ver-e nade-t’.
Masˇa-dat be.prs what.acc Vera-dat wear-inf
Livitz (to appear: 3)
The MPC in (41-a) asserts the existence of a garment in Masˇa’s possession that
Vera can wear; the MEC does not allow such disjoint reference. Furthermore, the

























Livitz (to appear: 3)
Finally, the MEC Dative can be expressed by a wh-word, as illustrated in (43-a).




















‘One can wash floors at someone’s place.’
‘*There is someone to wash the floors.’ Livitz (to appear: 16)
Livitz demonstrates that an MPC interpretation is not available in (43-b); the
u-PP here can only be understood as the locative phrase ‘at someone’s place’ and
the construction is in fact a MEC. Livitz states that the differences in (41)-(43)
can be accounted for by positing that in MECs the Dative argument raises from
within the infinitival complement of the existential predicate, whereas the u-PP in
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MPCs is introduced in PossP intervening between the existential and the
infinitive. In her view of possession Livitz (to appear) follows Szabolcsi (1994) and
Jung (2008), assuming a predicative relation between the possessor and the
possessum, the former constructed as the subject of the predication. Note that
Jung (2008) also includes MPCs into her analysis:


























The derivation after the representation in (44-b) is presumably the same as in the
be-possessive: the infinitive (either the n’ -level or just the CP) moves to
SpecLowFocP above be, after which the PP/DP would be able to remnant-move
to the subject position. Livitz adopts Jung’s proposal but construes the u-PP as a
constituent to the exclusion of the possessum, introduced by the Poss predicate, as
illustrated in (45):











‘I have something to read.’
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cˇtoj PRO pocˇitat’ tj
The Poss predicate in Livitz’s analysis relates the possessor to the possessum,
similar to my Anchor projection. Livitz (p.9), however, ties the Poss predicate to
the existential predicate, which is reminiscent of Chvany’s (1975) analysis. In
Chapters 4 and 5 I show that possessive semantics should be derivable
independent of an existential predicate.
I suggest that Livitz’s structure can be accommodated to my analysis once the
possessor-introducing predicate is merged above the existential – similar to the






The structure in (46) asserts the existence in someone’s possession of an entity
described by the infinitival complement. On the internal structure of the
infinitival complement see Livitz (to appear) and Sˇimı´k (2011); here I am
concerned with the material outside of the infinitive.
The association of PossP with existential byt’ in Livitz’s (to appear) analysis
forces her to distinguish between u-PPs in (existential) be-possessives and MPCs
on the one hand and u-PPs in external possession constructions on the other
hand: in Footnote 7 the author notes that external possessors occur with a variety
of predicates and do not require an existential predicate. Livitz observes that
possessive u-PPs in existentials differ from external u-possessors with regard to
11A similar proposal for Russian MPCs is made in Sˇimı´k (2011: 203).
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‘Your pen broke when I had it on me.’ Livitz (to appear: 11)
In my analysis, where all of the u-PPs in (47) are introduced by the Anchor
predicate, the binding differences are derived structurally. In (47-a) and (47-b) the
u-PPs and the reflexives are situated within one clause (the matrix clause in the
case of the MPC in (47-b)), that is why binding is possible. In (47-c), however,
the u-PP is projected above TP, too high to bind the reflexive that needs a local
binder within the TP.
Where Livitz’s analysis may at first glance seem to have the upper hand is in the
explanation of negation in MPCs. Livitz (to appear) notes that MPCs resist


















































‘I have no one to call.’
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‘I have no one to talk to.’ Livitz (to appear: 19)
Existing analyses of the ne-wh item in MECs require a locality of the negated
existential and the wh-item. Kondrashova and Sˇimı´k (to appear) observe that in
the present tense MECs negation is not expressed by the net-form as in the simple
existential sentences, but as a ne-wh item, as illustrated in (48-b). Kondrashova
and Sˇimı´k analyze negated be in MECs as a Sportiche-style quantificational
determiner; this determiner must be in a local configuration with the wh-element
for the latter to raise to combine with the determiner semantically – the complex
is spelled out as a ne-wh item. Babby (2000) presents a slightly different
approach, arguing for a separate negated existential verb, but he also posits a
locality requirement on the verb and the wh-element. With the locality-based
analyses of ne-wh in mind (specifically Babby 2000), Livitz notes that in MPCs
ne-wh items are not characterized by sturdy grammaticality, as in (49-c) and
(49-d).12 Livitz ascribes the incompatibility of (49-c) and (49-d) with the
possessive interpretation of the u-PPs to the fact that if PossP is present in the
structure, it would intervene between the negated be and the wh-item. Livitz
claims that her analysis is supported by the fact that when overt byt’ ‘be’
separates the negation and the wh-item (such that there is no requirement for a

















































‘She didn’t understand death, she didn’t have anyone who could die.’
(Ruscorpora)
12I agree with Livitz that what makes these examples marginally acceptable is the locative
interpretation of the u-PP resulting in the overall reading that at the speaker’s place/house there
is no one who can be phoned or spoken to. If there is any control configuration in these examples,
then it is non-obligatory control, where PRO gets an arbitrary ‘one’-interpretation that can refer
to anyone in principle, including the referent of the u-PP.
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Here I wish to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that ne-wh items sound











































‘She had no one (no family) who could die.’ (own example,
paraphrase of (50-c))
In (51-a) the referent of the u-PP is the manager of a medical factory and lacks
workers who could wash the containers; I suggest that the interpretation of the
u-PP here is possessive, but of course one could claim that the u-PP should be
understood locatively to refer to the factory. (51-b) is a little more clear in this
respect: here the u-PP ‘at governor’ co-occurs with the locative v dome ‘in the
house’. If the u-PP were to be understood locatively, this would result in a
tautological statement of the type ‘In the governor’s house there is no one who
can clean the house’; the presence of the overt locative v dome in (51-b) supports
the possessor interpretation of the u-PP. (51-c) is my paraphrase of (50-c) and the
two sentences are characterized by the same degree of grammaticality. Livitz, who
ascribes the unavailability of possessive interpretation in (49) to an intervention
effect that PossP would create for the spell-out of a ne-wh item, would have to
explain why such intervention does not occur in (51). In view of the grammatical
examples in (51) I propose a different explanation for the data in (49). It may be
that with regard to the possibility of negation in (48) and (49) we are dealing with
structure competition: the negations of these two constructions have
(pragmatically) the same meaning and the Dative MEC ‘wins’ – as the more
economical option, perhaps. The disjoint reference of the oblique argument and
the subject of the infinitive is exactly where MPCs differ from MECs – and this is
where ne-wh items are allowed. I spell out the proposal below.
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According to Livitz (to appear), there is an interpretive difference between MECs
and MPCs in that MECs assert the existence of a possibility, whereas MPCs
assert the existence of an entity in the real world. Livitz demonstrates the




















‘I have things that I can invent.’ Livitz (to appear: 25)
The example in (52-a) can be uttered by an inventor who thinks that there is still
room (and necessity) in the world for new inventions. In this same context (52-b)
is ungrammatical, because the construction presumably asserts the existence of an
entity in the real world, whereas the verb izobresti ‘invent’ implies that the entity
does not exist yet. This is a difference illustrated for affirmative sentences. My
hunch is that when negated, however, the two constructions have the same
meaning: non-existence of an entity in the real world equals non-existence of some
possibility or other that might be related to that entity. Considering that the
negated meaning is the same, it is the MEC that ‘wins over’, perhaps because it is
a more economical one with regard to involving raising of one element, and not
control, a relation that involves two elements. The only area where an MPC can
do what a MEC cannot is the possibility for a non-coreferential subject in the
infinitive, which is why examples like (51) surface. More research into this
question is necessary. The ne-wh evidence Livitz refers to to argue for the low
position of PossP is inconclusive and can be ascribed to other factors, rather than
the intervention of PossP.
Lastly, I would like to discuss a type of an existential sentence that has already





















‘But you have Lena!’ Arutjunova and Sˇirjaev (1983, 24)
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(53-a) is an example of an existential be-sentence with a Theme that is expressed
by a proper name; (53-b) is an existential be-possessive with an R-expression
Theme. In Chapter 5 I described the interpretation of such existential sentences in
the following way: the definite Themes are re-introduced into the discourse by
virtue of some relevant property or function, the way they can be useful. This
interpretation is reminiscent of MPCs where the infinitival complement describes
a function of some entity and perhaps the analysis proposed for MPCs may be







The definite Theme here is projected in some high position, e.g. where the
wh-word usually is in modal possessives. The rest of the structure – the function
of the referent – is left unexpressed.13
7.5 Multiple u-PPs and co-occurring Anchors
In this chapter I have added to the discussion more constructions whose analysis
also involves the Anchor predicate: syntactic phrases of different size have been
shown to be taken as complements by this predicate. It thus seems that the
approach predicts prodigious co-occurrence of Anchor projections in one
construction. In reality, however, the co-occurrence possibilities are restricted by
the combinatorial properties of syntactic phrases and mutually exclusive
derivational choices. For instance, an u-causer is not expected to be found with
existential statements, event nominals, property possessives, temporary
possessives, etc. – everything that cannot be ‘caused’. Derivations resulting in an
existential be-possessive and in a temporary copular be-possessive exclude each
other from the beginning with regard to the semantic type and categorial status of
the Theme and the nature of the predicates involved.
13The ungrammaticality of the verb imet’ ‘have’ in constructions similar to (53) would then
correlate with the ungrammaticality of this verb with MPCs in Russian, and both phenomena
could be attributed to the inability of the verb to take CP-complements.
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The combinations that are expected should involve one Anchor phrase that takes
a big complement, such as TP or CP – because all constructions, independent of
their semantics and event-type, develop into a TP/CP. Among the constructions
considered here the u-PPs that take TP/CP-size complements are external
u-possessors, world-creating u-PPs and also u-PPs in MPCs (that involve
embedded CPs). The prevalent option among the examples I have gathered is
where one of the u-PPs is an external u-possessor. In (55-a) we observe an
external u-possessor u menja and an u-possessor of the existential be-possessive;
























‘My grandma has a cat.’
(55-a) belongs to the colloquial register. (55-b) has almost the same meaning,
with adnominal possession mojej ‘my.gen’ indicating more discourse salience of
the noun babusˇki ‘grandmother.gen’. There is a slight difference in discourse
properties between the two examples. In (55-a) the grandmother has not been
introduced into the discourse at a previous point in the conversation, there is thus
a need to introduce her by the u-PP referring to the speaker, who is more salient.











The first Anchor projection introducing the u-PP u babusˇki takes V∃P as its
complement, which results in a permanent possession interpretation; the
u-possessor may raise to provide a subject for the verbal event, as indicated in
(56-a). The second Anchor projection introducing the u-PP u menja takes the TP
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as its complement; the u-PP receives an external possession interpretation from
the binding of the relational variable R inside the DP babusˇki.
(57-a) presents another be-possessive type where an external u-possessor can
























‘My child has orthopedic problems.’
Here the base is a copular property be-possessive whose possessor argument lacks










Be-possessives with event possessums demonstrate that an external u-possessor





















‘Alecˇka’s child has a matinee in the kindergarten today.’ (Ruscorpora)
The structure for (59) differs from (58) in the size of the complement for the lower
Anchor predicate: for event possessives I assume the complement to be nP, as
hypothesized in Chapter 5.
There are also examples with two external possessors:
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‘My mother has an acquantaince who tutors, I can ask today.’
(Ruscorpora)
In both examples in (60) the higher u-PP is the external possessor of the lower
u-PP, the latter is the external possessor for a clause-internal DP: the Accusative
syna ‘son’ in (60-a) or the Nominative znakomaja ‘acquaintance’ in (60-b). The
higher u-PP is the most discourse-salient entity in (60). I assume that structures












There are two variable-binding relations in these structures: the u-PP introduced
by the higher Anchor binds the R variable in the u-PP introduced by the lower
Anchor; the lower u-PP, in turn, binds the R variable in the clause-internal DP.
In all of the examples above the lower u-PP is the highest argument in the
complement of the higher u-PP. We also expect examples with the general
configuration in (62), where the complement of (the higher) external possession
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The lower u-PP in such examples would have to be a middle-field external
possessor, an ablative u-PP or a small-clause predicate (as in temporary



























































‘Petya has my car. He borrowed it for a couple of days.’ (own
examples)
The option where an external u-possessor co-occurs with a temporary possessor
does not seem to be available, as shown in (63-c). I do not have an account for the
ungrammaticality of (63-c). As it is now, the unavailability of a pattern like (63-c)
can be used as an argument in favor of DP-internal analysis of possession
relations, in the manner of Jung (2011).
As for world-creating u-PPs and MPC u-PPs, I have not found any examples
containing them as the higher u-PP. When it comes to world-creating u-PPs,
there are specific restrictions on the properties of the clausal complement: as
discussed in section 7.3, the clause must contain modal and/or evaluative elements
in the main predication. Copular property possessives satisfy these restrictions, in







































Chapter 7. Related constructions with u-PPs
‘According to you, all good books must have a bad ending.’ (own
examples)
The intended meaning in (64-a) finds a grammatical expression in (64-b), where
the holder of the opinion is referred to by po-PP. More understanding of the
properties of world-creating u-PP constructions is needed.
As for MPC u-PPs, the restrictions come from the infinitival complement. The
predicate in the complement must be a lexical predicate that can host PRO. An
u-PP that we expect to find in the infinitival complement must not be higher than
PRO, because a control configuration in general prohibits any arguments
c-commanding PRO in the infinitive – this means that external u-possessors and
u-causers are ruled out, as they take TP complements. This narrows the u-PP
candidacy down to middle-field u-possessors and ablative u-PPs. A middle-field
































‘Kolya has something what to steal from Petya.’ (own examples)
An example of an ablative u-PP in an MPC is not immediately available, cf. the
ungrammatical example in (65-b). It may be that such examples are in principle
ruled out due to a clash in meaning between the matrix clause and the infinitival
clause. The ablative use of u-PPs generally describes removal of possession, such
that the infinitival clause in (65-b) describes something that is currently in Petya’s
possession, while the matrix clause states that that object is in possession of
Kolya.14 A middle-field u-possessor is thus the only Anchor-introduced u-PP that
my analysis predicts to be able to co-occur with the matrix u-PP in MPCs, as













‘There is something that Kolya can steal from Petya.’
The contrast in grammaticality between (i) and (65-b) is in keeping with Livitz’s (to appear) claims
about the interpretations of MECs and MPCs (possibility as opposed to assertion of existence in
the real world).
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illustrated in (65-a).
I distinguish co-occurring Anchor projections discussed above from doubling and










































‘All of us have approximately the same ideas about what is good and
what is bad.’
The doubling in (66) is of the phrase-internal nature, as described in Yadroff
(1999) and Strahov (2006). Yadroff (1999) assigns the doubling property to
functional (as opposed to lexical) prepositions to which preposition u in Russian
presumably belongs. Strahov’s (2006) structural analysis of functional
prepositions is that they do not project their own PP structure, but occupy the D
head instead. Prepositional doubling of the type in (66) is seen as the recursion of
the highest maximal projection (Strahov 2006: 82). To the extent that preposition
u can be analyzed as a morphological form, my understanding of the data in (66)
leans towards a spell-out of a dependency on multiple terms of the possessor.




















































‘We, the whole group, have C’s in English.’
15There are, of course, also constructions where one of the u-PPs has a locative meaning. I do
not give examples here, as those are easy to discern.
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In each of the examples in (67) both u-PPs refer to the same individual and
constitute an appositional construction. Heringa (2011) analyzes appositional
constructions as syntactic constituents (to the exclusion of the rest of the clause)
that simultaneously involve coordination-like and subordination-like structures.16
Thus, although we observe double u-PPs in (67), they act as one syntactic
constituent, a single Anchor element for the rest of the clause.
This section has presented some observations and predictions as to the expected
patterns of co-occurring Anchor projections. I have stated that most of the
co-occurrence possibilities are ruled out on independent grounds, such as
structural restrictions and interpretive clashes. On the whole, more data are
needed to verify the analysis.
7.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter I have applied the Anchor-analysis to a range of constructions
employing u-PPs: external possession and involuntary causation constructions,
MPCs and constructions with world-creating u-PPs. Unified treatments for these
constructions have been proposed in non-generative approaches, such as the
cognitive study of Cienki (1995); generative research, however, has proposed
analyses only for subsets of these constructions so far. The analysis proposed in
this thesis applies to these constructions without recourse to complicated
derivations: continuing the line of reasoning from the previous chapters, the
Anchor predicate is assumed to take complements of different size. The dynamicity
of the notion of ‘possessum’ is thus extended even further into the clausal domain.
I also show that whereas at first glance it seems that the analysis has no
predictive power with regard to how many Anchor phrases there can be in one
construction, the attested (and predicted) structural patterns can be derived in
part by analysis-internal assumptions and in part by independent structural and
interpretive restrictions.
16There is an unfortunate terminological coincidence: the first element of an appositional con-
struction is referred to as anchor by Huddleston and Pullum (2002) and Heringa (2011). The




But all I need is a couple of words
and space for a step forward.
Kino, ‘Mesto dlja sˇaga vper’od’
(1989)
This thesis investigates a range of constructions whose common characteristic can
be identified as the expression of possession in the Russian clausal domain. I show
that a rigid universal argument structure for predicative possessives
cross-linguistically is not motivated either typologically, cognitively or formally. In
my analysis of these constructions I argue for a flexible approach to
structure-building that is compatible with the dynamic approach to syntax as
proposed in such works as Epstein (1995), Frampton and Gutmann (2002) and
Zwart (2007).
Here is a chapter-by-chapter summary of the thesis.
Chapter 2 provides a general frame for the thesis. The first part of the chapter
gives an overview of the object of the study – possession in the clausal domain.
The two important points that I wish to emphasize here are: the typology of
predicative possession includes more construction types than what is generally
assumed in generative research at the moment; the proximity requirement in the
pre-theoretic notion of possession can be satisfied by different conceptualization
frames, not only by location. These two points have considerable consequences for
generative analyses of possessive constructions. In particular, one underlying
structure for all predicative possessives cross-linguistically is much harder to
sustain in view of the significant typological diversity and the new understanding
of the proximity requirement. In this part of the chapter I also describe the
predicative possession landscape of Russian that at present consists of three
constructions: the be-possessive, the have-possessive and the anticausative
possessive; furthermore, constructions employing u-PPs with a varying degree of
possessive meaning are also discussed. The second part of the thesis introduces
the formal part of the frame. I claim that a dynamic approach to syntax is more
in the spirit of the Minimalist program as it employs the local configuration to
drive the derivation; I discuss a number of works, such as Epstein (1995) and
Zwart (2006b, 2007) who provide dynamic explanations of various syntactic
phenomena. Global structural considerations that lie in the base of the
cartographic approach to syntax are unnecessary complications to the theory.
Chapter 3 is a descriptive chapter providing an overview of the basic properties of
the Russian be-possessive – the main means of expressing predicative possession in
the language. I discuss the criteria that should be satisfied by a construction in
order to be called a be-possessive: in particular, a relation of possession should be
taking place between the u-PP and the Nominative noun phrase. This criterion
allows one to set aside as irrelevant some of the examples that have surfaced in
the discussion of be-possessives, such as phrases meaning ‘at X’s place’. I single
out several structural types of be-possessives: existential, copular temporary and
copular property. I show that the constructions differ with regard to the nature of
the possessum nominal, binding possibilities, subjecthood and behavior of the
verb byt’ ‘be’. I conclude the chapter by stating that all of the diverse properties
should be derivable in an analysis of these constructions.
In Chapter 4 I review the existing analyses of be-possessives. The transformational
account of Chvany (1975) presents be-possessives as dyadic unaccusatives, where
the possessor and the possessum are arguments of the lexical existential predicate.
The analysis accounts for many properties of be-possessives and provides a lot of
insight into the syntax of these constructions; however, the obligatory association
of possessive u-PPs with the existential predicate turns out to be the weakness of
the analysis. Next I consider the minimalist analyses of Harves (2003), Dyakonova
(2007) and Jung (2011). Harves (2003) provides a syntactic account of the
phenomenon of unaccusativity in Russian and argues that all PPs occurring in
be-sentences are unaccusative predicates; Harves takes the model of
Den Dikken (1995) as the base of her analysis. I show that Harves’s claims are
based on an overgeneralization of the distribution of GenNeg. Another analysis
based on Den Dikken (1995) is offered by Dyakonova (2007) who proposes that
the possessor interpretation in all three types of predicative possessives in Russian
is introduced by an applicative head, in the sense of Pylkka¨nen (2002). Jung
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(2011) develops another analytical direction – the model of Kayne (1993), where
the possessor and the possessum are projected in a small-clause configuration
c-commanded by a prepositional complementizer. Neither Dyakonova’s nor Jung’s
analyses can deal with copular temporary be-possessives. All of the minimalist
analyses considered in this chapter depend on re-ordering operations; thus the
benefit of economy of representation that is achieved by having one underlying
structure for a variety of be-possessives is diminished by the amount of operations
(head-incorporations, remnant movements) that are necessary in order to derive
the attested word orders. I conclude that none of the analyses can properly
account for the properties of be-possessives described in Chapter 3.
I combine the observations about the nature and typology of possession spelled
out in Chapter 2 and the observations of the syntactic properties of Russian
be-possessives offered in Chapter 3 to propose my own analysis of these
constructions in Chapter 5. I adhere to a composite understanding of possession
where the parameter of proximity is supplemented by the parameter of c-control.
I also use the insights from cognitive linguistics that provides some useful imagery
for the understanding of the possession relation in the locational possessive
strategy. I propose that in the Russian be-possessive the duality of possessors is
encoded in the nature of the possessor-introducing predicate, Anchor. The
predicate is based on the locational cognitive frame, but at the same time caters
for the prominent status of the possessor. The different types of be-possessives
identified earlier in the thesis are derived by the different merging possibilities
available to the Anchor phrase. In the existential be-possessive the Anchor phrase
merges to the existential statement that contains an NP Theme, turning the
whole phrase into its possessum. In the copular property possessive the Anchor
phrase takes an NP complement directly (or an nP complement, in the case of
event possessums). In the copular temporary possessive the Anchor phrase is
constructed as a small-clause predicate.
A separate chapter, Chapter 6, is dedicated to the discussion of Russian
have-possessives: the transitive have-possessive and the anticausative possessive
that employs an u-PP. I refer to the typological evidence and the understanding of
the notion of possession presented in Chapter 2 to argue that the have-possessive
has a syntactic structure different from that of the be-possessive. I also refer to
works where the P-to-BE incorporation analysis of have has been criticized from a
minimalist point of view (B laszczak 2007b). I then proceed to posit a vP
structure for the Russian have-possessive; the anticausative possessive is derived
by the merging of the Anchor phrase to the have-base.
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The Anchor phrase is further exploited in Chapter 7 in the analysis of
constructions employing the u-PP with a general meaning of possession. These
are external possession and involuntary causer constructions, constructions with
world-creating u-PPs and modal possessive constructions. I propose that
constructions where the u-PP can be interpreted as an external possession or an
involuntary causer share the general structural configuration: the Anchor phrase
introducing the u-PP is merged to a TP phrase. In both of these constructions the
u-PP serves as a reference point for an event; the difference is in whether the u-PP
binds a relational possessor variable within a clause-internal DP. The TP-size of
the complement is motivated by binding data and embeddability of these
constructions. World-creating constructions present an interesting application of
the u-phrase, not previously discussed in generative literature. I propose that the
Anchor phrase takes a propositional CP-complement, with the u-PP delineating
the boundaries of a hypothetical world. Modal possessive constructions are given
the same analysis as the existential be-possessive, with the sole difference that the
existential predicate takes a CP complement. I also discuss co-occurrence
possibilities of Anchor phrases in one utterance. I show that the attested and
predicted structural patterns can be derived in part by analysis-internal
assumptions and in part by independent structural and interpretive restrictions.
The biggest part of the thesis is dedicated to predicative possession in Russian,
the be-possessive in particular – the discussion of this construction is spread along
three chapters. I hope that at least the descriptive account of the basic properties
of be-possessives in Chapter 3 and the review of the existing analyses in Chapter 4
would be beneficial to a reader interested in predicative possession, regardless of
whether my own understanding of the situation presented in Chapter 5 has the
same effect.
Although I support the dynamic approach to syntax, my analysis still involves
some degree of cartography: as I argue for a particular structural configuration, I
refer to syntactic processes whose analyses still refer to such notions as syntactic
position. The core of the analysis, however, has a dynamic principle. As soon as
the various syntactic phenomena that I employ for evidence also receive dynamic
accounts, my analysis of Russian u-possessors can easily be fitted into the overall
system of grammar.
In this investigation I had to steer through many cases of misanalysis, hasty
assumptions and circular reasoning – my own and others’. In this book I hope to
have presented a clear picture of what is going on with all (or, rather, most of)
those u-PPs. I started from disentangling the story of the existential be-possessive
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and ended up contemplating the coils of modal possessives. At the very least this
book can be seen as a coherent classification of the data. At its most, the book
provides an adequate analysis for the observed phenomena and supports the
dynamic approach to syntax.
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Sammenvatting
Deze dissertatie is een studie van verschillende constructies in het Russisch die we
onder de noemer ‘predicatieve possessiva’ kunnen scharen. In deze context kunnen
we in het Russisch drie typen constructie onderscheiden: possessiva uitgedrukt
met ‘zijn’ (be-possessiva), possessiva uitgedrukt met ‘hebben’ (have-possessiva) en
de anti-causatieve possessief. Daarnaast wordt ook aandacht besteed aan
constructies met u-PPs die diverse graden van de possessieve betekenis kunnen
duiden, zoals constructies met een externe bezitter en een onvrijwillige
veroorzaker, constructies met wereld-cree¨rende u-PPs en modale possessiva.
De typologie van predicatieve possessiva omvat meer typen constructies dan dat er
op dit moment meestal wordt aangenomen in generatief taalkundig onderzoek.
Daarnaast kan vastgesteld worden dat de zogenaamde ‘proximiteitsvoorwaarde’
(i.e. de veronderstelde nabijheid van het possessum en de possessor) die van
toepassing is op de pre-theoretische notie van bezit, ingevuld kan worden door
meer soorten kaders dan locatie alleen. Deze twee observaties hebben grote
gevolgen voor de generatieve benaderingen van possessiva. Immers, als we de
aanzienlijke typologische diversiteit en ons nieuwe begrip van de
proximiteitsvoorwaarde in acht nemen, is het idee van e´e´n onderliggende structuur
voor alle predicatieve possessiva een stuk minder aantrekkelijk. In mijn analyse
van possessiva pleit ik daarom voor een flexibele benadering van het opbouwen
van structuur. Deze is verenigbaar met de dynamische benadering van syntaxis die
alleen betrekking heeft op de lokale (en niet de globale) configuratie, zoals wordt
voorgesteld in Epstein (1995), Frampton and Gutmann (2002) en Zwart (2007).
Het grootste gedeelte van dit proefschrift is gewijd aan de beschrijving van
predicatieve possessiva in het Russisch, met name de be-possessiva, waarvan de
bespreking zich uitstrekt over drie hoofdstukken. Hoewel ik beoog dat op zijn
minst de descriptieve benadering van de basale eigenschappen van be-possessieva
in hoofdstuk 3 en de kritische beschouwing van de bestaande analyses in
hoofdstuk 4 van waarde zijn voor de lezer die ge¨ınteresseerd is in de predicatieve
possessief, hoop ik dat de analyse die ik voorstel in 5 hetzelfde effect zal hebben.
Hierin bestudeer ik bepaalde structurele varianten van de be-possessief in het
bijzonder (de existentie¨le, de temporele copula en de eigenschap-copula
possessief). Ik laat zien dat deze varianten verschillen wat betreft de aard van het
nomen van het possessum, de bindingsmogelijkheden, de mogelijkheid om als
subject te fungeren en het gedrag van het werkwoord byt’ (‘zijn’) – deze
verschillen vormen een probleem voor analyses waarin beoogd wordt om
be-possessiva af te leiden uit e´e´n onderliggende structuur.
In mijn analyse streef ik naar een hybride begrip van de bezitsrelatie, waarbij de
parameter van proximiteit wordt aangevuld door de parameter van c-controle.
Hiernaast maak ik ook gebruik van ideee¨n uit de cognitieve lingu¨ıstiek, die
inzichtelijke beeldspraak verschaffen voor het begrijpen van de bezitsrelatie in de
locatieve possessieve strategie. Ik stel voor dat de dualiteit van possessors in de
Russische be-possessief besloten ligt in de aard van het predicaat dat de possessor
introduceert: het Anker. Het predikaat vindt zijn basis in het locatieve cognitieve
frame, en draagt tegelijk bij aan de prominente status van de possessor. De
verschillende typen be-possessiva kunnen vervolgens worden afgeleid uit de
verschillende manieren waarop het Anker kan worden gemerged. In geval van de
existentie¨le be-possessief, wordt het Anker gemerged met een existentie¨le uitspraak
die een NP Theme bevat, hetgeen de gehele frase verandert naar zijn possessum.
Voor de eigenschap-copula possessief geldt dat het Anker direct een NP als
complement neemt (of een nP-complement, zoals in het geval van een
event-possessum). Tenslotte wordt het Anker van een temporele copula possessief
geconstrueerd als predikaat van een small clause.
De have-possessiva worden apart in hoofdstuk 6 besproken: de transitieve
have-possessief, en de anti-causatieve possessief waarin gebruik wordt gemaakt
van een u-PP. Ik maak gebruik van typologische, cognitieve en formele
argumenten in een pleidooi voor een differentie¨rende analyse van de
have-possessief. Hierin wordt een vP structuur geponeerd, i.e. de anti-causatieve
possessief wordt afgeleid uit de merger van het Anker en have in zijn basispositie.
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt de notie Anker verder ingezet in de analyse van constructies
met een u-PP die een meer algemene bezitsrelatie uitdrukken. Voor constructies
waarin de u-PP ge¨ınterpreteerd kan worden als externe possessor of een
onvrijwillige veroorzaker, stel ik een algemene uniforme structuur voor. In deze
gevallen wordt het Anker dat de u-PP introduceert, gemerged met een TP. In
beide constructietypen dient de u-PP als referentiepunt voor een gebeurtenis; het
verschil ligt in het wel of niet binden van een relationele possessor variabele
binnen een zinsinterne DP door de u-PP. De omvang van de TP in het
complement wordt onafhankelijk gemotiveerd door bindingsdata en in hoeverre
deze constructies ingebed kunnen worden. Wereld-cree¨rende constructies vormen
een interessante toepassing van de u-frase, die nog niet eerder aan het licht is
gekomen in de literatuur. Mijn voorstel is dat het Anker in dit geval een
propositioneel CP-complement neemt, waarin de u-PP de grenzen van een
hypothetische wereld afbakent. Modale possessiva kunnen vervolgens op dezelfde
manier benaderd worden als existentie¨le be-possessiva, met als enige verschil dat
het existentie¨le predicaat een CP-complement neemt. Tenslotte bespreek ik ook de
mogelijkheden van het gelijktijdig voorkomen van meerdere Ankers in e´e´n uiting.
Ik laat zien dat de bevestigde en voorspelde structurele patronen ten dele volgen
uit de interne assumpties van mijn analyse, en ten dele uit onafhankelijke
structurele en interpretatieve restricties.
Voor dit onderzoek heb ik een weg gebaand langs vele verkeerde analyses, haastige
aannames en cirkelredeneringen – die van mijzelf en die van anderen.
Desalniettemin hoop ik een duidelijk en zo compleet mogelijk beeld geschetst te
hebben van de Russische u-PP. Wat begon als een poging om de intrigerende
eigenschappen van de existentie¨le be-possessief te ontwarren, eindigde in de
krochten van de modale possessief. Op zijn minst kan dit boek worden beschouwd
als een coherente classificatie van de data. Op zijn best geeft het een adequate
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